---
title: Baltic counter-disinformation:Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
url: https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/baltic-counter-disinformation/
description: 'from 2014 the three Baltic states answered Russian state media with a mix of tools: volunteer "elves" and a newsroom-backed debunking centre in…'
section: Case studies
---

![Illustration: a redacted Cold War intelligence-dossier collage centred on a world map of influence operations, with the U.S. Capitol among the evidence.](https://propagandaarchive.org/static/generated/hero-home.jpg)

[Case studies](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/)

# Baltic counter-disinformation:Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

At a glance

From 2014 the three Baltic states answered Russian state media with a mix of tools: volunteer "elves" and a newsroom-backed debunking centre in Lithuania, a publicly funded Russian-language TV channel in Estonia…

- **When:** 2014
- **Actor:** Governments and broadcast regulators of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania…
- **Target:** Russian state television and news outlets reaching Baltic audiences, especially Russian speakers…
- **Confidence:** **documented** Primary documents, court records, official disclosures
- **Regime:** [Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin](https://propagandaarchive.org/regimes/putin-government/)

Full details

- **Actor:** Governments and broadcast regulators of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR); volunteer and civil-society groups (Lithuanian 'elves', Debunk.org)
- **Target:** Russian state television and news outlets reaching Baltic audiences, especially Russian speakers; pro-Kremlin messaging online

On this page

- [What happened](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/baltic-counter-disinformation/#what-happened)
- [How it worked](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/baltic-counter-disinformation/#how-it-worked)
- [Measured effect](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/baltic-counter-disinformation/#measured-effect)
- [Positions on the record](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/baltic-counter-disinformation/#positions-on-the-record)
- [Same-method test](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/baltic-counter-disinformation/#same-method-test)
- [What the record shows and doesn't](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/baltic-counter-disinformation/#what-the-record-shows-and-doesn-t)
- [See also](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/baltic-counter-disinformation/#see-also)
- [See also in Learn](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/baltic-counter-disinformation/#see-also-in-learn)
- [Images](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/baltic-counter-disinformation/#images)
- [Sources](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/baltic-counter-disinformation/#sources)

On this page

**In one line:** from 2014 the three Baltic states answered Russian state media with a mix of tools: volunteer "elves" and a newsroom-backed debunking centre in Lithuania, a publicly funded Russian-language TV channel in Estonia, repeated suspensions and then near-total bans of Russian channels, and the use of EU sanctions to close Sputnik's local offices, which press-freedom bodies criticised. Audience surveys over the same years recorded Russian TV losing ground.

![Map of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with three numbered pins: Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius, and a key to the measures taken in each](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/baltic-counter-disinformation-locator-map.svg)

*The three Baltic capitals and the measures on this page taken in each. Map drawn by FRAME from Natural Earth (public domain).*

## What happened

- **April 2014.** Lithuania's Radio and Television Commission (RTCL) suspends part of the retransmission of RTR Planeta, finding that a programme on Ukraine justified violence against civilians and military intervention and incited hatred.
- **2014.** In Lithuania, Ričardas Savukynas ("Hawk") and a small group of friends start flagging pro-Kremlin content in comment sections and on Facebook. They call themselves "elves" because "elves fight trolls".
- **28 September 2015.** ERR launches ETV+, a Russian-language public channel. Its 2015 budget was €2.53 million.
- **29 March 2016.** Latvia's internet registry NIC suspends Sputnik's .lv domain, citing the 2014 EU sanctions regulation. Latvia's foreign ministry spokesman says it regards Sputnik as "a propaganda tool". OSCE media freedom representative Dunja Mijatović says she is concerned this "might set a dangerous precedent".
- **7 April 2016.** Latvia's regulator NEPLP bans retransmission of Rossiya RTR for six months over repeated incitement to hatred, citing a November 2015 programme in which Vladimir Zhirinovsky called for bombing Turkey.
- **2015 to 2019.** Lithuania suspends RTR Planeta again: for three months from April 2015, three months from November 2016, and twelve months from February 2018. The European Commission finds each suspension compatible with EU law.
- **2017 to 2018.** The Lithuanian news portal Delfi, with money from Google's Digital News Innovation Fund, launches Demaskuok (Debunk), which becomes Debunk.org (Debunk EU). Sources give 2017 for the project and 2018 for the organisation.
- **31 January 2019 and November 2019.** NEPLP suspends Rossiya RTR for three months over hate speech. In November it suspends nine Russian-language channels whose beneficiary, Yuri Kovalchuk, is under EU sanctions.
- **October to December 2019.** Estonian banks freeze accounts of Rossiya Segodnya, whose head Dmitry Kiselyov is under EU sanctions. In December the Financial Intelligence Unit tells Sputnik Estonia staff that continuing to work for the company could bring criminal liability. Sputnik Estonia closes on 31 December 2019; its Tallinn office had 35 staff.
- **30 June and 8 July 2020.** Latvia, then Lithuania, bans RT channels, citing the EU sanctions on Kiselyov.
- **24 to 28 February 2022.** After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Estonia's regulator TTJA orders five channels off air for twelve months because they broadcast Vladimir Putin's speech justifying the invasion. Lithuania's commission suspends six channels (three to five years) and then two more.
- **6 to 9 June 2022.** Latvia bans the remaining 80 Russia-registered channels under a new law, until Russia ends the war and returns Crimea.
- **6 December 2022.** NEPLP revokes the licence of TV Rain (Dozhd), an exiled Russian channel critical of the Kremlin, citing national security and public order.
- **January and October 2025.** An Estonian county court convicts former Sputnik Estonia employee Mati-Dmitri Terestal of breaching sanctions (a suspended sentence of 2 years 4 months). The district court upholds the conviction.

## How it worked

**Volunteers.** The elves work anonymously in Facebook groups. They flag stories they judge false and accounts they suspect are trolls, post counter-comments, and mass-report content to platforms to get it removed. Press accounts put them at about 4,000 volunteers in 13 countries by 2021. Debunk.org describes a model that joins an AI tool, which it says spots disinformation "within 2 minutes" of publication, with volunteer elves, journalists who check claims, and newsrooms that publish the results. It adapted the prebunking game *Bad News* for Baltic audiences with the Dutch company DROG (see [Inoculation and prebunking](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/inoculation-and-prebunking/)).

**A state-funded public channel.** ETV+ was set up to give Russian speakers news about Estonia and a different view of world events than the Russian state channels widely watched there. It is funded from the Estonian state budget through ERR.

**Regulators.** Before 2022 the suspensions used the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive, which lets a country restrict a channel from another member state's jurisdiction for incitement to hatred, subject to Commission review. From 2020 Latvia and Lithuania also used EU sanctions against Kiselyov as the legal basis for RT bans. After February 2022 the grounds became national security and war propaganda, and Latvia changed its law to cover every channel registered in Russia.

**Sanctions against a news agency.** Estonia issued no order against Sputnik's content. It applied an asset freeze on a sanctioned person and warned staff of criminal liability, and the office closed. The FIU's head, Madis Reimand, said Kiselyov's person was the only reason for the measures and that Sputnik's journalism was irrelevant to them.

**Schools.** Lithuania has a mandatory upper-secondary course on "media and influence" covering bots and trolls. Latvia's 2018 curriculum places media analysis under "digital competence". The US non-profit IREX ran a "Media Literacy in the Baltics" programme with 13 universities and youth trainers. See [Media literacy](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/media-literacy/) and, for the neighbouring model, [Finland's media literacy model](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/finland-media-literacy/).

![A tall glass-fronted office block with a concrete annex, seen from above across a street junction in Tallinn](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/baltic-counter-disinformation-err-radio-house-tallinn.jpg)

*The Estonian public radio building (Radio House) at Gonsiori 21, Tallinn, of the public broadcaster ERR, which launched ETV+ in 2015. Photographed 3 May 2024 by Sam Wilson, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0.*

![A multi-storey grey office building with the words Televizija and Radijas on its roof edge and three flagpoles in front, behind bare trees in snow](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/baltic-counter-disinformation-lrt-building-vilnius.jpg)

*The building of Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT), the Lithuanian public broadcaster, on Konarskio Street, Vilnius, photographed 25 January 2019 by POLNET55, Wikimedia Commons, CC0.*

## Measured effect

- **ETV+ audience.** Andres Jõesaar's study of TNS Emor audience data (January 2006 to May 2016) found that ERR's long decline in viewing among Russian speakers reversed after ETV+ launched. ETV+ reached about 17% of Russian speakers weekly by May 2016. In 2018 it had an estimated 1% share of viewing, near the bottom of the Russian-language channels available. Its share rose to 3.1% by May 2022, after the bans. A 2026 study in *Frontiers in Communication* reports that weekly reach fell again after a 2021 peak, and that some Russian-speaking focus-group participants saw ERR's war coverage as one-sided.
- **After the 2022 bans (Estonia).** A government office survey led by Marianna Makarova found that the share of "other nationalities" naming Russian TV among their three main information sources fell from 33% (February 2022) to 11% (February 2023). Belief that Russian channels cover the war honestly fell from 40% to 18%. This is a before-and-after survey; it cannot separate the bans from the effect of the war itself.
- **Side effects.** A 2026 *Frontiers* study of Russian speakers in Estonia describes "media indifference" and distrust that the bans deepened. The Insider reported that when Latvia cut 80 channels, about 8% of viewers sought workarounds such as VPNs, IPTV or satellite.
- **Elves and Debunk.** No independent evaluation of their effect on belief was found. Counts of volunteers and reports measure activity, not persuasion.
- **Media literacy.** IREX reports that youth-trainer participants said they were 49% more likely to cross-check information and scored 15% higher on a short test. These are the implementer's own self-report and short-term figures, with no control group reported.

## Positions on the record

- **Baltic governments and regulators.** They describe the bans as responses to incitement to hatred and war propaganda that threaten national security. Latvia's foreign minister Edgars Rinkēvičs urged other EU states to consider Sputnik bans. Estonian officials described the Sputnik case as sanctions enforcement, not action against journalism.
- **The European Commission.** It found Lithuania's RTR Planeta suspensions of 2015, 2016 and 2018 compatible with EU law.
- **Press-freedom bodies.** The OSCE's Mijatović criticised the 2016 Sputnik domain takedown. Her successor Harlem Désir said he was "closely following" Sputnik Estonia and asked Estonia for information. RSF said Estonia forced Sputnik's closure "by abusively threatening to prosecute its employees", and in July 2020 called the Baltic RT bans a misuse of sanctions that "is not a legitimate tool". EFJ secretary general Ricardo Gutiérrez told RIA Novosti Estonia's approach was "an excessive interpretation" of sanctions. RSF called Latvia's move against TV Rain "shameful". In 2023 the EBU and RSF opposed Latvia's plan to end Russian-language content on its public media from 2026, saying Russian speakers would lose access to fact-checked news.
- **The Russian government and state media.** In 2016 the Russian Foreign Ministry said Latvia's RTR ban showed "disdain for the basic principles of freedom of speech". Russia's embassy in Riga called the November 2019 suspension of nine channels "heavy censorship" under "far-fetched pretexts". Margarita Simonyan, head of RT and Sputnik, asked Estonia's president not to let staff be arrested. In 2026 Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Russia was preparing a case against the three states under the UN convention on racial discrimination over their treatment of Russian speakers.
- **Minority-rights observers and audiences.** Minority Rights Group notes that Latvian state bodies have faced a growing risk of fines for giving information in Russian as well as Latvian. The Insider reports that the Russian-speaking audience reacted negatively to the 2022 bans. No named Russian-speaking community organisation's statement on the bans was verified for this page.
- **Estonian analysts.** The Tallinn think tank ICDS published "Was Sputnik Eesti a trap?", questioning how the case played for Russia.

## Same-method test

If Russia, citing sanctions on a Western executive, told staff of a Western broadcaster's Moscow bureau they faced prosecution, and a regulator removed every channel registered in a hostile state, this archive would record it as state closure of foreign media, with the stated security reason reported beside it. It records the Baltic measures the same way. The differences are documented: the Baltic suspensions went through EU Commission review, the Sputnik prosecution went through two levels of courts, and Baltic outlets and regulators were openly criticised by RSF, the EFJ and the OSCE without penalty. The TV Rain case shows the tools also reached a Kremlin-critical channel. Other state labelling bodies are compared in [Government fact-check units: Russia, China, India and Ukraine](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/government-fact-check-units/) and legal bans in [Laws against "fake news": Germany, France and Malaysia under one standard](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/fake-news-laws/).

## What the record shows and doesn't

- **Documented:** the dates and legal bases of the suspensions and bans; the Sputnik Estonia closure and conviction; ETV+'s launch, budget and audience figures; the fall in Russian TV use and trust among Estonia's Russian speakers after February 2022; criticism from RSF, the EFJ, the OSCE and the EBU; the Russian government's objections.
- **Not shown:** a causal estimate of what any single measure (elves, Debunk, ETV+, bans or school courses) did to beliefs; how much Russian TV viewing moved to workarounds; whether the bans or the war drove the survey changes.
- **Frames, not findings:** "Baltic censorship of Russians" and "a model of resilience" are both arguments laid over this record.

## See also

- [EUvsDisinfo and the EEAS East StratCom Task Force](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/euvsdisinfo-east-stratcom/), [Government fact-check units: Russia, China, India and Ukraine](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/government-fact-check-units/), [Laws against "fake news": Germany, France and Malaysia under one standard](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/fake-news-laws/), [Finland's media literacy model](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/finland-media-literacy/)
- [Media literacy](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/media-literacy/), [Inoculation and prebunking](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/inoculation-and-prebunking/), [Fact-checking and corrections](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/fact-checking/), [The debate over counter-disinformation](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/debates/)
- [Countering propaganda](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/countering/)

## See also in Learn

- [Social identity](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/social-identity/)
- [Motivated reasoning](https://propagandaarchive.org/learn/motivated-reasoning/)

## Images

| Image | Source | Licence |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Where the Baltic measures on this page were taken | FRAME drawing (`case-studies/make_baltic_map.py`); basemap [Natural Earth](https://www.naturalearthdata.com/) | CC BY 4.0 (FRAME drawing); Natural Earth basemap is public domain |
| Estonian public radio building (Radio House), Gonsiori 21, Tallinn | [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gonsiori_21,_Tallinn_(Radio_House).jpg), Sam Wilson | CC BY-SA 2.0 |
| Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT) building, Konarskio Street, Vilnius | [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:LRTpastatas.jpg), POLNET55 | CC0 1.0 (public domain dedication) |

### Image gaps

- **ETV+ on-air graphics, Debunk.org or elves material.** Not openly licensed; not included.
- **RT, Sputnik and RTR Planeta branding.** Non-free logos; not included.
- **Photos of the Sputnik Estonia office or the Terestal trial.** No openly licensed photo was found.
- **Photos of the elves, of Savukynas, or of the Latvian and Lithuanian regulators.** Searched on Wikimedia Commons; nothing found. The LRT and ERR building photos show the public broadcasters, not the regulators.

## Sources

- [IRIS Merlin, Lithuania: retransmission of Russian-language programmes (2014)](https://merlin.obs.coe.int/article/6929)
- [European Commission, Lithuania's decision to suspend RTR Planeta complies with EU rules](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/lithuanias-decision-suspend-broadcast-russian-language-channel-rtr-planeta-complies-eu-rules) and [2018 decision](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/decision-suspend-broadcast-russian-language-channel-rtr-planeta-lithuania-complies-eu-rules)
- [RTCL, The suspension of "RTR Planeta" is compatible with EU law](https://www.rtk.lt/en/news/the-suspension-of-rtr-planeta-is-compatible-with-eu-law)
- [TIME, Meet the Lithuanian 'Elves' Fighting Russian Disinformation](https://time.com/6155060/lithuania-russia-fighting-disinformation-ukraine/)
- [Dangerous Speech Project, Lithuanian Elves](https://www.dangerousspeech.org/counter-speech-case-studies/lithuanian-elves)
- [Euronews, Europe's army of Elves (13 April 2022)](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/04/13/ukraine-war-europe-s-army-of-elves-fights-real-world-russian-disinformation)
- [Debunk.org, About](https://www.debunk.org/about) and [About Elves](https://www.debunk.org/about-elves)
- [CredCatalog, Debunk EU](https://credibilitycoalition.org/credcatalog/project/debunk-eu/)
- [ERR, Estonia launches its first Russian-language TV channel](https://news.err.ee/116841/estonia-launches-its-first-russian-language-tv-channel)
- [The Moscow Times, Estonia launches new channel to win over its Russians (27 September 2015)](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/09/27/estonia-launches-new-channel-to-win-over-its-russians-a49854)
- [Jõesaar, Trend Breaker: the impact of the launch of ETV+ (Baltic Screen Media Review)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310509979_Trend_Breaker_The_impact_of_the_launch_of_Russian-language_television_channel_ETV_on_Estonian_Public_Broadcasting's_viewing_trends)
- [Frontiers in Communication (2026), Safeguarding democracy in a small media market](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/communication/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2026.1776742/full)
- [Frontiers in Communication (2026), Consequences of war on media trust among Russian-speakers in Estonia](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/communication/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2026.1802996/full)
- [ERR, Russian info channels in Estonia viewed, trusted far less than year ago](https://news.err.ee/1608909242/russian-info-channels-in-estonia-viewed-trusted-far-less-than-year-ago)
- [The Insider, How three years of Kremlin propaganda bans have affected Russian-speaking audiences](https://theins.press/en/politics/279746)
- [LSM, Latvia suspends Rossiya RTR channel (2016)](https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/latvia-suspends-rossiya-rtr-channel.a177088/)
- [Meduza, Foreign Ministry says Latvian ban violates freedom of speech (8 April 2016)](https://meduza.io/en/news/2016/04/08/foreign-ministry-says-latvian-ban-of-russian-tv-channel-violates-freedom-of-speech)
- [RFE/RL, Latvia blocks Sputnik site as Kremlin "propaganda tool"](https://www.rferl.org/a/latvia-blocks-russian-news-site-sputnik-calling-kremlin-propaganda-tool/27643252.html) and [EFJ blog on the same](https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2016/03/30/latvia-shuts-down-russian-sputniks-website-for-propaganda/)
- [LSM, Rinkēvičs: other EU states should consider Sputnik bans](https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/rinkevics-other-eu-states-should-consider-sputnik-bans.a175975/)
- [ERR, Financial intelligence unit: Rossiya Segodnya/Sputnik sanctions no surprise](https://news.err.ee/1018403/financial-intelligence-unit-rossiya-segodnya-sputnik-sanctions-no-surprise)
- [RFE/RL, Sputnik closes Estonia operations after employees quit](https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-news-agency-sputnik-closes-estonia-operations-after-employees-quit/30355321.html)
- [The Moscow Times, Sputnik shuts Estonia operations (2 January 2020)](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/01/02/russian-state-news-agency-sputnik-shuts-estonia-operations-a68793)
- [RT, OSCE "closely following" case of Sputnik Estonia](https://www.rt.com/news/477921-sputnik-estonia-osce-reply/) (Russian state media, cited for the OSCE statement it reports)
- [Aletho News reposting RT on journalist groups and the EFJ comment (21 December 2019)](https://alethonews.com/2019/12/21/journalist-groups-call-to-protect-sputnik-reporters-from-police-harassment-in-estonia/)
- [ICDS, Was Sputnik Eesti a trap?](https://icds.ee/en/was-sputnik-eesti-a-trap/)
- [Estonian Prosecutor's Office, charges for violation of international sanctions](https://www.prokuratuur.ee/en/news/office-prosecutor-general-filed-charges-violation-international-sanctions) and [Duane Morris, Estonia: details of 5 criminal convictions for sanctions breaches (July 2026)](https://blogs.duanemorris.com/europeansanctionsenforcement/2026/07/06/estonia-details-of-5-criminal-convictions-for-sanctions-breaches/)
- [RSF, Baltic countries: misusing EU sanctions to ban Russian TV channels is not a legitimate tool](https://rsf.org/en/baltic-countries-misusing-eu-sanctions-ban-russian-tv-channels-not-legitimate-tool-promoting)
- [RFE/RL, Lithuania suspends broadcasts by Russia's RT over EU-sanctioned head](https://www.rferl.org/a/lithuania-suspends-broadcasts-by-russian-rt-over-eu-sanctioned-head/30714550.html)
- [TASS, Embassy slams Latvia's ban on Russian TV channels as censorship (21 November 2019)](https://tass.com/politics/1091487)
- [Lexology, Spotlight: free speech and media freedom in Latvia](https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=09358bbc-328d-4b81-acdf-4183fc27b234)
- [ERR, Four Russian TV channels banned from Estonian airwaves](https://news.err.ee/1608512162/four-russian-tv-channels-banned-from-estonian-airwaves) and [IPI alert](https://ipi.media/alerts/four-russian-and-one-belarusian-tv-channel-banned-in-estonia/)
- [RTCL, Decision to suspend retransmission of 6 Russian language TV programmes](https://www.rtk.lt/en/news/decision-to-suspend-retransmission-of-6-russian-language-tv-programmes)
- [Broadband TV News, Latvia bans remaining Russian channels (7 June 2022)](https://www.broadbandtvnews.com/2022/06/07/latvia-bans-remaining-russian-channels/) and [LSM, All Russia-based TV channels banned in Latvia](https://eng.lsm.lv/article/features/media-literacy/all-russia-based-tv-channels-banned-in-latvia.a460236/)
- [NEPLP, revokes the broadcast permit of TV Rain](https://www.neplp.lv/en/article/neplp-revokes-broadcast-permit-tv-rain-due-threats-national-security-and-public-order) and [RSF, Latvia's censorship of Russian exile TV channel is shameful](https://rsf.org/en/latvia-s-censorship-russian-exile-tv-channel-shameful-says-rsf)
- [EBU, concern over Latvian proposal to ban Russian-language content on PSM from 2026](https://www.ebu.ch/news/2023/10/international-media-organizations-extremely-concerned-by-latvian-proposal-to-ban-russian-language-content-on-psm-from-2026)
- [GlobalSecurity.org reprint, Zakharova on a possible ICJ case against Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (May 2026)](https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2026/05/russia-260531-russia-mfa01.htm)
- [Minority Rights Group, Russians in Latvia](https://minorityrights.org/communities/russians-4/)
- [Equal Times, Baltic states' tools against Russian disinformation](https://www.equaltimes.org/in-the-existential-fight-against?lang=en) and [Media and Learning Association, Media literacy in the Baltics](https://media-and-learning.eu/type/featured-articles/media-literacy-in-the-baltics-similar-backgrounds-but-different-approaches/)
- [IREX, Youth trainers in the Baltics unite for Media Literacy Skills Month](https://www.irex.org/success-story/youth-trainers-baltics-unite-media-literacy-skills-month) and [Media Literacy in the Baltics](https://www.irex.org/project/media-literacy-baltics)