---
title: The Red Guards:how Mao turned millions of students into a political weapon, 1966-68
url: https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/red-guards-youth-mobilization/
description: Between August 1966 and late 1968, Mao Zedong and the Central Cultural Revolution Group built, endorsed, reviewed and funded a nationwide student…
section: Case studies
---

![Illustration: a Cold War intelligence collage of a non-aligned-movement conference and a map spanning Latin America, Africa and Asia.](https://propagandaarchive.org/static/generated/detail/hero-cold-war-global-south.jpg)

[Case studies](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/)

# The Red Guards:how Mao turned millions of students into a political weapon, 1966-68

At a glance

Between August 1966 and late 1968, Mao Zedong and the Central Cultural Revolution Group built, endorsed…

- **When:** August 1, 1966
- **Actor:** Mao Zedong and the Central Cultural Revolution Group…
- **Target:** Secondary-school and university students, organized into Red Guard detachments as a mass political…
- **Source:** Identified Openly sourced: the speaker is who they say they are
- **Confidence:** **documented** Primary documents, court records, official disclosures
- **Techniques:** [Bandwagon](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/bandwagon/) [Identity fusion](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/identity-fusion/) [Testimonial](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/testimonial/) [Name-calling](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/name-calling/) [Euphemism / doublespeak](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/euphemism/)
- **Regime:** [People's Republic of China under Mao Zedong](https://propagandaarchive.org/regimes/peoples-republic-of-china-mao/)

Full details

- **Actor:** Mao Zedong and the Central Cultural Revolution Group; the CCP Central Committee, State Council and Central Military Commission (the free rail-travel notices); Lin Biao and the People's Liberation Army (the 1968 propaganda teams)
- **Target:** Secondary-school and university students, organized into Red Guard detachments as a mass political instrument; from 1967 rival Red Guard factions became targets of each other, and from mid-1968 the Red Guards as a whole became a target of the state's own demobilization campaign

On this page

- [What happened](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/red-guards-youth-mobilization/#what-happened)
- [How it works](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/red-guards-youth-mobilization/#how-it-works)
- [Then and now](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/red-guards-youth-mobilization/#then-and-now)
- [Positions on the record](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/red-guards-youth-mobilization/#positions-on-the-record)
- [Same-method test](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/red-guards-youth-mobilization/#same-method-test)
- [How to spot it](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/red-guards-youth-mobilization/#how-to-spot-it)
- [Images](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/red-guards-youth-mobilization/#images)
- [Sources](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/red-guards-youth-mobilization/#sources)

On this page

> **Content note.** This page describes beatings and killings, including factional battles among Red Guard groups in 1967-68 that are estimated to have killed thousands of people. It names organizations, dates and death-toll estimates as evidence of how the mobilization worked and how it was later demobilized; it does not show graphic imagery. The 5 August 1966 killing of deputy principal Bian Zhongyun and the labels used against denunciation targets are covered on [Big-character posters: how the opening labels of China's Cultural Revolution did the work of charges (1966-68)](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/cultural-revolution-big-character-posters/), which this page does not repeat.

**In one line:** Between August 1966 and late 1968, Mao Zedong and the Central Cultural Revolution Group built, endorsed, reviewed and funded a nationwide student movement called the Red Guards — legitimized by a personal letter and a worn armband, multiplied by eight Tiananmen rallies and free state-funded rail travel — then watched it fracture into rival factions that fought and killed each other before the party itself dissolved the factions and shipped millions of their members to the countryside.

![Diagram: Mao's 1 August 1966 letter endorses the Tsinghua University Middle School Red Guards; the model replicates nationally; eight Tiananmen rallies review an estimated 11 to 13 million people; free state rail travel ("great networking") spreads the movement countrywide; the movement splinters into rival "old" and "rebel" factions under the bloodline theory; the party sends in worker and PLA propaganda teams in 1968 and disperses former Red Guards to the countryside](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/red-guards-youth-mobilization-diagram.svg)

## What happened

- **29 May 1966.** A small group of students at the middle school attached to Tsinghua University (Qinghua Fuzhong) secretly forms the first self-styled "Red Guards" (红卫兵) detachment, taking a name associated with Mao's own guard units. Work teams sent onto campuses by the party apparatus under Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping are still enforcing order, so the group operates underground through June and July, posting radical big-character posters under cover.
- **Late July 1966.** Mao, back in Beijing after weeks away, has the work teams withdrawn from the campuses. The check that had kept radical student groups underground is removed.
- **1 August 1966.** Mao writes to the Tsinghua Fuzhong Red Guards. His letter (later published and widely cited by scholars, including MacFarquhar and Schoenhals) endorses their posters and repeats a phrase from his own 1939 writings, "to rebel against reactionaries is justified" (造反有理), giving his personal backing to a self-organized, extralegal student group acting outside any party or school chain of command. Within weeks, schools and universities across Beijing form their own Red Guard detachments explicitly modelled on the endorsed group; by early autumn the practice has spread nationwide.
- **18 August 1966.** The first of eight mass rallies is held in Tiananmen Square. Mao, in military uniform, appears on the rostrum; Song Binbin, a student from the middle school attached to Beijing Normal University, pins a Red Guard armband on him. Photographs of Mao wearing Red Guard insignia circulate nationally as the movement's founding image. Lin Biao's speech calls for smashing the "Four Olds" (old ideas, culture, customs and habits).
- **18 August - 26 November 1966.** Seven more rallies follow. Estimates of the combined attendance across all eight range from about 11 million to 13 million (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals's figure is toward the top of that range); no other gathering of the Cultural Revolution matched this scale, and none was repeated after November 1966.
- **From late August 1966.** Central directives authorize students to travel the country free of charge — by train, with lodging and meals covered by the state — to "exchange revolutionary experience" (交流革命经验), a practice known as the "great networking" (大串联, dà chuànlián). Students converge on Beijing to be reviewed and travel on to sites such as Yan'an, Jinggangshan and Mao's birthplace at Shaoshan. Estimates of the total number of free trips taken run into the tens of millions by early 1967.
- **Winter 1966-67.** The rail network buckles under the load. Central authorities begin restricting travel in December 1966 and formally wind the free-travel scheme down by around March 1967, citing the strain on transport and a shift in the movement's phase toward seizing power locally rather than travelling.
- **Autumn 1966 - early 1967.** The movement splits. Groups dominated by children of veteran cadres and military officers — later called "old Red Guards" — promote a "bloodline theory" (血统论), summarized in a couplet holding that a hero's son is a good man and a reactionary's son is a wretch, and use it to police who counts as a genuine revolutionary. Rival "rebel" (造反派) factions, drawing more broadly across class backgrounds, turn the movement's logic against the very cadre families the old Red Guards belonged to. In December 1966 an old-Red-Guard hardline group, the United Action Committee (联合行动委员会, "Liandong"), is itself suppressed by the Cultural Revolution Group as insufficiently radical — proof that no faction's claim to revolutionary purity was safe from a rival's higher claim.
- **January 1967.** The "January Storm" power seizure in Shanghai, backed by the Cultural Revolution Group, becomes a template copied across the country. Multiple rival factions in the same city or institution each claim to have legitimately "seized power," multiplying the grounds for factional conflict.

![Column of demonstrators in Hong Kong in May 1967 raising small red books beside the Bank of China building](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/red-guards-youth-mobilization-hong-kong-march-1967.jpg)

*Demonstrators marching along a street beside the Bank of China building in Hong Kong on 20 May 1967, raising small red books of Mao Zedong's sayings and carrying placards, during the 1967 Hong Kong disturbances. Photographed from the Hong Kong Hilton terrace. Taken in Hong Kong, not on the mainland, in the same months as the Red Guard movement on this page. Photograph by Roger W, CC BY-SA 2.0, via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1967-05-20_The_1967_Hong_Kong_riot.jpg).*

- **1967-68.** Factional warfare escalates, increasingly with weapons taken from military depots after army units are drawn in on different sides. Documented episodes include the Wuhan Incident of July 1967, in which a regional military faction briefly detained a central official sent from Beijing, and heavy fighting in Chongqing in the summer of 1967 involving small arms, artillery and vessels on the Yangtze, with local estimates running into the hundreds or low thousands killed; a Red Guard cemetery from the fighting survives at Chongqing's Shapingba Park. Death-toll estimates for the wider 1967-71 repression that followed the factional period, compiled from county annals by Walder and Su, run from 750,000 to 1.5 million nationally; most of this violence came after 1966, in the suppression phase rather than the original mobilization.
- **27 July 1968.** At Tsinghua University, Workers' Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams — factory workers backed by the People's Liberation Army — are sent onto campus to end fighting between rival student factions. Five workers are killed in the clash (the "27 July Incident"). The next day, Mao personally summons the "Five Great Leaders" of Beijing's student Red Guard factions and rebukes them for the violence, marking a public break between the leadership and the movement it had built.
- **August-December 1968.** Worker and PLA propaganda teams occupy universities and schools nationwide, disband independent Red Guard organizations, and place campuses under direct military and party control.
- **22 December 1968.** Mao issues the directive that launches the Up to the Mountains, Down to the Countryside movement, sending millions of urban "educated youth" — a large share of them former Red Guards — to settle and labour in rural areas. Scholars including MacFarquhar and Schoenhals describe the rustication drive as serving, among its other stated purposes, to disperse a politically volatile generation of mobilized, now-factionalized youth out of the cities once the party no longer had a use for them as a mass weapon. The drive itself, and the "educated youth" it sent down, are covered on [Down to the countryside: how China rebranded a mass relocation of youth as revolutionary 're-education' (1968-1980)](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/down-to-the-countryside-movement/).

## How it works

- [Testimonial](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/testimonial/): Mao's 1 August 1966 letter singled out one clandestine, unauthorized student group and gave it his personal endorsement; his acceptance of a Red Guard armband on the Tiananmen rostrum on 18 August did the same thing as an image rather than a text. Both converted a handful of students into a nationally imitated model — proof, to every school that followed, that this was the approved way to be revolutionary.
- [Bandwagon](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/bandwagon/): the eight Tiananmen rallies put an estimated 11 to 13 million people in front of the cameras, and the free rail-travel scheme put millions more students on trains at state expense so they could see the rallies' scale for themselves and carry it home. The argument was the crowd: joining looked less like a political choice than like falling in with what everyone else was already doing.
- [Identity fusion](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/identity-fusion/): the armband and the label "Red Guard" fused personal identity, loyalty to Mao and organizational membership into a single thing. The bloodline theory made revolutionary standing hereditary rather than something a person could earn or revise, so once a faction had defined itself against a rival, backing down looked like betraying not just a political position but an identity — one reason the splits, once formed, were resolved by force rather than compromise.
- [Name-calling](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/name-calling/): once the movement split, rival Red Guard factions turned on each other with the same kind of label the movement had used against teachers and officials in 1966. "Royalist" (保皇派) branded a rival faction as a covert defender of the old power-holders; "conservative" and "counter-revolutionary" moved between factions depending on which one currently held the Cultural Revolution Group's favour, so the label that had justified violence against outside targets became the currency of Red Guard-on-Red Guard warfare.
- [Euphemism / doublespeak](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/euphemism/): "exchanging revolutionary experience" described what was, mechanically, free nationwide rail travel funded and organized by the state. "Workers' Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams" described the 1968 operation, backed by the PLA, that disarmed and disbanded the Red Guard factions the party had spent two years building up and arming through its own tolerance of factional violence.

## Then and now

The same organizational method — a leader's personal endorsement of a youth vanguard, then a staged mass review presented as proof of support — recurs in later state-built youth movements meant to supply political muscle rather than just future cadre. Russia's Nashi movement, founded with Kremlin backing in 2005 after the 2004-05 "colour revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine, recruited young activists for pro-government rallies reported in the tens of thousands, ran summer camps at Lake Seliger addressed by senior officials including Vladimir Putin, and mounted public harassment campaigns against opposition figures and, in 2006-07, against the British ambassador to Moscow, Anthony Brenton. Journalists and researchers repeatedly compared Nashi's methods, though not its ideology, to the Cultural Revolution's mobilized youth. Public funding and visible activity for Nashi wound down by around 2012-13 as the Kremlin shifted to other tools.

![Vladimir Putin walking with young people, some in naval cadet uniform and some holding red carnations, on 4 November 2006](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/red-guards-youth-mobilization-putin-nashi-2006.jpg)

*Vladimir Putin with cadets of the Nakhimov Naval School (Leningrad) and the Moscow Suvorov Military School and members of the youth movements Nashi and Young Russia, 4 November 2006. Photograph from kremlin.ru, the website of the President of the Russian Federation, CC BY 4.0, via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putnin_with_cadets,_Nashi_and_Rumol_-_2006-11-04.jpg).*

The differences are large. Nashi never approached Red Guard numbers, received no comparable personal letter of endorsement from a head of state, and its harassment campaigns, intimidating as they were, are not documented to have killed anyone — unlike the Red Guards' factional warfare, estimated to have killed thousands. The comparison holds at the level of mechanism (leader endorsement, staged mass review, state-subsidized mobility for the movement's own members), not at the level of what followed.

## Positions on the record

- **The Maoist position at the time.** Mao's 1 August 1966 letter and the 8 August 1966 "16 Points" (quoted on [Big-character posters: how the opening labels of China's Cultural Revolution did the work of charges (1966-68)](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/cultural-revolution-big-character-posters/)) frame the Red Guards as revolutionary successors liberating themselves from bureaucratic restraint. After the 1967-68 factional violence, the leadership's public position shifted: the 28 July 1968 rebuke of the "Five Great Leaders" and the 22 December 1968 rustication directive were presented as correction and continued revolutionary education, not as the reversal of an earlier policy.
- **The party's later position.** The Communist Party of China's 1981 "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party" (see [Big-character posters: how the opening labels of China's Cultural Revolution did the work of charges (1966-68)](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/cultural-revolution-big-character-posters/) for the text) calls the Cultural Revolution as a whole "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses" since 1949 and describes the 1967-68 period in particular as a time of chaos it attributes to Mao's own leadership.
- **Scholarship.** MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006) trace the mobilization to deliberate decisions by Mao and a small central group aimed at outflanking the party apparatus by using students as a weapon it could not easily control. Walder's *Fractured Rebellion* (2009) argues, from a detailed study of Beijing's Red Guard factions, that the splits formed around political choices made under uncertainty in 1966-67, not around pre-existing social or class divisions, complicating any simple "old guard versus rebels" account. Walder's *Agents of Disorder* (2019), built on more than 2,000 county annals, argues that most of the killing in 1967-71 came from power struggles among party cadres and a mishandled military intervention rather than directly from the original 1966 mobilization. Guobin Yang's work on the "Red Guard generation" traces how the great-networking travel and the movement's later dispersal shaped the political memory of an entire age cohort.
- **What is documented.** The dates of Mao's letter, the eight rallies and their general order of magnitude, the central directives authorizing and later winding down free rail travel, the 27 July 1968 Tsinghua incident and the 22 December 1968 rustication directive.
- **What is contested.** The precise total headcount reviewed at the rallies and the precise number of free rail trips taken, both of which are estimated rather than counted; the death toll from factional warfare in individual cities such as Chongqing, where local estimates vary widely; and how much of the wider 1967-71 violence traces directly to the 1966 mobilization as opposed to the power struggles and military missteps that followed it, on which Walder's later work revises his own earlier account.
- **Not ruled on here.** Which faction's claim to be the "true" revolutionaries was correct in any given local dispute, and the broader Mao-Liu Shaoqi policy argument that the mobilization was nominally fought over, which is covered on [Big-character posters: how the opening labels of China's Cultural Revolution did the work of charges (1966-68)](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/cultural-revolution-big-character-posters/).

## Same-method test

The same organizational test — did the state deliberately build a youth wing to function as political muscle, not only as a pipeline of future cadre — applies to the Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend), made compulsory for German boys and girls from 1936 and used for street propaganda, surveillance of adults and eventually emergency conscription into the Volkssturm in 1945, and to the Soviet Union's Komsomol and Young Pioneers, age-graded state organizations built from 1922 that structured most of Soviet childhood and adolescence and supplied labour and personnel for campaigns from collectivization brigades to wartime partisan recruitment. [Bandwagon](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/bandwagon/) scores in each case in the mass oath or rally staged as proof of support, and [Identity fusion](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/identity-fusion/) scores in each case in the fusion of personal identity with the organization and its ideology.

The scale and the state's own disposal of the movement differed sharply. The Hitler Youth and the Komsomol were built as permanent institutions with adult oversight throughout, decades of continuous existence, and career ladders into the ruling party. The Red Guards were mobilized in weeks, given no comparable institutional structure or adult chain of command, tacitly permitted to fight each other for over a year, and then forcibly disbanded and dispersed to the countryside within about two and a half years of their founding, once the party that had built them found them a liability rather than an asset.

## How to spot it

- Ask whether a personal message or gesture from the top elevated one small, previously unauthorized group into the national model almost overnight. That is endorsement doing the organizing work, not spontaneous growth.
- Watch for scale that the state itself paid to create — free transport, free lodging, free time off school or work — being presented back to participants and observers as grassroots enthusiasm.
- Check whether purity claims keep escalating. If each new faction accuses the last one of insufficient revolutionary zeal, membership has become a moving target with no stable test, which is a sign the movement is heading toward internal violence rather than resolution.
- Ask what happens to the youth movement once its usefulness to the state ends. A state that can conjure a mass youth movement in a matter of weeks can also disband, disarm or disperse it just as fast, and how it does so — quietly reassigned, or publicly rebuked and sent away — is itself part of the record.

## Images

| Image | Source | Licence |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Mechanism diagram (above) | Drawn for FRAME from the sources below (`make_diagrams_youth_red_guards.py`) | CC BY 4.0, FRAME |
| Demonstrators with Mao quotation books, Hong Kong, 20 May 1967 | [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1967-05-20_The_1967_Hong_Kong_riot.jpg), Roger W (Flickr: 24736216@N07) | CC BY-SA 2.0 (photographer's own work, via Flickr) |
| Putin with Nashi and Young Russia members and cadets, 4 November 2006 | [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putnin_with_cadets,_Nashi_and_Rumol_-_2006-11-04.jpg), Press Service of the President of Russia (kremlin.ru) | CC BY 4.0 (kremlin.ru) |

### Image gaps

- **Mainland photographs of the 1966-68 movement.** The two photographs on this page are a 1967 street photograph taken in Hong Kong by a private photographer and a 2006 Russian presidential-website photograph used for the comparison in "Then and now"; neither shows the mainland movement. No mainland Red Guard photograph with a clear U.S.-public-domain or open-licence basis was found (see the gaps below).
- **Photographs of the Tiananmen rallies and the 18 August 1966 armband ceremony.** No openly licensed photograph of the rallies or of Song Binbin pinning the armband on Mao was found. A related photograph, File:Songbinbin2.jpg on Wikimedia Commons, is tagged "Public domain" but credited only to a 2014 Radio Free Asia article reproducing an unknown-author 1966 press photograph; as with the 1966-67 press photographs already documented as excluded on [Big-character posters: how the opening labels of China's Cultural Revolution did the work of charges (1966-68)](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/cultural-revolution-big-character-posters/), Chinese-origin photographs from this period can have had their U.S. copyright restored under the URAA even where a Commons uploader has tagged them public domain in China. Identified and licence-checked; not hosted for the same reason as that page's equivalent gap.
- **Photographs of Red Guards renaming or relabelling institutions (October 1966).** Two Commons files, credited to Taiwan's Central News Agency (中央通訊社) via a National Taiwan University digital archive and dated 7 October 1966, show Red Guards renaming the Palace Museum "the Palace of Blood and Tears" and Peking Union Medical College Hospital "the Anti-Imperialist Hospital." Commons tags both "Public domain," but the underlying rights basis (an ROC government-work exemption, a Commons uploader's own PD determination, or something else) is not stated on the file pages, and the same unclear-U.S.-status concern applies. Identified and licence-checked; not hosted.
- **A "Down with Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Tao Zhu" poster (1966), publisher credited as "Shanghai Red Guards."** Already documented as excluded, for the same URAA reason, on [Big-character posters: how the opening labels of China's Cultural Revolution did the work of charges (1966-68)](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/cultural-revolution-big-character-posters/); not duplicated here since this page is about the Red Guards as an organization rather than about poster labels.
- **Free rail travel ("great networking") scenes: crowded trains, station queues, or a chuanlian travel pass or permit.** No openly licensed photograph or scanned document was found. Wikimedia Commons and chineseposters.net hold period material, but neither offers a clear U.S. rights clearance for it.
- **Factional-warfare material: photographs of the Chongqing fighting, the Shapingba Red Guard cemetery, or captured factional weapons.** No openly licensed photograph was found; most published photographs of the cemetery are recent press photographs (Reuters, AP, and Chinese outlets) under standard copyright, not open licences.
- **The 1968 Workers' Propaganda Team occupation of campuses, or the rustication send-off.** No openly licensed photograph was found for either.

## Sources

- Mao Zedong, letter to the Red Guards of the Middle School attached to Tsinghua University, 1 August 1966, discussed and partly translated in Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006).
- Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006): [publisher page](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674027480).
- Andrew G. Walder, *Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing Red Guard Movement* (Harvard University Press, 2009).
- Andrew G. Walder, *Agents of Disorder: Inside China's Cultural Revolution* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019): [publisher page](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674238329).
- Andrew G. Walder and Yang Su, "The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Scope, Timing and Human Impact", *The China Quarterly* 173 (2003): 74-99: [PDF, Stanford](https://sociology.stanford.edu/sites/sociology/files/walder-sucq.pdf).
- Guobin Yang, *The Red Guard Generation and Political Activism in China* (Columbia University Press, 2016).
- Frank Dikötter, *The Cultural Revolution: A People's History, 1962-1976* (Bloomsbury, 2016).
- Communist Party of China, "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China", 27 June 1981: [marxists.org](https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm); [USC US-China Institute](https://china.usc.edu/node/20941).
- Reporting on Song Binbin's 2014 public statement about Bian Zhongyun's killing, cited via the Radio Free Asia Mandarin article credited on Wikimedia Commons file File:Songbinbin2.jpg: [rfa.org](https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/meiti/aw-01152014150329.html).
- Reporting on the Nashi movement and its Seliger camp and harassment campaigns, for the same-method test: contemporaneous Western press coverage, 2005-2012 (Reuters, BBC, the Guardian, the Moscow Times).
- Central News Agency (中央通訊社) photographs of 7 October 1966, Red Guards renaming the Palace Museum and Peking Union Medical College Hospital, via the National Taiwan University Research Center for Modern China digital archive, for the image-gap note above: [newnrch.digital.ntu.edu.tw](http://newnrch.digital.ntu.edu.tw/nrch/query.php?keyword=%E7%B4%85%E8%A1%9B%E5%85%B5&advanced=).