---
title: The Division of News
url: https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/08-the-division-of-news/
description: The Division of News, from How We Advertised America by George Creel.
section: FRAME
---

![Illustration: an interwar radio-and-newsreel intelligence collage with a 1930s map of Europe and propaganda poster proofs.](https://propagandaarchive.org/static/generated/detail/hero-interwar.jpg)

[Library](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/) · Book · [How We Advertised America](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/)

# The Division of News

This text

- **Work:** [How We Advertised America](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/)
- **Author:** George Creel
- **Published:** 1920

Full details

- **Rights:** Published in the United States in 1920, more than 95 years ago, so in the public domain in the United States; the Internet Archive lists the scan as not in copyright. Creel died in 1953, so the text is also in the public domain in countries that count the author's life plus 70 years.

Chapters

1. [Dedicatory](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/01-dedicatory/)
2. [Foreword](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/02-foreword/)
3. Part I: The Domestic Section
4. [The “Second Lines”](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/03-the-second-lines/)
5. [The “Censorship” Bugbear](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/04-the-censorship-bugbear/)
6. [The “Fourth of July Fake”](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/05-the-fourth-of-july-fake/)
7. [The Committee’s “Aircraft Lies”](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/06-the-committee-s-aircraft-lies/)
8. [Relations with Congress](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/07-relations-with-congress/)
9. [The Division of News](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/08-the-division-of-news/)
10. [The Four Minute Men](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/09-the-four-minute-men/)
11. [The Fight for the Mind of Mankind](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/10-the-fight-for-the-mind-of-mankind/)
12. [The Battle of the Films](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/11-the-battle-of-the-films/)
13. [The “Battle of the Fences”](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/12-the-battle-of-the-fences/)
14. [The War Expositions](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/13-the-war-expositions/)
15. [The Speaking Division](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/14-the-speaking-division/)
16. [The Advertising Division](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/15-the-advertising-division/)
17. [The “Americanizers”](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/16-the-americanizers/)
18. [Work among the Foreign-Born](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/17-work-among-the-foreign-born/)
19. [A Wonderful Fourth of July](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/18-a-wonderful-fourth-of-july/)
20. [The “Official Bulletin”](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/19-the-official-bulletin/)
21. [Division of Women’s War-Work](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/20-division-of-women-s-war-work/)
22. [Other Divisions](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/21-other-divisions/)
23. [Showing America to the Foreign Press](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/22-showing-america-to-the-foreign-press/)
24. Part II: The Foreign Section
25. [The Fight in Foreign Countries](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/23-the-fight-in-foreign-countries/)
26. [America’s World News Service](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/24-america-s-world-news-service/)
27. [The Foreign Mail Service](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/25-the-foreign-mail-service/)
28. [Fighting with Films](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/26-fighting-with-films/)
29. [Breaking through the Enemy Censorship](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/27-breaking-through-the-enemy-censorship/)
30. [France, England, and Italy](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/28-france-england-and-italy/)
31. [The Work in Mexico](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/29-the-work-in-mexico/)
32. [The Work in Switzerland](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/30-the-work-in-switzerland/)
33. [The Work in Holland](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/31-the-work-in-holland/)
34. [The Work in Spain](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/32-the-work-in-spain/)
35. [The Work in Scandinavia](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/33-the-work-in-scandinavia/)
36. [The Work in the Orient](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/34-the-work-in-the-orient/)
37. [The Work in South America](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/35-the-work-in-south-america/)
38. [The Russian Campaign](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/36-the-russian-campaign/)
39. Part III: Demobilization
40. [After the Armistice](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/37-after-the-armistice/)
41. [“Americanizing” Mittel Europa](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/38-americanizing-mittel-europa/)
42. [Confusion and Neglect](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/39-confusion-and-neglect/)
43. Appendix
44. [The American Newspaper Publishers’ Association](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/40-the-american-newspaper-publishers-association/)
45. [“Savagery” vs. Sanity](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/41-savagery-vs-sanity/)
46. [Publications of the Committee on Public Information in the United States](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/42-publications-of-the-committee-on-public-informat/)

[← Relations with Congress](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/07-relations-with-congress/) [The Four Minute Men →](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/09-the-four-minute-men/)

**Content note:** Quotes wartime anti-German language, including "Hun", and period terms for racial and national groups. This object is shown as it was published. [Why](https://propagandaarchive.org/about/#as-it-was)

EOKING back, it seems a miracle that the original purpose of the Committee's existence should have survived the terrific strain of creation. Everything with which we had to do was new and foreign to the democratic process. There were no standards to measure by, no trails to follow, and, as if these were not difficulties enough, the necessities of the hour commanded instant action. Even before any allotment of funds, before an organization could be gathered or quarters secured, the Committee was forced into urgent duties and decisions.

We found temporary lodgment in the navy library, a shadowy, shelf -filled room peopled by quiet, retiring gentlewomen, who shuddered in corners while noisy mobs invaded their sanctuary. Every day saw and heard its hundreds of callers — eager patriots, duty-dodgers, job-hunters, cranks, inventors, Congressmen with constituents to place — buzzing like a locust swarm and devouring time with much the same rapacity.

Arthur Bullard and Ernest Poole, quitting their literary work at the first call to arms, came to my aid, and were followed by Edgar G. Sisson, who resigned his post as editor of The Cosmopolitan that he might serve. When I think of their unselfish drudgeries, their contributions from loyal hearts and driving minds, I find fault with every phrase designed to convey appreciation. Bullard,

7Q with his first-hand knowledge of countries and peoples and his even more intimate study of the Allied effort to capture public opinion; Poole, with his clear, democratic vision; and Sisson, with his tireless energy and rare executive genius — shot light through the general confusion, and, in spite of every hopelessness, purposes commenced to take form.

The voluntary censorship, driven through in the best fashion that conditions permitted, was companioned by the creation of machinery for the collection and issuance of the official news of government. Out of that early chaos also came the Official Bulletin, the Four Minute Men, the mobilization of the artists and the novelists, and various other ideas that had a later fruitage.

For shelter we managed finally to rent quarters at 10 Jackson Place, an old dwelling-house once the home of either Daniel Webster or John C. Calhoun, tradition dividing sharply in the matter. What we should have done was to have commandeered an apartment-house at the very start, but as a result of incessant attack economy obsessed me, an obsession, by the way, that remained to hamper and delay. The house next door was not leased until we had men and women working in basement cubbyholes and attic cells, and a third dwelling was taken over only when kitchens and hallways were filled to overflowing.

The Division of News, fitting the voluntary censorship as skin fits the hand, was equally fundamental as far as the purpose of the Committee was concerned. With the press depended upon to protect military information of tangible benefit to the enemy, it became an obligation to meet the legitimate demand for all war news that contained no military secrets. It was not a duty, however, that could be left safely to the peace-time practice of the press with its uninterrupted daily swing of reporters through the various departments, the buttonholing of clerks, and the haphazard business of permitting minor officials to make unchecked and unauthorized statements. Nor was there room for the "scoop," since war news could not be looked upon in any other light than common property calling for common issuance.

There were also dangers from the other side. Admirals and generals had been reared in a school of iron silence, and as a result of their training looked upon the war-machinery as something that had to be hidden under lock and key. To the average military mind everything connected with war was a "secret," and the press itself had no rights that needed to be respected. Even in the few cases where officials appreciated the value of publicity there was an utter lack of the "news sense," with the result that trivialities were brought forward and real importances buried.

What was needed, and what we installed, was official machinery for the preparation and release of all news bearing upon America's war effort — not opinion nor conjecture, but facts — a running record of each day's progress in order that the fathers and mothers of the United States might gain a certain sense of partnership. Newspaper men of standing and ability were sworn into the government service and placed at the very heart of endeavor in the War and Navy departments, in the War Trade Board, the War Industries Board, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Labor. It was their job to take deadwood out of the channels of information, permitting a free and continuous flow.

A more delicate and difficult task could not have been conceived, for both the press and the officials viewed the arrangement with distrust, if not hostility. On the side of government there was the deep conviction that necessary concealments were being violated, and even when this antagonism was overcome there developed the assumption that only "favorable news" should be given out for publication. It was our insistence that the bad should be told with the good, failures admitted along with the announcements of success, and that the representatives of the Committee should have the unquestioned right to exercise their news sense and to check up every statement in the interest of absolute accuracy. Owing to the unswerving support of Secretary Baker and Secretary Daniels, we carried our contentions, and after much preliminary creaking the machine commenced to function with smoothness and certainty.

On the part of the press there was the fear, and a very natural one, that the new order of things meant "press-agenting" on a huge scale. This fear could not be argued away, but had to be met by actual demonstration of its groundlessness. Our job, therefore, was to present the facts without the slightest trace of color or bias, either in the selection of news or the manner in which it was presented. Thus, in practice, the Division of News set forth in exactly the same colorless style the remarkable success of the Browning guns, on the one hand, and on the other the existence of bad health conditions in three or four of the cantonments. In time the correspondents realized that we were running a government news bureau, not a press agency, and their support became cordial and sincere.

The Division of News kept open the whole twenty-four hours. Every "story," on the moment of its completion, was mimeographed and "put on the table" in the pressroom where the news associations kept regular men, and to which the correspondents came regularly. . These "stories" were "live news," meant for the telegraphwire, and the method employed assured speedy, authoritative, and equitable distribution of the decisions, activities and intentions of the government in its war-making branches.

Not only this, but the Division of News was the one central information bureau. Before its creation Washington correspondents, running down a "story" or tracking a rumor, were compelled to visit innumerable offices, working delay to overburdened officials, or else telephoning endlessly, even dragging department heads out of their beds at ungodly hours. Our desk men, in touch with every happening at every hour of the day and night, were able to confirm or deny, so that one visit or one telephone-call met the need of the correspondent, saving his time and likewise the time of officials.

No attempt was made, however, to prevent independent news-gathering or to interfere with individual contacts. It was our insistence and arrangement that correspondents should have daily interviews with all executive heads, and in every case where a correspondent, feature-writer, or magazine- writer had an idea for a "story" either we supplied him with the facts, information, and statistics desired or else cleared the way for him to get his material first hand.

When we found that the rural press was experiencing a sense of neglect, in that it had neither wire service nor Washington correspondents, we secured the services of a capable "country editor" from the state of Washington, and had him prepare a weekly digest of the official war news that went to the country weeklies in galley form. Country dailies also asked to be put on this list, which grew to more than twelve thousand. At any intimation that this matter was not desired the paper was removed from the mailing-list, and by this and other checking we were able to keep a more or less careful watch on the extent to which the service was used. It ran as high as six thousand columns a week.

The Division of News also operated the voluntary censorship, advising and interpreting the government's requests for secrecy in the matter of purely military information. Each Washington correspondent, likewise every newspaper office in the United States, had the card that bore these requests; nevertheless, there were hundreds of inquiries daily as to "what the government wanted" or did not want. The men on the reference-desk either insisted that the news item in point was fully covered by the card or advised that there was no objection to publication. In all cases of doubt, decision was referred to Gen. Frank Mclntyre, acting for the War Department, or to the navy representative, who rendered the official ruling. In no instance, however, was any direct order laid upon the press. It was up to each correspondent to comply with the wishes of the government or to reject them, the decision being left entirely to his common sense and patriotism. The Committee itself was at all times careful to avoid any appearance of censorship, refusing to assume authorities and holding fast to the safe role of adviser and interpreter.

There can be no question as to the value of the Division of News to the government itself. Through its news-gathering machinery it gave to the people a daily chronicle of the war effort so frank, complete, and accurate that in time it developed a public confidence that stood like iron against the assaults of rumor and the hysteria of whispered alarm.

Nor can there be any question as to the value of the division to the press. It saved the newspapers thousands of dollars in time and in men by the daily delivery and equitable distribution of the official war news, and was equally quick to assist in the handling of larger problems. In the case of the casualty lists, for instance, ordinary procedure would have compelled the three press associations, and such papers as maintained independent services, to make separate copies for separate distribution over the telegraph-wires. This duty was assumed by the Division of News, and a plan was worked out by which the Committee printed the lists and mailed them to newspapers with a five-day release date. By this method the press was saved the time and money and the overburdened wires out of Washington were relieved of a crushing burden. The system meant no delay in the notification of relatives, who received word by telegram from the Adjutant- General's office several days in advance of publication in the newspapers.

As a matter of fact, the Division of News stood at all times as the servant and champion of the newspapers, making daily and vigorous fight against unnecessary secrecies. By way of illustration, it was the original decision that correspondents should not be permitted to accompany General Pershing and the first troops that went to France. The Committee insisted that such a course would arouse just and wide-spread indignation, and by dint of unanswerable argument we won a ruling from Secretary Baker that recognized the right of the press to adequate representation. Commencing with the men selected by the news associations, the number was increased carefully and intelligently until twenty-three accredited correspondents were at headquarters in France. At this point General Pershing put his foot down hard, cabling that there were twice as many correspondents with the small American force as with the great armies of England and France, a fact that was commencing to cause laughter and ridicule.

All of which was true, but it was equally true that neither England nor France was sending soldiers three thousand miles from home, nor was it taken into consideration that the United States had ten times as many papers as the French or the English. The order held, but the Committee refused to admit defeat and devised a scheme of "warzone visits." Our Paris office, working in conjunction with the American, French, and English authorities, gained permission to conduct correspondents to the various fronts on inspection tours. This done, the Washington office made itself reponsible for passports and letters of introduction, with the result that no responsible, duly accredited American newspaper man was denied the right to see and study the American effort in France.

The Grand Fleet was another case in point. We were willing to admit that there should be secrecy as to the number and whereabouts of our war-ships, but we saw only absurdity in the attempt to hide the fact that there really was a fleet and that it was ready to fight. One of the most popular pre-war lies was the "demoralization of the navy." What finer message to carry to the people than the might of "the gray, mailed fist"? Secretary Daniels and Admiral Mayo saw the force of the argument, and the Committee was permitted to send party after party of correspondents and writers to Yorktown, where the war-ships of the United States lay at anchor in the early days of the war. Not one word was ever printed as to location or number, but the daily and periodical press was filled with columns that told America of our naval invincibility. The two articles by Mary Roberts Rinehart, published in The Saturday Evening Post, were worth a host of recruiting officers, for they told the people that the first line of defense was worthy of full confidence and complete reliance.

The same system was followed with respect to cantonments, shipyards, and munition-factories, and as a result a flood of positive news crowded out the negative and destructive. Another thing that aided materially in the stabilization of public opinion was the open pledge of the army and the navy that all accidents, disasters, and casualties would be given instant announcement. It was a pledge that was kept.

The Committee, while safeguarding the interests of the government and upholding the rights of the press, felt that its true responsibility was to the people of the United States. As a consequence of this belief, which put us between the press and the government as an independent, impartial force, the Committee met with almost constant attack from either one side or the other. When we supported the contentions of the correspondents, the admirals and generals declared that we wanted "to run the war in the interest of the newspapers," and when we accepted censorship rulings as sound and reasonable, the press talked wildly of gags and muzzles. Sometimes it was the case that both sides joined in attack, forgetting differences in the joy of a common irritation.

For instance, in March, 1918, in the absence of Secretary Baker, and without previous warning or consultation, the War Department curtly informed us that thereafter all casualty lists must be issued to the press without the home address or the name of the next of kin. The form that we had been following was as follows:

Wounded: Private John Jones. S. J. Jones (father) 2 Yale Street, Brooklyn, N. Y.

The new War Department order prescribed this form: Wounded: Private John Jones.

We realized at once that the thousands of identical names in the United States made it certain that the new form would work anxiety and suffering to countless homes. Merely to announce that John Jones or Patrick Kelly was killed or wounded meant that the parents, relatives, and friends of the innumerable John Joneses and Patrick Kellys would be given over to every fear and grief, since there was nothing to indicate exact identity.

We took up the matter with Assistant-Secretary Crowell at once, and asked the reason for the sudden and astonishing change in plans. Boiled down, this was the explanation given : The German spies, reading the printed casualty lists, would proceed at once to the home and there, under some pretense, worm out of the family the unit to which the soldier belonged. Then the spy would transmit the information to Berlin and Berlin would then send it to the front, thus acquainting the German generals with the character of the American troops that faced them.

As we pointed out, why should the Germans adopt this tedious, roundabout method when a trench raid would give them the same information in a night? And even if we granted the absurd contention that there were .enough German spies in America to visit homes in every city, how would they convey then* information to Germany? Assistant-Secretary Crowell ended the discussion by the brusk declaration that the military authorities were in possession of conclusive proof that Berlin received American news within twenty-four hours of its publication. Unable to secure any modification of the order, and deeply convinced that it was as stupid as it was cruel, the Committee refused to issue casualty lists in the new form.

For a full year the press had thundered at the Committee as an "agency of repression," yet now, when we were standing for a sane and proper publicity, the papers described a virtuous roundabout, and attacked the Committee for its "impudent presumption" in daring to question the War Department's efforts to safeguard the military secrets of America.

The Committee stood by its position, and I deemed the matter of sufficient gravity to carry it to the President himself. I cited hundreds of cases of families needlessly torn by anguish and told of the avalanche of telephonecalls and telegrams from all parts of the country. In addition to this I insisted that the War Department should produce its proof that German spies in tnis country were in communication regularly with Berlin. Grudgingly enough, the alleged proof was brought forward and was seen to be the desired publication in German papers of news of American effort designed to weaken German morale by steady hammering on the inevitability of German defeat from the growing American force — news that the Committee itself had sent to Holland and which our representative in The Hague had managed to slip into Germany past the censorship.

In five minutes the whole Crowell contention was shown to be the last word in absurdity, and the President ordered a return to the former method that gave the home address and the next of kin

Such conditions inevitably made the Division of News a storm-center, and the fact that it rode the waves to success is in itself the best commentary upon the devotions and abilities of the men who were called upon to direct this most important department of the Committee's endeavor.

It was Mr. Sisson who gave form and purpose to the division, organizing the machinery to operate the voluntary censorship, as well as gathering and training the organization for news collection and distribution. Passing time compelled many changes, but they were in detail only, for Mr. Sisson built on the solid rock of common sense, justice, efficiency, and impartiality. L. Ames Brown, the Washington writer and newspaper man, was the first director of the division, and, when transferred to inaugurate a new line of work, was succeeded by Mr. J. W. McConaghy, who left his position in the New York newspaper field to serve with us. He brought energy and ideas, and during his regime the scope of the work was broadened materially. Mr. McConaghy, drafted by the Foreign Section to make a survey of the Central-American countries, was succeeded by Mr. Leigh Reilly, formerly managing editor of The Chicago Record-Herald, a man of rich experience and highest standing in the newspaper profession. He bore the great burden of the summer and autumn of 1918, and the credit for efficiency in the period of supreme stress is his.

As far as the work itself was concerned, the two most important tasks were in connection with the army and the navy, for these afforded not only the bulk of the news, but it was the news that dealt with the importances of life and death. With respect to the navy, we were fortunate at the very outset in securing the services of John Wilbur Jenkins, dean of the Baltimore newspaper fraternity, for in his indefatigable little body he coupled an invincible placidity with amazing steadfastness. Storms might break upon him and every wind of confusion roar about him, but when the sun came out again it was invariably the case that John Wilbur was to be seen plugging along at his original task, serene and unchanged. He won the respect of every naval official, and this relationship was no small factor in promoting the success of a working arrangement bound up with so many prejudices and decisions.

It was Secretary Daniels himself, however, who made the Committee's contacts with the navy as effective as they were pleasant, for, more than any other high official in Washington, save the President, he had common sense and abiding faith in straightforward truth-telling. He wanted the people to know, and in every dispute his decision was always on the side of openness. Admiral Benson early caught the spirit of the Committee's endeavor, and gave it confidence and undeviating support. Admiral Earle, Admiral Taylor, and Admiral Palmer were also our honored helpers.

The War Department was no such easy problem. Infinitely more huge and complex than the navy, it bubbled new activities each day, all far-reaching, and each one a mass of delicate detail. First we "tried out" Hey wood Brown, of The New York Tribune, but he returned to his paper in a short while, and we then reached forth and plucked Wallace Irwin away from his prose and poetry. While his bodily strength lasted the brilliance of his work was equaled only by his personal popularity, but he didn't last long enough. There was no question as to the drudgery of the position, but what really brought about his collapse was worry. Strangely enough for a poet and novelist, Wallace had an ingrowing conscience, and after working eighteen hours a day he spent the remaining six fretting over sins of omission. As a consequence, he took to his bed one fine day, and an indignant wife transported him to New York "beyond our clutches."

At that time Marlen Pew was running The Editor and Publisher, and before that was one of the "star men" of the Newspaper Enterprise Association. Of all the field, he looked the best, and there was never occasion to regret the choice. Every inch a progressive, with an insistent belief in the right of the people to have the facts, he had the courage of his very intense convictions, and he finished his service with the proud record of never having lost a battle with red tape or mossbackism. He created a machinery that functioned with almost automatic precision, even winning the reluctant admiration of the Washington correspondents to such a degree that they asked its continuance when the Committee abandoned the work after the armistice. Mr. Arthur Crawford, formerly of The Chicago Herald, looked after the Quartermaster's Department; Mr. Edwin Newdick, who came to us from The Christian Science Monitor, worked with the Surgeon- General; Mr. Carl H. Butman covered the Aircraft Board; and other representatives in other divisions of the War Department were Mr. Livy Richards of Boston and Mr. John Calvin Mellet, formerly with the International News Service.

Other branches of the government were no less well served by newspaper men of the same high character and proved ability. Mr. Archibald Mattingly, Mr. Charles P. Sweeney, Mr. Garrard Harris, and Mr. E. H. Hitchcock measured up to every demand of their difficult positions, contributing materially to the achievement of the division.

Mr. Kenneth Durant and Mr. Charles Willoughby, dividing the duties of the reference-desk, had difficult positions, for it was was to them that inquiries came. Hour in and hour out, they answered them with ability, patience, fairness, and never-failing tact.

Even to-day, when I review the work of the Division of News in critical dispassion, I thrill to the sheer wonder of the achievement. Here was a brand-new organization, called to do a brand-new thing, assembled under highest pressure and driven at top speed at all times, and yet its record for accuracy is without parallel in the annals of news-gathering. During the eighteen months of existence it cleared all of the official war news of government, issuing more than six thousand releases. Every one of these releases ran the gantlet of incessant and hostile scrutiny, yet only three were ever subjected to direct attack on the score of inaccuracy.1 In two of these cases the Committee was justified by investigation, while the fault in the third instance was that of a high official whose word could not be questioned.

Chapters 3 and 4.

[← Relations with Congress](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/07-relations-with-congress/) [The Four Minute Men →](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/09-the-four-minute-men/)

How We Advertised America, George Creel. Published in the United States in 1920, more than 95 years ago, so in the public domain in the United States; the Internet Archive lists the scan as not in copyright. Creel died in 1953, so the text is also in the public domain in countries that count the author's life plus 70 years. [Provenance and rights](https://propagandaarchive.org/library/creel-how-we-advertised-america-1920/).