---
title: Xinjiang's 'vocational training centres':the government's messaging and its critics'
url: https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging/
description: the Chinese government moved from calling reports of mass detention in re-education centres untrue to presenting the centres as schools for "trainees"…
section: Case studies
---

![Illustration: a redacted Cold War intelligence-dossier collage centred on a world map of influence operations, with the U.S. Capitol among the evidence.](https://propagandaarchive.org/static/generated/hero-home.jpg)

[Case studies](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/)

# Xinjiang's 'vocational training centres':the government's messaging and its critics'

At a glance

The Chinese government moved from calling reports of mass detention in re-education centres untrue to presenting the centres as schools for "trainees"…

- **When:** August 13, 2018
- **Actor:** Government of the People's Republic of China and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region authorities…
- **Target:** International audiences, foreign governments and UN bodies…
- **Source:** Identified Openly sourced: the speaker is who they say they are
- **Confidence:** **documented** Primary documents, court records, official disclosures
- **Techniques:** [Euphemism / doublespeak](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/euphemism/) [Limited hangout](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/limited-hangout/) [Card stacking](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/card-stacking/) [Testimonial](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/testimonial/) [Astroturfing](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/astroturf/) [Manufactured consensus](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/manufactured-consensus/) [Whataboutism](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/whataboutism/)

Full details

- **Actor:** Government of the People's Republic of China and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region authorities; critics including the U.S. government, researchers, parliaments and media consortia
- **Target:** International audiences, foreign governments and UN bodies; domestic Chinese audiences; Uyghur diaspora

On this page

- [What happened](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging/#what-happened)
- [How it works](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging/#how-it-works)
- [Then and now](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging/#then-and-now)
- [Positions on the record](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging/#positions-on-the-record)
- [Same-method test](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging/#same-method-test)
- [How to spot it](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging/#how-to-spot-it)
- [Images](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging/#images)
- [Sources](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging/#sources)

On this page

> **Content note.** This case quotes findings and allegations of mass detention, torture, sexual violence, crimes against humanity and genocide, and the labels each side applies to the other. They are quoted as evidence of how each side argues. This page makes no finding on whether "genocide" or "crimes against humanity" applies.

**In one line:** the Chinese government moved from calling reports of mass detention in re-education centres untrue to presenting the centres as schools for "trainees", then backed that frame with testimony from former "trainees" and state-linked social media networks; its critics answered with leaked directives, extrapolated detention estimates and legal determinations, some of which are disputed in turn.

![Diagram: the 2018 denial of mass detention, then the "vocational training" name, then testimony from former "trainees", then distribution by accounts Twitter removed; a side branch shows the counter-charge about U.S. history; a separate branch shows critics' leaks, estimates and determinations](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging-diagram.svg)

A note on words: this page calls the sites "facilities" or "centres", notes the OHCHR's finding of "large-scale arbitrary deprivation of liberty" in them, and quotes each side's own terms ("re-education camps", "vocational education and training centres").

## What happened

**Government messaging**

- **13 August 2018, Geneva.** At the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Hu Lianhe of the United Front Work Department says: "The argument that 1 million Uighurs are detained in re-education centers is completely untrue."
- **9 October 2018.** Xinjiang's legislature amends its de-extremification regulation to provide for "vocational skills education and training centres". They are to teach the national common language, law and job skills, and carry out anti-extremist ideological education and psychological and behavioural correction.
- **16 October 2018.** Regional chairman Shohrat Zakir tells the state news agency Xinhua the programme answers the "three evil forces" of terrorism, extremism and separatism. He describes free education for "trainees" and says "the dormitories are fully equipped with radio, TV, air conditioning, bathroom and shower".
- **12 March 2019.** Zakir tells the state-run China News Service that talk of "re-education camps" or "concentration camps" is pure slander and absurd.
- **18 March and 16 August 2019.** The State Council Information Office publishes white papers on counter-terrorism and on "Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang". The first gives "top priority to a preventive counterterrorism approach".
- **December 2019.** The state broadcaster CGTN releases two English documentaries built on footage of past attacks, including the 2013 Tiananmen Square attack. On 9 December Zakir says the "trainees" "have all graduated". Uyghurs abroad tell Radio Free Asia, a U.S.-government-funded broadcaster, that their relatives are still held.
- **2020-2021.** Changyu Culture, an Urumqi company, makes videos of Uyghurs describing happy lives. In late 2019 it won a 600,000-yuan (about US$90,000) contract for a project called "This is Xinjiang" from the government-owned Xinjiang Audio-Video Publishing House (ASPI, March 2021). ProPublica and The New York Times analyse more than 3,000 such videos. They report that most were made by propaganda officials in Xinjiang, carried no logos, and moved from Chinese platforms to YouTube and Twitter with English subtitles (June 2021).
- **10 February 2021.** Fifteen former "trainees" appear at a Xinjiang government press conference in Beijing. One rebuts a BBC report of systematic rape in the facilities: "all of us women trainees feel very angry" (China News Service video title).
- **31 March 2021.** Asked about the genocide charge, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying replies: "Speaking of the US, there was genocide of native Indians through the Westward Expansion and the sins of trading enslaved black people."
- **2 December 2021.** Twitter removes 2,048 accounts that boosted official narratives on Xinjiang, attributed to the Chinese state, and 112 accounts attributed to Changyu Culture, a private company acting for the regional government. The Stanford Internet Observatory analyses both networks.
- **1 September 2022.** China's Geneva mission says the OHCHR assessment "uses disinformation and lies fabricated by anti-China forces as its main sources".

**Critics' messaging**

- **May 2018.** Adrian Zenz (Jamestown Foundation) estimates from several hundred thousand to just over one million people held. The high end extrapolates from a leaked police tally of about 892,000 detainees in 68 counties, with detention rates from Radio Free Asia reporting applied to the areas it missed; government procurement and construction bids document the facilities. Estimates of a million or more become the common headline figure. Xinhua says Zenz fabricated his.
- **16 and 24 November 2019.** The New York Times publishes internal speeches ("Xinjiang Papers"). The ICIJ publishes the "China Cables", including a 2017 telegram under security chief Zhu Hailun's name titled "Opinions on ... Vocational Skills Education and Training Centers". It orders double-locked doors, surveillance with no blind spots, escape prevention and "repentance and confession" sessions. China's embassy in London calls the documents "pure fabrication and fake news".
- **February 2020.** The "Karakax List" gives reasons 311 people were sent to the facilities, including beards, veils, unused passports, relatives abroad and too many children (CNN). The Chinese government disputes CNN's reading.
- **19 January 2021.** On the last full day of the Trump administration, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo says the PRC "has committed genocide against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups". Foreign Policy later reports that the State Department's legal office had concluded that the mass imprisonment and forced labour of Uyghurs amounted to crimes against humanity, but that there was insufficient evidence to prove genocide, and that the memo to Pompeo was split. The Biden administration restated the finding in its human rights report of 30 March 2021.
- **February-April 2021.** Canada's House of Commons (266-0), the Dutch parliament and the UK House of Commons pass non-binding genocide motions. In Canada the foreign minister abstains for the government, and the Dutch government declines to use the word.
- **9 December 2021.** The Uyghur Tribunal, a non-governmental body set up at the World Uyghur Congress's request and chaired by Sir Geoffrey Nice, finds genocide "beyond reasonable doubt" through birth-prevention measures. The state-run China Daily calls it a "propaganda show".
- **24 May 2022.** The "Xinjiang Police Files", passed to Zenz by an anonymous source, are published by 14 media outlets as UN High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet visits Xinjiang. Zenz says the timing was not intended. They include more than 5,000 police photographs from 2018. The BBC reports a protocol to shoot detainees who try to escape.
- **31 August 2022.** The OHCHR finds "large-scale arbitrary deprivation of liberty" of Uyghurs and others "in so-called VETC and other facilities, at least between 2017 and 2019", and says the extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention "may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity". It finds allegations of patterns of torture or ill-treatment "credible", as are allegations of individual incidents of sexual and gender-based violence. It says it cannot confirm the estimates of total numbers, and makes no genocide finding.

![Former "trainees" at a Xinjiang government press conference in Beijing, 10 February 2021](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging-press-conference-2021.jpg)

*Former "trainees" at the Xinjiang government's press conference in Beijing, 10 February 2021. The subtitle reads "Everyone take a look: isn't it beautiful?" Still from a China News Service video, CC BY 3.0. Shown as an example of the state-organised testimony format, not as a judgement on the speaker.*

## How it works

- [Euphemism / doublespeak](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/euphemism/): "vocational education and training centres", "trainees" and "graduated" are school words. The 2017 directive for the same centres orders double locks and escape prevention, and the OHCHR describes "large-scale arbitrary deprivation of liberty" in "so-called VETC and other facilities". The operational word (detain, confine) is missing from the official name. The government calls the leaked directive fabricated; the OHCHR says it based its description on its own review.
- [Limited hangout](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/limited-hangout/): in August 2018 an official calls the reports of a million held in re-education centres untrue. From October the centres are named, given a legal basis and described as schools. The existence of a programme is conceded. Compulsion and scale, the parts the leaked rules and the estimates describe, are not.
- [Card stacking](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/card-stacking/): the October 2018 interview lists dormitory televisions, air conditioning and sports venues, and the 2019 documentaries lead with attack footage. The pile is amenities, curricula, past attacks and outcomes. The confinement rules in the 2017 directive (double locks, escape prevention) are not in it.
- [Testimonial](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/testimonial/): named Uyghurs rebut named critics on camera, at state press events and in videos made under a government-funded contract. Pompeo is named in 386 of the Changyu videos (ASPI). A person describing their own life is a primary witness. What makes this testimonial is the chain: state selection, state production and state distribution, and the viewer has no independent way to check the speaker's circumstances. Whether any speaker is sincere is not something this page can establish.
- [Astroturfing](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/astroturf/): the Changyu network used old accounts that had posted spam, pornography and Korean-drama fan content, plus fake Uyghur personas. The Changyu YouTube channel had more than 5,460 subscribers but 949 views (ASPI). Here the source is concealed, unlike the white papers. The same method appears on the critics' side: a pro-Western covert network that Twitter and Meta removed in 2022, which Meta linked to individuals associated with the U.S. military, included a fake persona and a sham media outlet aimed at Central Asian readers that posted about an alleged genocide in Xinjiang (Graphika and Stanford Internet Observatory 2022; Meta 2022). Most of that network's posts drew only a handful of likes or retweets.
- [Manufactured consensus](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/manufactured-consensus/): thousands of similar clips from a common official origin, with no logos, look like many people independently saying the same thing. The larger network's retweets were 48% state media and diplomats. ASPI reports that content from foreign visitors was promoted as organic although some was likely made on state-backed tours. State media and diplomats also amplified third-party outlets such as The Grayzone. ASPI notes those outlets are not necessarily directed by the government.
- [Whataboutism](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/whataboutism/): Hua's reply cannot be true or false about Xinjiang. It moves the question to U.S. history. The historical wrongs she named are documented. The technique lies in using them as the answer. ASPI describes the wider effort as asserting "moral equivalence" with human rights problems in the U.S.

## Then and now

![Exclusion order posted in San Francisco, 1942](https://propagandaarchive.org/collection/images/exclusion-order-japanese-ancestry-1942.jpg)

*['Instructions to All Persons of Japanese Ancestry' (exclusion order posted in San Francisco)](https://propagandaarchive.org/collection/exclusion-order-japanese-ancestry-1942/), U.S. Army Western Defense Command, photographed by Dorothea Lange, 1942. Public domain.*

In 1942 the U.S. government called forced removal "evacuation", citizens "non-aliens" and holding sites "assembly centers". In Xinjiang, holding sites are "training centres", the people held are "trainees" and release is "graduation". Both use an administrative vocabulary that keeps the confinement out of the name. The differences are large. The U.S. orders were public and based openly on ancestry. About 120,000 people were held. A federal commission condemned the policy in 1983, and Congress apologised and paid redress in 1988. In Xinjiang, the rules surfaced through leaks, numbers held are estimated rather than known, and the government maintains its description.

## Positions on the record

- **Chinese government:** the centres were lawful education and counter-terrorism measures, and all "trainees" graduated in 2019. Genocide claims are lies. The leaks, the OHCHR assessment and the Uyghur Tribunal draw on "anti-China forces".
- **Critics:** the U.S. government (2021) and several parliaments call it genocide. The Uyghur Tribunal (2021) found genocide. Researchers and Uyghur groups describe mass detention, which the OHCHR (2022) found to be "large-scale arbitrary deprivation of liberty".
- **What is documented:** the 2018 denial and later acknowledgement; the official terms; the leaked directives, whose authenticity the government disputes; the Changyu contract; the Twitter takedown and its attributions; the OHCHR findings.
- **What is not shown / disputed:** the number held. "One million" or more is an extrapolation from leaked partial tallies and local reports, and the OHCHR declined to confirm it. Whether "genocide" applies is also disputed: the OHCHR did not use it, Foreign Policy reported that the State Department's own lawyers found crimes against humanity but insufficient evidence to prove genocide, and the Dutch government declined the word. Much of the network analysis comes from ASPI, which states that it takes government funding. Twitter's attribution and the Stanford analysis are separate checks.

The critics' material was checked against the same definitions. The leaks are primary documents. The U.S. determination carries its source and meets none of the tags above. The State Department roundtable is a government-organised testimony event in the same format as the Beijing press conference, so the same [Testimonial](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/testimonial/) test applies to it: the State Department hosted it and published its own readout, which describes the participants only as "seven Uyghur internment camp survivors, advocates, and relatives of individuals detained in Xinjiang", without names. The test turns on the speakers' circumstances, and there the two events differ. The Beijing speakers appeared in China, at an event run by the government accused of holding them, so a viewer cannot check what they were free to say; the roundtable's speakers were presented by a government that was not accused of holding them. One covert method is documented on that side, the pro-Western network under [Astroturfing](https://propagandaarchive.org/techniques/astroturf/); the sources reviewed do not tie it to the leaks, the estimates or the determination. That is a finding about method, not a ruling on accuracy. The split legal memo behind the January 2021 determination and its March 2021 restatement, the timing of the May 2022 Police Files release (which Zenz says was not intended) and the extrapolated totals are recorded above as open questions.

## Same-method test

Swap the flag and the scores hold. The U.S. government's "enhanced interrogation techniques" (Senate Intelligence Committee, 2014) is the same euphemism move. The U.S. military's 2020-2021 fake-account campaign against China's Sinovac vaccine in the Philippines (Reuters, 2024) would be tagged astroturf. So is the pro-Western covert network Twitter and Meta removed in 2022, tagged above. Any government that met an atrocity charge by listing its accuser's past crimes would be tagged whataboutism.

## How to spot it

- Ask what an official name leaves out: can the people held leave, who sends them, and for how long?
- When many ordinary-looking videos say the same thing, check who paid for them, where they were first posted and whether the wording repeats.
- Separate a primary document from an estimate built on it, and a court from a tribunal, a motion or a ministerial determination. Each carries a different weight.

![Leaked Karakax List, first page, photographed by Voice of America, 2020](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging-karakax-list-2020.png)

*First page of the leaked Karakax List, redacted, photographed for Voice of America, February 2020. Public domain (U.S. government work). The heading reads "trainees sent for training who are relatives of people who went abroad and did not return": the internal record uses the same school vocabulary as the public statements.*

![Chart of re-education-related procurement bids in Xinjiang, April 2016 to May 2018](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging-procurement-bids-chart.png)

*Re-education-related government procurement bids in Xinjiang by month, April 2016 to May 2018, from Jamestown Foundation data. Chart by Wikimedia user Clpo13, CC0. Bids like these document the building of facilities; they count facilities and spending, not people. The detention estimates rest mainly on leaked partial tallies.*

![Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a virtual roundtable with Xinjiang camp survivors, 6 July 2021](https://propagandaarchive.org/case-studies/images/xinjiang-training-centres-messaging-blinken-roundtable-2021.jpg)

*U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a State Department-organised virtual roundtable with "Xinjiang Internment Camp Survivors and Advocates", 6 July 2021. U.S. Department of State photo, public domain. The event title is the State Department's own wording. Shown as an example of a government-organised testimony event on the critics' side, as the press-conference still above is for the Chinese government's.*

## Images

| Image | Source | Licence |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Mechanism diagram (above) | Drawn for FRAME from the sources below (`make_diagrams.py`) | CC BY 4.0, FRAME |
| Former "trainees" at the Beijing press conference (10 Feb 2021) | [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2021%E5%B9%B42%E6%9C%8810%E6%97%A5_%E6%96%B0%E7%96%86%E6%95%99%E5%9F%B9%E4%B8%AD%E5%BF%83%E7%BB%93%E4%B8%9A%E5%AD%A6%E5%91%98%E9%A9%B3%E9%81%AD%E5%8F%97%E7%B3%BB%E7%BB%9F%E6%80%A7%E6%80%A7%E4%BE%B5%EF%BC%9A%E2%80%9C%E6%88%91%E4%BB%AC%E5%85%A8%E4%BD%93%E5%A5%B3%E5%AD%A6%E5%91%98%E9%83%BD%E6%84%9F%E5%88%B0%E5%BE%88%E6%84%A4%E6%80%92%E2%80%9D.webm), China News Service | CC BY 3.0 (video still) |
| Karakax List, first page (2020) | [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Karakax_List_VOA_2020-02-19.png), Voice of America | Public domain (U.S. government work) |
| Procurement-bids chart | [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Number_of_re-education_related_government_procurement_bids_in_Xinjiang.svg), Clpo13 | CC0 |
| Blinken roundtable (6 Jul 2021) | [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Secretary_Blinken_Participates_in_a_Virtual_Roundtable_with_Xinjiang_Internment_Camp_Survivors_and_Advocates_%2851294575316%29.jpg), U.S. Department of State | Public domain (U.S. government work) |
| Exclusion order (1942) | FRAME gallery | Public domain (U.S. government work) |

### Image gaps

- **Facility exteriors and satellite images.** No openly licensed ground photograph was found. ASPI and Maxar satellite imagery is copyrighted. A public-domain U.S. government map of facility locations built from ASPI data is on Commons ("Xinjiang Internment Map, US-Aus Gov Assessment"). It is fillable once its mixed RAND/NGA attribution is checked.
- **The Changyu Culture videos and CGTN documentaries.** Removed or copyrighted.
- **The 2019 white paper's title page.** Commons marks it exempt from copyright as a PRC official document, but the printed page carries a Foreign Languages Press copyright notice. Dropped until the status is clear.
- **Zakir's March 2019 "pure slander" clip.** On Commons as CC BY 4.0 (China News Service), but Commons flags a licence mismatch in its structured data. Not used.
- **Xinjiang Police Files photographs.** Not openly licensed, and they show identifiable detainees.

## Sources

- Uyghur Human Rights Project, ["The Happiest Muslims in the World": Disinformation, Propaganda, and the Uyghur Crisis](https://uhrp.org/report/uhrp-report-happiest-muslims-world-disinformation-propaganda-and-uyghur-crisis-html/) (quotes Hu Lianhe at CERD, August 2018)
- China Daily, 14 August 2018: [Slandering Xinjiang as 'no rights zone' against fact, Chinese official told UN panel](https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/14/WS5b7260a6a310add14f385a92.html)
- Inquirer/AFP, October 2018: [China region gives legal basis for Muslim internment camps](https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1041423/china-region-gives-legal-basis-for-muslim-internment-camps)
- Xinhua, 16 October 2018: [Full transcript: interview with Xinjiang government chief on counterterrorism, vocational education and training](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-10/16/c_137535821.htm)
- China News Service, 12 March 2019: [Shohrat Zakir video, via Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:%E9%9B%AA%E5%85%8B%E6%9D%A5%E6%8F%90_%E6%89%80%E8%B0%93%E2%80%9C%E5%86%8D%E6%95%99%E8%82%B2%E8%90%A5%E5%9C%B0%E2%80%9D%E6%88%96%E2%80%9C%E9%9B%86%E4%B8%AD%E8%90%A5%E2%80%9D%E8%AF%B4%E6%B3%95%E7%BA%AF%E5%B1%9E%E6%B1%A1%E8%94%91%E5%8D%81%E5%88%86%E8%8D%92%E8%B0%AC.webm)
- State Council Information Office, [The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang](https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm) (18 March 2019) and [Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang](https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201908/17/content_WS5d57573cc6d0c6695ff7ed6c.html) (16 August 2019)
- CGTN, 12 December 2019: [Documenting the fight against terrorism in China's Xinjiang](https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-12-12/Documenting-the-fight-against-terrorism-in-China-s-Xinjiang-MmmfqsFCrC/index.html)
- China Daily, 10 December 2019: [Trainees 'have all graduated' from centers](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201912/10/WS5def0737a310cf3e3557d1ee.html); Radio Free Asia, 9 December 2019: [China claims all Xinjiang detainees have 'graduated'](https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/graduation-12092019154443.html)
- China News Service, 10 February 2021: [press conference video of former "trainees", via Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2021%E5%B9%B42%E6%9C%8810%E6%97%A5_%E6%96%B0%E7%96%86%E6%95%99%E5%9F%B9%E4%B8%AD%E5%BF%83%E7%BB%93%E4%B8%9A%E5%AD%A6%E5%91%98%E9%A9%B3%E9%81%AD%E5%8F%97%E7%B3%BB%E7%BB%9F%E6%80%A7%E6%80%A7%E4%BE%B5%EF%BC%9A%E2%80%9C%E6%88%91%E4%BB%AC%E5%85%A8%E4%BD%93%E5%A5%B3%E5%AD%A6%E5%91%98%E9%83%BD%E6%84%9F%E5%88%B0%E5%BE%88%E6%84%A4%E6%80%92%E2%80%9D.webm)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC: [Hua Chunying's regular press conference, 31 March 2021](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202103/t20210331_9170717.html)
- Albert Zhang, Jacob Wallis and Zoe Meers, [Strange bedfellows on Xinjiang: the CCP, fringe media and US social media platforms](https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2021-03/Strange%20bedfellows.pdf), ASPI, March 2021
- ProPublica and The New York Times, June 2021: [How China Spreads Its Propaganda Version of Life for Uyghurs](https://www.propublica.org/article/how-china-uses-youtube-and-twitter-to-spread-its-propaganda-version-of-life-for-uyghurs-in-xinjiang)
- Twitter, 2 December 2021: [Disclosing state-linked information operations we've removed](https://blog.x.com/en_us/topics/company/2021/disclosing-state-linked-information-operations-we-ve-removed)
- Stanford Internet Observatory, [One Topic, Two Networks: Evaluating Two Chinese Influence Operations on Twitter Related to Xinjiang](https://fsi.stanford.edu/publication/one-topic-two-networks) (December 2021)
- Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Albert Zhang and Jacob Wallis, [#StopXinjiang Rumors: the CCP's decentralised disinformation campaign](https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2021-12/StopXinjiangRumours-v2.pdf), ASPI Policy Brief 54/2021
- Adrian Zenz, [New Evidence for China's Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang](https://jamestown.org/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang/), Jamestown Foundation China Brief, May 2018; ChinaFile, [Where Did the One Million Figure for Detentions in Xinjiang's Camps Come From?](https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/where-did-one-million-figure-detentions-xinjiangs-camps-come)
- ICIJ, November 2019: [Exposed: China's Operating Manuals for Mass Internment and Arrest by Algorithm](https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/); [About the China Cables investigation](https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/about-the-china-cables-investigation/)
- CNN, February 2020: [the Karakax document](https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2020/02/asia/xinjiang-china-karakax-document-intl-hnk/) and [Chinese government disputes Xinjiang detention records leaked to CNN](https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/25/asia/xinjiang-karakax-list-china-response-intl-hnk/index.html)
- U.S. Department of State, 19 January 2021: [Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang](https://2017-2021.state.gov/determination-of-the-secretary-of-state-on-atrocities-in-xinjiang/); Washington Post, 30 March 2021: [Biden administration formalizes genocide declaration against Beijing](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-genocide-human-rights-report/2021/03/30/b2fa8312-9193-11eb-9af7-fd0822ae4398_story.html)
- Foreign Policy, 19 February 2021: [State Department lawyers concluded insufficient evidence to prove genocide in China](https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/19/china-uighurs-genocide-us-pompeo-blinken/)
- U.S. Department of State: [Secretary Blinken's Roundtable with Xinjiang Internment Camp Survivors and Advocates](https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-roundtable-with-xinjiang-internment-camp-survivors-and-advocates/) (readout of the 6 July 2021 meeting)
- Forbes, 2 April 2021: [U.S. State Department confirms the finding of the Uyghur genocide](https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2021/04/02/us-state-department-confirms-the-finding-of-the-uyghur-genocide-chinese-foreign-ministry-spokesperson-denies-yet-again/)
- CBC News, 22 February 2021: [MPs vote to label China's persecution of Uighurs a genocide](https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/uighur-genocide-motion-vote-1.5922711); Al Jazeera, 26 February 2021: [Dutch parliament says China's treatment of Uighurs is genocide](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/26/dutch-parliament-says-chinas-treatment-of-uighurs-is-genocide); CNN, 22 April 2021: [UK lawmakers declare China's treatment of Uyghurs is genocide](https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/22/world/uk-china-uyghur-genocide-motion-gbr-intl/index.html)
- Uyghur Tribunal, [Judgment, 9 December 2021](https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Uyghur-Tribunal-Judgment-9th-Dec-21.pdf); China Daily, 16 June 2021: [Uyghur Tribunal a 'propaganda show' against China](https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202106/16/WS60c9955ea31024ad0bac9786.html)
- Al Jazeera, 24 May 2022: [Xinjiang leak sheds new light on China's Uighur camps](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/24/xinjiang-leak-sheds-new-light-on-chinas-uighur-camps); UK House of Commons, 24 May 2022: [Xinjiang Internment Camps: Shoot-to-Kill Policy](https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2022-05-24/debates/FCB750C1-EBD7-4D1F-A739-E5034666FDD5/XinjiangInternmentCampsShoot-To-KillPolicy)
- OHCHR, 31 August 2022: [Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf)
- Permanent Mission of the PRC in Geneva, 1 September 2022: [Spokesperson Liu Yuyin's remarks on the so-called "assessment" on Xinjiang](http://geneva.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/ryrbt/202209/t20220901_10758786.htm)
- Same-method comparisons: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program*, executive summary (2014); Chris Bing and Joel Schectman, "Pentagon ran secret anti-vax campaign to undermine China during pandemic", Reuters, 14 June 2024; Graphika and Stanford Internet Observatory, [*Unheard Voice: Evaluating Five Years of Pro-Western Covert Influence Operations*](https://www.graphika.com/reports/unheard-voice) (August 2022); Meta, *Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report, Q3 2022* (November 2022).