---
title: The Active Measures Working Group (1981 to 1992)
url: https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/active-measures-working-group/
description: a part-time U.S. interagency committee, formed in 1981 under the State Department and later run through USIA, collected reports of Soviet forgeries and…
section: Case studies
---

![Illustration: a Cold War intelligence collage of a non-aligned-movement conference and a map spanning Latin America, Africa and Asia.](https://propagandaarchive.org/static/generated/detail/hero-cold-war-global-south.jpg)

[Case studies](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/)

# The Active Measures Working Group (1981 to 1992)

At a glance

A part-time U.S. interagency committee, formed in 1981 under the State Department and later run through USIA, collected reports of Soviet forgeries and planted stories and published them to the press and Congress…

- **When:** 1981
- **Actor:** U.S. interagency Active Measures Working Group, chaired by the State Department and later run…
- **Target:** Soviet 'active measures': forgeries, planted press stories and influence operations aimed at…
- **Confidence:** **documented** Primary documents, court records, official disclosures
- **Techniques:** [Narrative laundering](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/narrative-laundering/) [Testimonial](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/testimonial/)

Full details

- **Actor:** U.S. interagency Active Measures Working Group, chaired by the State Department and later run through the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), with the CIA, FBI, Defense Department, DIA, Justice Department and ACDA
- **Target:** Soviet 'active measures': forgeries, planted press stories and influence operations aimed at foreign and U.S. audiences, including the AIDS-origin campaign

On this page

- [What happened](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/active-measures-working-group/#what-happened)
- [How it worked](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/active-measures-working-group/#how-it-worked)
- [Measured effect](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/active-measures-working-group/#measured-effect)
- [Positions on the record](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/active-measures-working-group/#positions-on-the-record)
- [Same-method test](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/active-measures-working-group/#same-method-test)
- [What the record shows and doesn't](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/active-measures-working-group/#what-the-record-shows-and-doesn-t)
- [See also](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/active-measures-working-group/#see-also)
- [See also in Learn](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/active-measures-working-group/#see-also-in-learn)
- [Images](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/active-measures-working-group/#images)
- [Sources](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/active-measures-working-group/#sources)

On this page

**In one line:** a part-time U.S. interagency committee, formed in 1981 under the State Department and later run through USIA, collected reports of Soviet forgeries and planted stories and published them to the press and Congress; its best-known case was the Soviet bloc claim that the U.S. military created AIDS, which Moscow backed away from in 1987 and a Russian intelligence chief attributed to the KGB in 1992.

## What happened

- **Summer 1981.** The Active Measures Working Group (AMWG) forms under Dennis Kux of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Kux chairs it until January 1984. CIA Director William Casey encouraged its creation, Lawrence Eagleburger backed it at State, and John Lenczowski of the National Security Council contributed.
- **9 October 1981.** State publishes *Special Report No. 88, Soviet Active Measures: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations*, a four-page overview. 14,000 copies go to news organizations, federal agencies and others.
- **13 to 14 July 1982.** The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence holds hearings titled "Soviet Active Measures." Representative Bill Young had called for them.
- **November and December 1982.** President Reagan says "Soviet agents" helped instigate the nuclear freeze movement. Committee chairman Edward Boland answers in a press release: "On the basis of my own review of the material submitted by the FBI, it is my personal assessment that Soviet agents have had no significant influence on the nuclear freeze movement."
- **March 1983.** A 29-page FBI report states: "we do not believe the Soviets have achieved a dominant role in the U.S. peace and nuclear freeze movements, or that they directly control or manipulate the movement."
- **1983.** The Indian newspaper *Patriot* runs "AIDS may invade India: Mystery disease caused by US experiments," attributed to an unnamed "well-known American scientist and anthropologist." It says AIDS was created at Fort Detrick, Maryland, as part of a Pentagon biological weapons program.
- **1985.** Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kathleen C. Bailey takes over the group, which accounts describe as "moribund," and chairs it until late 1987. In October 1985 the Soviet *Literaturnaya Gazeta* repeats the AIDS claim.
- **1986.** Jakob Segal, a retired East German biophysicist, co-writes a 47-page pamphlet, *AIDS: its nature and origin*, with Lilli Segal and Ronald Dehmlow. State submits an active-measures report to Congress on 30 July.
- **August 1987.** State publishes *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-87*, covering June 1986 to June 1987.
- **23 October 1987.** Mikhail Gorbachev complains to Secretary of State George Shultz that the report goes against the spirit of glasnost. Shultz charges that the USSR has peddled "bum dope" on AIDS. The Soviet side then backs away from the campaign.
- **March and April 1988.** USIA publishes *Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost* (143 pages). Czechoslovak intelligence files an abridged copy of USIA's 6 April press release with its active-measures papers.
- **1992.** Yevgeny Primakov, head of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), acknowledges that the KGB was behind the Soviet articles claiming the U.S. government created AIDS. In June, USIA publishes the group's last report, *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era 1988-1991*, written by Todd Leventhal. The group is not replaced. (Schoen and Lamb date its end as a working group to January 1989. Its reports continued through USIA until 1992.)

![First page of a four-page State Department report titled Soviet Active Measures: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations, dated October 1981](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/active-measures-working-group-special-report-88-page-1.jpg)

*Page 1 of*Special Report No. 88, Soviet "Active Measures": Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations*, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, October 1981. Source: GovInfo, public domain (U.S. government work). The scan carries a later "Approved For Release 2006/05/25" CIA reading-room stamp.*

## How it worked

**Method.** The group used a "report, analyze, publicize" method. It combined reports from USIA posts, the CIA and FBI investigations, and put out unclassified reports to other agencies and to the press. Calder Walton (2022) calls the method detecting, attributing and exposing. He notes that the British government's RESIST counter-disinformation toolkit follows the same principles.

**What it countered.** *Special Report 88* defined Soviet "active measures" (*aktivnyye meropriyatiya*) as written or spoken disinformation, efforts to control media in foreign countries, the use of Communist parties and front groups, clandestine radio, blackmail and political influence operations. Forgeries of the period included a letter over Ronald Reagan's signature urging King Juan Carlos to take Spain into NATO, and a bogus U.S. Army field manual that Soviet outlets cited as proof that the CIA was steering Italy's Red Brigades.

**The AIDS campaign.** The *Patriot* story shows [Narrative laundering](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/narrative-laundering/): the claim appeared first in a foreign paper, not in Soviet media. The former KGB officer Ilya Dzhirkvelov, who defected in 1980, said *Patriot* had been launched at the KGB's behest as a channel for disinformation. The story's unnamed "well-known American scientist," and later Segal's pseudo-scientific paper, were used to lend it credence. That is [Testimonial](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/testimonial/): an authority vouches in place of evidence. Thomas Boghardt, writing in the CIA's *Studies in Intelligence* (2009), popularized the code name "INFEKTION" on the word of the former Stasi officer Günter Bohnsack. The historian Douglas Selvage, working from Stasi files (*Journal of Cold War Studies*, 2019), says the Stasi's name was "Denver," and that Segal was enabled by the Stasi but seems to have believed the claim and acted on his own initiative. The story appeared in over 80 countries and more than 30 languages, mostly in leftist and communist media. It ran 40 times in Soviet media in 1987 alone.

**Staff and tradecraft.** Herbert Romerstein joined USIA in 1982, and he and his assistant Todd Leventhal tracked the AIDS campaign for the group. Boghardt describes one case: Romerstein had given a Czechoslovak diplomat a copy of a letter, marked so it could be traced. When a forgery carrying the mark surfaced in August 1986, USIA exposed it at a press conference, and the result was a *Washington Post* story about Soviet forgery.

![Printed page opening Chapter V of a State Department report, titled The U.S.S.R.'s AIDS Disinformation Campaign, with an overview beginning "In October 1985, the Soviet Union mounted an extensive campaign"](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/active-measures-working-group-1987-report-aids-chapter.jpg)

*Page 33, opening Chapter V ("The U.S.S.R.'s AIDS Disinformation Campaign") of*Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-87*, U.S. Department of State, August 1987. Source: Internet Archive scan, public domain (U.S. government work). The report's cover reproduces a Soviet cartoon, which this page does not host (see Image gaps).*

## Measured effect

- **No outcome evaluation exists.** No study measured whether AMWG reports changed what foreign or U.S. audiences believed. The evidence is case history.
- **The case most often cited for success.** The Soviet side backed away from the AIDS claim after the 1987 report and Shultz's rebuke, and in 1992 Primakov attributed the campaign to the KGB. Schoen and Lamb (NDU, 2012) conclude that the group exposed some Soviet covert operations and "raised the political cost of others by sensitizing foreign and domestic audiences to how they were being duped." This is a qualitative judgment from an official U.S. defense university. The retreat also came during glasnost and a wider thaw, so the report's share in it cannot be separated out.
- **Measuring the other side was also hard.** Walton notes that Eagleburger said controlled experiments on Soviet active measures were impossible, because Moscow ran them alongside its overt policy. The same problem applies to the counter-effort.
- **The claim outlived the exposure.** In a 2005 RAND and Oregon State University survey (Bogart and Thorburn, *JAIDS*, 500 African Americans aged 15 to 44), nearly half said HIV is man-made and about 27 percent agreed that "AIDS was produced in a government laboratory." The survey does not trace where these beliefs came from. It shows that exposing the Soviet role did not end belief in the claim.

![A group of U.S. and Soviet officials seated in armchairs in the Oval Office, several wearing translation earpieces; a desk and flags are behind them](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/active-measures-working-group-reagan-gorbachev-oval-office-1987.jpg)

*President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev with U.S. and Soviet advisers, including Secretary of State Shultz, in the Oval Office on 9 December 1987, the morning plenary of the Washington Summit, seven weeks after the October meeting in Moscow described above. White House Photographic Office, NARA, public domain.*

## Positions on the record

- **The group and its supporters.** Schoen and Lamb present the AMWG as a part-time interagency committee that "made a major difference" and successfully set and carried out U.S. policy on Soviet disinformation. An essay on the U.S. Army War College's *War Room* site asks whether it should be revived against Russian influence operations.
- **Congress and the FBI on the nuclear freeze.** Boland and the FBI's 1983 report rejected the claim that Moscow controlled the freeze movement. The FBI also said Soviet front groups had helped organize pro-freeze demonstrations.
- **Scholarly critics.** Jeffrey Whyte (*International Political Sociology*, 2024) describes the AMWG as an organization of Reagan administration appointees that "constructed" Soviet active measures as a national-security threat. He argues it framed the U.S. anti-war movement as both a target and a vehicle of those measures. Gavin Wilde (*Texas National Security Review*, 2024) argues more generally that fears of foreign propaganda subverting democracy may be exaggerated, because the link between media and beliefs is murky.
- **Within the U.S. government.** Accounts of the group say that after the October 1987 meeting Shultz, annoyed that the report had caused the incident, ordered staff to stop producing reports. The work then moved to USIA.
- **The Soviet and Russian side.** Gorbachev said the 1987 report went against the spirit of glasnost. Soviet scientists, among them the virologist Viktor Zhdanov, said publicly that the virus was not man-made. In 1992 Primakov, speaking for Russia's post-Soviet foreign intelligence service, acknowledged the KGB's role in the AIDS story. No broader official Soviet response to the group's reports was found in the sources checked for this page.

## Same-method test

The United States ran covert propaganda of its own, and its own Congress documented it. In April 1976, the Senate's Church Committee reported that about 50 of the CIA's covert relationships were with American journalists or employees of U.S. media organizations. By the end of 1967 the agency had produced, subsidized or sponsored well over 1,000 books, often through cultural groups it backed, sometimes without the author's knowledge. Some circulated in the United States first, to win a good reception abroad. The committee's Chile study describes secret CIA funding for the newspaper *El Mercurio*: $700,000 authorized on 9 September 1971 and $965,000 more on 11 April 1972. A CIA memo concluded that agency-supported media had helped set the stage for the September 1973 coup. In 1977 Carl Bernstein reported in *Rolling Stone* that, according to CIA documents, more than 400 American journalists had secretly carried out CIA assignments over 25 years. By this archive's standard, books and newspapers that hid a state sponsor are the same [Narrative laundering](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/narrative-laundering/) as the *Patriot* story, whatever the flag. The differences are of record and timing. The U.S. programs were exposed by a U.S. Senate inquiry in 1975 and 1976, before the AMWG existed. The Soviet programs were exposed mainly by their adversary, and by Russia's own admission only after 1991. In the AMWG's own years, the State Department ran the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean (1983 to 1987), set up to build support for the administration's Central America policy. On 30 September 1987 the Comptroller General found that it had engaged in "prohibited, covert propaganda activities" and spent appropriated funds on them in breach of the law. The congressional Iran-Contra committees reported that it had placed pro-Contra newspaper articles by paid consultants who did not disclose their connection to the administration. The office was closed in 1987.

## What the record shows and doesn't

- **Documented:** the group's founding, members, chairs and reports; the 1982 hearings, the Boland statement and the 1983 FBI finding; the AIDS campaign's route from *Patriot* to world media; the October 1987 exchange; Primakov's 1992 acknowledgment; the Church Committee's findings. Print runs and the 80-country reach measure spread, not persuasion.
- **Disputed or uneven:** when the group ended (1989 or 1992), the code name (INFEKTION or Denver), how far Segal acted for the Stasi, and when Moscow dropped the AIDS story (one account puts the official disowning in summer 1987, after a U.S. protest; others place the retreat after the October meeting).
- **Frames:** the AMWG as a model interagency success (Schoen and Lamb, the *War Room* essay) and as a construction of threat that took in the peace movement (Whyte) are interpretations. The documents support parts of both.
- **Not shown:** that the group's reports changed public belief in any country, or that Soviet agents controlled the nuclear freeze movement. Reagan said in 1982 that they had helped instigate it; the FBI's 1983 report found Soviet front groups involved in some of its activity but no dominant or controlling Soviet role.

## See also

- [The State Department's Global Engagement Center (2016 to 2025)](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/global-engagement-center/), the later U.S. counterpart at the State Department.
- [EUvsDisinfo and the EEAS East StratCom Task Force](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/euvsdisinfo-east-stratcom/) and [The UK's Counter Disinformation Unit and its sister units (2019 to 2024)](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/uk-counter-disinformation-unit/), later European exposure units.
- [Cold War radio jamming (1948 to 1988)](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/cold-war-radio-jamming/), the Soviet bloc's own counter-measure against Western broadcasts.
- [Fact-checking and corrections](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/fact-checking/), [The debate over counter-disinformation](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/debates/) and [Countering propaganda](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/countering/).

## See also in Learn

- [Continued influence effect](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/continued-influence-effect/)
- [Illusory truth effect](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/illusory-truth-effect/)
- [Motivated reasoning](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/motivated-reasoning/)

## Images

| Image | Source | Licence |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Soviet "Active Measures": Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations (Special Report No. 88), page 1 | [U.S. Government Publishing Office (GovInfo)](https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GOVPUB-S-PURL-gpo90452), U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs | Public domain (U.S. government work) |
| Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-87, page 33 (Chapter V, "The U.S.S.R.'s AIDS Disinformation Campaign") | [Internet Archive (scan of the State Department report)](https://archive.org/details/dos-report_s-12so-8-12), U.S. Department of State | Public domain (U.S. government work) |
| President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev with advisers in the Oval Office during the Washington Summit | [National Archives and Records Administration, via Digital Public Library of America and Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:President_Ronald_Reagan_During_The_Washington_Summit_and_The_State_Visit_of_General_Secretary_Mikhail_Gorbachev_of_Union_of_Soviet_Socialist_Republics_USSR_During_The_Morning_Plenar_-_DPLA_-_72798fec357fd7ca1f3405e62758b7ec.jpg), White House Photographic Office | Public domain (U.S. government work, White House Photographic Office) |

### Image gaps

- **Cover of the August 1987 report.** The State Department cover reproduces a Soviet cartoon of the AIDS claim by a named cartoonist (D. Agaev), captioned as taken from a Soviet newspaper. The report is a U.S. government work, but the reproduced cartoon has its own copyright status, so the cover is not hosted; the report's page 33 is, and the full text is linked under Sources.
- **Shultz and Gorbachev, 23 October 1987 (Moscow).** No photo of that meeting was found; the December 1987 Washington summit photo above is a different meeting.
- **Boghardt's 2009 article** is on Commons as a PDF (a U.S. government work), but it is a document, not an image.
- **The Church Committee report on the media.** Book I, which holds the media findings, is on Commons only as a 642-page PDF; only a page of Book II (domestic intelligence, a different subject) exists as an image, so none is hosted.

## Sources

- [U.S. GAO: Comments on lobbying and propaganda activities of the Office for Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, B-229069 (30 September 1987)](https://www.gao.gov/products/b-229069)
- [Wikipedia: Office of Public Diplomacy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_Public_Diplomacy) (used for orientation; the Iran-Contra committees' finding)
- [Wikipedia: Active Measures Working Group](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Measures_Working_Group) (founding, chairs, member agencies, method, the Shultz episode, the final report)
- [U.S. State Department, *Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations: Soviet Active Measures* (Special Report 88), GovInfo](https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GOVPUB-S-PURL-gpo90452)
- [East Carolina University, Cold War & Internal Security Collection: "Active Measures"](https://sites.ecu.edu/cwis/2019/09/active-measures/) (Special Report 88 date, length, print run)
- [U.S. State Department, *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-87* (August 1987), Internet Archive](https://archive.org/details/dos-report_s-12so-8-12)
- [Minulost.cz: "Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost," USIA press release of April 1988 in Czechoslovak intelligence files](https://www.minulost.cz/en/active-measures-era-glasnost-press-release-us-information-agency-april-1988)
- [Schoen, F. and Lamb, C. J. (2012). *Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference*. NDU Press, Strategic Perspectives 11](https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-11.pdf)
- [Walton, C. (2022). "What's Old Is New Again: Cold War Lessons for Countering Disinformation." *Texas National Security Review* 5(4)](https://tnsr.org/2022/09/whats-old-is-new-again-cold-war-lessons-for-countering-disinformation/)
- [Whyte, J. (2024). "Soviet Active Measures and the Second Cold War: Security, Truth, and the Politics of Self." *International Political Sociology* 18(3)](https://academic.oup.com/ips/article/18/3/olae024/7708152)
- [Wilde, G. (2024). "From Panic to Policy: The Limits of Foreign Propaganda and the Foundations of an Effective Response." *Texas National Security Review* 7(2)](https://tnsr.org/2024/03/from-panic-to-policy-the-limits-of-foreign-propaganda-and-the-foundations-of-an-effective-response/)
- [U.S. Army War College *War Room*: "Countering Propaganda and Disinformation: Bring Back the Active Measures Working Group?"](https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/countering-propaganda-disinformation-bring-back-active-measures-working-group/)
- [U.S. House History, Art & Archives: News Release on Soviet Active Measures (Boland)](https://history.house.gov/HouseRecord/Detail/25769819747)
- [*Soviet Active Measures*, hearings before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 13 and 14 July 1982 (WorldCat)](https://search.worldcat.org/title/soviet-active-measures-hearings-before-the-permanent-select-committee-on-intelligence-house-of-representatives-ninety-seventh-congress-second-session-july-13-14-1982/oclc/10183852)
- [CIA Reading Room: "FBI Warned of Manipulation on Nuclear Issue"](https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/node/1877083) and [*The Battalion*, 10 March 1983](https://newspaper.library.tamu.edu/lccn/sn86088544/1983-03-10/ed-1/seq-9/ocr) (1983 FBI report)
- [Boghardt, T. (2009). "Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign." *Studies in Intelligence* 53(4), CIA](https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/volume-53-no-4/) ([DTIC copy](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA514366.pdf))
- [Selvage, D. (2019). "Operation 'Denver': The East German Ministry of State Security and the KGB's AIDS Disinformation Campaign, 1985-1986 (Part 1)." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 21(4), 71-123](https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-abstract/21/4/71/13815/Operation-Denver-The-East-German-Ministry-of-State)
- [Wilson Center: "Operation 'Denver': KGB and Stasi Disinformation regarding AIDS"](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/operation-denver-kgb-and-stasi-disinformation-regarding-aids)
- [MIT Press Reader: "Lessons From Operation 'Denver,' the KGB's Massive AIDS Disinformation Campaign"](https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/operation-denver-kgb-aids-disinformation-campaign)
- [Wikipedia: Operation Denver](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Denver) (reach in 80 countries, 1987 Soviet media count, Primakov 1992)
- [spid.center: "Operation INFEKTION: How the KGB convinced the world that the Americans had created AIDS"](https://spid.center/en/articles/3021) (the *Patriot* headline, Dzhirkvelov, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Segal pamphlet)
- [Engelsberg Ideas: "Inside the disinformation forever war"](https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/inside-the-disinformation-forever-war/) (summer 1987 disowning; frequency of Soviet forgeries)
- [Wikipedia: Viktor Zhdanov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Zhdanov)
- [Linvill, D. and Warren, P. "Infektion's Evolution: Digital Technologies and Narrative Laundering." Clemson University Media Forensics Hub](https://open.clemson.edu/mfh_reports/3/)
- [Wikipedia: Forgery as covert operation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forgery_as_covert_operation) (Juan Carlos letter, field manual)
- [RAND press release, 25 January 2005: "Conspiracy Beliefs Among African Americans Deter Condom Use"](https://www.rand.org/news/press/2005/01/25.html) and [Bogart, L. M. and Thorburn, S. (2005), *JAIDS* 38(2), 213-218 (PubMed)](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15671808/)
- [Wikipedia: Church Committee](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_Committee) and [Wikipedia: Operation Mockingbird](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mockingbird) (April 1976 final report, about 50 journalists, books)
- [National Security Archive: "Covert Action in Chile: The Significance of the Church Committee Report 50 Years Later"](https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2025-12-04/covert-action-chile-significance-church-committee-report-50) and [*Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973*, Transnational Institute](https://www.tni.org/en/article/covert-action-in-chile-1963-1973)
- [Bernstein, C. (1977). "The CIA and the Media." *Rolling Stone*, via RealClearInvestigations](https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2018/08/26/investigative_classics_journalists_as_cia_spies_by_carl_bernstein_1977.html)