Pentagon-linked gc_ network of pseudo-news sites

Filed

September 10, 2026, 10:10 UTC

Actor

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) / Department of Defense information operations ecosystem and contractors (including General Dynamics Information Technology / GDIT; infrastructure and advertising links to prior TRWI and second-generation CENTCOM-linked sites)

Target

Arabic- and Farsi-speaking audiences in the Middle East (Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt, Iran and diaspora), plus secondary Latin American, Russian-speaking, Indo-Pacific and other regional audiences; public discourse on Iran regime vulnerability, Gulf partners, China influence, and U.S. regional security priorities

Confidence

high Multiple independent open sources, low disagreement about the facts

Techniques

Narrative laundering Card stacking Synthetic media

Channels

pseudo-independent news websites with attenuated U.S. government funding disclosures
paid advertising on Meta and Google for reach
social media accounts (X, Instagram, YouTube) without platform state-media labels
shared codebase, GTM containers and design elements linking generations
occasional AI-generated on-air presenters
selective quoting of CENTCOM releases and aligned framing

Summary

Investigative reporting by The Intercept and analysis by Renée DiResta on Lawfare documented a third-generation network of U.S. government-funded websites (internally tagged gc_) presenting as independent Middle Eastern and regional news outlets. Sites including Al-Fassel News (Arabic) and Pishtaz News (Farsi) carry attenuated disclosures of U.S. government funding while omitting CENTCOM links on social profiles. Promotion shifted from earlier fake-persona amplification to paid ads on Meta and Google (via contractor GDIT), generating tens of millions of views. Content focuses on Iran, Houthis, Hamas, regional security, and aligned narratives; some use of AI-generated presenters noted. Sites remain active into September 2026.

Analysis

Primary documentation consists of The Intercept’s April 2026 investigation by Sam Biddle identifying Al-Fassel and Pishtaz News as part of a U.S. government-funded network, and Renée DiResta’s May 2026 Lawfare analysis tracing a broader ‘gc_’ generation of seven sites via shared codebase, Google Tag Manager containers, design artifacts, and advertising by GDIT (the original TRWI contractor). Earlier generations (TRWI ~2008 and the 2022 ‘Unheard Voice’ second generation) used more overt CENTCOM sponsorship language and relied on fake personas that platforms removed for coordinated inauthentic behavior. The current model weakens disclosure to a generic ‘product of an international media organization publicly funded from the budget of the United States Government,’ omits labels on social profiles, and substitutes paid media buys for bot or persona amplification. View counts in the tens of millions on X for low-follower accounts, together with documented Meta and Google ad campaigns (some flagged for missing disclaimers), demonstrate purchased rather than organic reach. Content selection emphasizes Iranian repression, Houthi and Hamas liabilities, Gulf partner competence, and China-related risks in Latin America and the Indo-Pacific while downplaying counter-narratives.

The core mechanism is narrative laundering: institutional form (newsroom aesthetics, article structure, social accounts) and attenuated funding language create the surface appearance of independent journalism while the agenda, sourcing patterns, and contractor advertising trail align with U.S. military information objectives. Card-stacking appears in consistent editorial emphasis and omission. Synthetic media is present in at least one documented AI-generated newscaster. Because the operation uses the same commercial ad infrastructure available to legitimate publishers, it produces real user reactions and Community Notes rather than purely synthetic engagement, distinguishing it from classic astroturf botnets.

This qualifies as an influence operation under the taxonomy because authenticity of institutional origin and editorial independence is partially obscured (CENTCOM linkage removed from public-facing social and about pages despite forensic continuity), coordination across sites and prior generations is demonstrated by infrastructure, and the design goal is to shape foreign audience perceptions on contested security topics in ways favorable to U.S. policy. Technique scoring is independent of the actor; identical patterns of front media outlets, selective framing, and paid amplification have been documented across state and non-state operators. The post-2022 shift away from platform-violating personas toward ad-supported semi-overt sites reflects adaptation to enforcement pressure while preserving the information effect.

Literacy counter: examine funding disclosures and institutional provenance of any outlet that systematically amplifies a single state’s preferred regional narratives, especially when social profiles lack required state-media labels and advertising trails point to government contractors. Cross-check claims against primary military releases, independent local reporting, and multi-source data. Prefer named journalists with verifiable offline presence and transparent editorial governance over anonymized or contractor-operated brands optimized for paid reach. Platforms should enforce consistent disclosure labeling for government-funded media regardless of attenuated wording.

Pentagon-linked gc_ network of pseudo-news sites (Al-Fassel, Pishtaz) evolves from prior bot-driven ops to paid advertising for reach on Middle East and other audiences

Summary

Analysis

Evidence