---
title: Osami Nagano
url: https://propagandaarchive.org/quotes/osami-nagano/
description: 6 verified quotes from Osami Nagano, Chief of the Naval General Staff (1941-44), with sources.
section: FRAME
---

![Illustration: a Second World War naval-intelligence collage of a Pacific theatre map, aerial reconnaissance photographs and radar plots.](https://propagandaarchive.org/static/generated/detail/hero-wwii-pacific.jpg)

[Quotes](https://propagandaarchive.org/quotes/) · Japan

# Osami Nagano

![Admiral Osami Nagano before 1943](https://propagandaarchive.org/regimes/images/showa-japan/osami-nagano.jpg)

[Photo](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:ADMIRAL_O.NAGANO.jpg): Unknown, Public domain (PD-Japan-oldphoto)

Chief of the Naval General Staff (1941-44) · Japan

On the regime page: [Empire of Japan, 1937 to 1945](https://propagandaarchive.org/regimes/showa-japan/#osami-nagano)

6 quotes, oldest first. [Filter with other speakers](https://propagandaarchive.org/quotes/#speaker=osami-nagano).

1. > “However, even when the Empire gains a victory in this decisive battle, such a victory alone would not end the war. In all probability, the opponent will then switch to a prolonged war based on the strength of his superiority in industrial power and resources. Our Empire has not means by which to subjugate the enemy by invasion operations or to break his will to fight. Moreover, a long war is what we least desire because of the meagerness of our domestic resources.” — English: English text of Japanese Monograph No. 147 (Military History Section, HQ Army Forces Far East). Original-language text not found. — September 6, 1941 · Statement · Tokyo, Imperial Conference in the presence of Hirohito Verified (secondary source) — Navy Chief of Staff's explanation of the operational outlook to the Imperial Conference that adopted the 'Outline for the Execution of the Empire's National Policy', which set a timetable for war preparations alongside diplomacy. — Explanation by Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano at the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, Japanese Monograph No. 147, Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part III (Military History Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East), Appendix 3, p. A3-ii, as published on ibiblio.org [Source](https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/147/147app03.html)
2. > “By the latter half of next year, military preparations of the United States will have made such rapid strides that we will find it difficult to oppose them. Therefore, wasting time now can prove disastrous for the Empire.” — English: English text of Japanese Monograph No. 147 (Military History Section, HQ Army Forces Far East). Original-language text not found. — September 6, 1941 · Statement · Tokyo, Imperial Conference in the presence of Hirohito Verified (secondary source) — From the same explanation, on the growth of American, British and other military preparations in the Far East. — Explanation by Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano at the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, Japanese Monograph No. 147, Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part III (Military History Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East), Appendix 3, p. A3-i, as published on ibiblio.org [Source](https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/147/147app03.html)
3. > “We must avoid any war which can be avoided. But at the same time, for the future interest of our Empire we must not be forced into a position where we would have to fight under extremely disadvantageous conditions.” — English: English text of Japanese Monograph No. 147 (Military History Section, HQ Army Forces Far East). Original-language text not found. — September 6, 1941 · Statement · Tokyo, Imperial Conference in the presence of Hirohito Verified (secondary source) — Closing words of the same explanation, qualifying the military timetable. — Explanation by Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano at the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, Japanese Monograph No. 147, Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part III (Military History Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East), Appendix 3, p. A3-iv, as published on ibiblio.org [Source](https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/147/147app03.html)
4. **Content note:** Military order preparing for war. The words are shown as they were said or written. [Why](https://propagandaarchive.org/about/#as-it-was) — > “Because it is feared that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is inevitable, it has been decided that for the sake of the Empire's defense general operational preparations will be completed by the first part of December.” — English: Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, US Army Forces Pacific (1945), as printed in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 13. Original-language text not found. — November 5, 1941 · Statement · Tokyo, Imperial General Headquarters Verified (secondary source) — Order to the Combined Fleet issued the day of the Imperial Conference that approved preparations for war with the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. It directed that operational preparations be completed by early December. — Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 1 (essentials), 5 November 1941, Chief of the Naval General Staff Nagano to CinC Combined Fleet Yamamoto; Reply to a Questionnaire Concerning the Pearl Harbor Attack, Doc. #1032 (Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, US Army Forces Pacific, 17-20 October 1945), enclosed in GHQ SCAP letter AG 350.05 of 1 November 1945, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 8, in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 13 (US Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 415 [Source](https://archive.org/details/pearlharborattac13unit)
5. **Content note:** Military order opening hostilities. The words are shown as they were said or written. [Why](https://propagandaarchive.org/about/#as-it-was) — > “It has been decided that JAPAN will commence hostilities with the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND and the NETHERLANDS in the first part of December.” — English: Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, US Army Forces Pacific (1945), as printed in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 13. Original-language text not found. — December 1, 1941 · Statement · Tokyo, Imperial General Headquarters Verified (secondary source) — Order issued after the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941 approved the decision for war. Paragraph A of the order; later paragraphs direct operations against enemy forces and bases. — Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9 (essentials), 1 December 1941, Chief of the Naval General Staff Nagano to CinC Combined Fleet Yamamoto; Reply to a Questionnaire Concerning the Pearl Harbor Attack, Doc. #1032 (Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, US Army Forces Pacific, 17-20 October 1945), enclosed in GHQ SCAP letter AG 350.05 of 1 November 1945, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 8, in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 13 (US Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 416 [Source](https://archive.org/details/pearlharborattac13unit)
6. **Content note:** Military order setting the date for attack. The words are shown as they were said or written. [Why](https://propagandaarchive.org/about/#as-it-was) — > “Beginning 8 December, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will start using military power in accordance with Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9.” — English: Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, US Army Forces Pacific (1945), as printed in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 13. Original-language text not found. — December 2, 1941 · Statement · Tokyo, Imperial General Headquarters Verified (secondary source) — Order fixing 8 December 1941 (Tokyo time) as the day the Combined Fleet would begin using military force. The same day a verbal directive allowed for recall of the fleet if a Japanese-American agreement was reached before hostilities began. — Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 12 (essentials), 2 December 1941, Chief of the Naval General Staff Nagano to CinC Combined Fleet Yamamoto; Reply to a Questionnaire Concerning the Pearl Harbor Attack, Doc. #1032 (Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, US Army Forces Pacific, 17-20 October 1945), enclosed in GHQ SCAP letter AG 350.05 of 1 November 1945, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 8, in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 13 (US Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 417 [Source](https://archive.org/details/pearlharborattac13unit)
