--- title: US CENTCOM-linked contractors run third-generation gc_ semi-overt news sites with paid platform ads and diluted disclosures to deliver regional security narratives url: https://propagandaarchive.org/briefs/20260911-0500Z-pentagon-gc-network/ description: Investigations by The Intercept (April 2026) and Lawfare (May 2026) document a network of seven websites (Al-Fassel News, Pishtaz News, Entorno Diario… section: Watch briefs --- ![Illustration: a contemporary investigator's evidence wall of printed social-media posts, network diagrams and a pinned world map, in the same dossier style as the rest of the archive.](https://propagandaarchive.org/static/generated/detail/hero-contemporary-evidence-wall.jpg) [Watch briefs](https://propagandaarchive.org/briefs/) · September 11, 2026 # US CENTCOM-linked contractors run third-generation gc_ semi-overt news sites with paid platform ads and diluted disclosures to deliver regional security narratives - **Filed:** September 11, 2026, 05:00 UTC - **Actor:** US Central Command (CENTCOM) / Department of Defense via contractors including General Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT), continuing the Trans-Regional Web Initiative lineage - **Target:** Regional audiences in the Middle East (Arabic/Farsi), Latin America (Spanish/English), Russian-speaking Ukraine and diaspora, and Indo-Pacific, whose threat perceptions and policy preferences on Iran, China, and security the content is designed to shape - **Source:** Unidentified Source blurred: contractors, cutouts, buried disclosure - **Confidence:** **high** Multiple independent open sources, low disagreement about the facts - **Techniques:** [Disclosure theater](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/disclosure-theater/) [Narrative laundering](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/narrative-laundering/) [Card stacking](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/card-stacking/) [Manufactured consensus](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/manufactured-consensus/) [Flooding the zone](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/flooding-the-zone/) - **Where:** Middle East, Latin America, Ukraine, Indo Pacific, United States - **Channels:** Al-Fassel News, Pishtaz News, Entorno Diario, Kontur Novosti, GlobalWatch, BlueShift News, Focus News websitesX, Meta, and Google paid advertising buyssocial-media accounts without state-media labelsshared Google Tag Manager and codebase with prior CENTCOM propertiesGeneral Dynamics Information Technology contractor infrastructure ## Summary Investigations by The Intercept (April 2026) and Lawfare (May 2026) document a network of seven websites (Al-Fassel News, Pishtaz News, Entorno Diario, Kontur Novosti, GlobalWatch, BlueShift News, Focus News) sharing codebase markers (gc_#/ URLs, version tags), design elements, and Google Tag Manager with earlier CENTCOM/TRWI properties. Contractor General Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT), operator of the original 2008 Trans-Regional Web Initiative, runs verified Google and Meta ads for the sites, generating tens of millions of views on X despite thin organic engagement. Disclosures shifted from explicit CENTCOM sponsorship to generic “publicly funded from the budget of the United States Government” language buried on About pages and absent from social profiles. Content focuses on Iran, China in Latin America, Russian-speaking Ukraine audiences, and Indo-Pacific security, aligning with US strategic priorities. ## Analysis Primary open-source records are Sam Biddle’s Intercept investigation (20 April 2026) identifying Al-Fassel and Pishtaz as US-government-funded outlets with diluted disclosures, and Renée DiResta’s Lawfare analysis (13 May 2026) mapping the broader gc_ network through URL patterns, HTML version tags (gc1_2.7.0 etc.), design reuse, shared Google Tag Manager container GTM-M6PCSRF (also present on earlier CENTCOM-linked Al-Mashareq), and advertising trails. GDIT, the original TRWI contractor, appears as a verified advertiser promoting all seven sites plus the overt CENTCOM Citadel property. View counts on X reached tens of millions (Entorno Diario alone >56 million) while follower counts and organic engagement remained low, consistent with paid promotion rather than organic growth. Meta ad library entries show geographic targeting (Lebanon/Yemen/Egypt for Al-Fassel; Ukrainian oblasts for Kontur) and repeated flags for missing required disclaimers. Mechanism: disclosure-theater is load-bearing—the technical presence of a US-government funding statement is confined to About pages and does not travel with social posts, ad creatives, or search snippets that most users encounter. Narrative-laundering occurs when the content is presented through the institutional form of independent regional newsrooms rather than labeled military public-affairs or PSYOP product. Card-stacking selects frames (Iranian regime vulnerability, Chinese predatory investment, Kremlin aggression) that align with US priorities while omitting or downplaying countervailing local perspectives or US policy costs. Manufactured-consensus and flooding-the-zone are achieved not by bot farms but by commercial ad infrastructure that purchases the appearance of volume and relevance inside platform ranking systems. This is an influence operation and propaganda because the origin is blurred for the ordinary consumer, the institutional surface (regional journalism) is performed, and the design goal is to shape foreign threat perceptions under a quasi-domestic or neutral costume rather than under an explicit US military byline. Technique scoring is actor-agnostic: identical diluted disclosure, contractor-run pseudo-news sites, and paid-distribution models appear in other state and commercial campaigns. Color is gray: the ultimate US-government funding is discoverable by anyone who reads the About page or the contractor ad records, yet the social and search surfaces that deliver the content omit that provenance. Literacy counter: when a previously low-profile regional news site suddenly achieves high view counts on contested security topics while carrying only a buried generic funding statement and no platform state-media label, inspect the About page, ad transparency libraries, shared tracking containers, and codebase or design overlaps with known military properties. Prefer primary government statements, independent local reporting, and named correspondents over volume-optimized contractor content. Demand that funding and sponsorship labels travel with every post and ad creative. Apply the identical disclosure and provenance test to any state’s semi-overt media network—the method does not change with the flag. ## Tells - Buried generic ‘publicly funded from the budget of the United States Government’ language with no CENTCOM or military label on social profiles - Sudden high view counts on thin-follower accounts consistent with paid promotion - Shared Google Tag Manager, design elements, and /gc_#/ URL patterns with prior CENTCOM properties - GDIT or other defense contractors appearing as advertisers for the sites - Content selection tightly aligned with US combatant-command priorities while presented as independent regional journalism ## Literacy counter When a regional news site delivers high-volume security framing with only a buried generic US-government funding note and no platform state-media label, check About pages, ad libraries, tracking containers and design overlaps with known military properties. Prefer primary statements and independent local reporting. Apply the same disclosure test to every state’s semi-overt media network. ## Evidence 1. [The Intercept: These Middle Eastern News Sites Are U.S. Government Propaganda Operations (20 Apr 2026)](https://theintercept.com/2026/04/20/pentagon-middle-eastern-news-propaganda-iran/) 2. [Lawfare: Fewer Bots, More Ads: The Pentagon’s Evolving Online Influence Campaigns (13 May 2026)](https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/fewer-bots--more-ads--the-pentagon-s-evolving-online-influence-campaigns) 3. [DocumentCloud technical analysis accompanying Lawfare report on gc_ network](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28120707-gc-analysis-report/) 4. [Foreign Policy historical context on TRWI / General Dynamics sites (2011)](https://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/21/propagandastan)