Content note: Quotes First World War atrocity stories and abusive wartime language about the enemy, including "Hun", and period terms for racial groups, as examples of propaganda. This object is shown as it was published. Why
One prerequisite of a solid front against the enemy is cordial relations among allies. It is particularly important that allies should stimulate one another by emphasizing their strenuous exertion in the prosecution of the war. During the last War the effective entry of America into the struggle came before Italy had recovered from the collapse of Caporetto. Weary and discouraged, the Italian people were cynical of America's whole-hearted sincerity in making war. The Americans, so it was whispered about, are an industrial people, who have forgotten how to fight. They are unwilling to ' forsake their prosperous jobs for a post of danger. America had no army, did not want one, and could not raise one if she tried. Supposing that an army were actually raised, the submarines would sink all transports capable of bringing it to Europe. And, anyhow, American officers and soldiers were too inexperienced to matter much.*
The ringing keynote of American propaganda in Italy was, therefore, the invincible determination of America to smash the Central Powers, as revealed by her war preparations. The New York Office of the Committee on Public Information prepared items of news which were distributed through the Agenzi Stefani, the largest Press Association. These items had to do with military preparation, ship building, food conservation, Liberty Loans, Red Cross and other civilian services. A special mimeographed news letter was addressed to influential Italians.
^ On the Italian situation, see C. E. Merriam, ** American Publicity in Italy/' AWf^ricm Political Science Review, November, 1919.
Italian journalists were selected to tour America and report their impressions. Italians who lived in America were encouraged to write letters home, telling about the great American effort. Newspapers were induced to co-operate, pamphlets and booklets were put in print, Americans (especially of Italian origin) were sent over to speak, and motion picture reels and lantern slides were furnished in great profusion. American photographs and postcards, ribbons and buttons, posters, flags, music and exhibits were multiplied everywhere. A detachment of real, live American soldiers was brought to Italy, less for fighting than for exhibition purposes, and they aroused tremendous enthusiasm as the advance guard of America's contingent.
The dominating theme in all this was America's strenuous effort to win the War. The head of the Mission to Italy writes.
Our only inaccuracy consisted in understating the magnitude of American preparations. We felt that since Americans had a reputation as boasters it would be better to understate than to overstate, and were greatly pleased to receive, after having been in Italy for some months, a friendly criticism from an Italian who declared that the information that we were furnishing did not reveal the full strength of America's effort.
Strenuousness in the conduct of the war is not, of itself, sufficient to arouse the enthusiasm of an ally, if there is any reason to suspect that the war aims of one ally are at cross purposes with those of another. The English were continually forced to deal with an undercurrent of suspicion in France that victory would be used to the disadvantage of France. Persistent rumours crept about that the English^ were not only planning to stay in Calais, as shown by the fact that they were building quarters of permanent material, but that they were chiefly instrumental in prolonging the War for the sole purpose of using French blood to drown a dangerous commercial rival. In the hard winter of 1917 Mr. Wickham Steed, of the London Times, was- appalled to discover how much headway had been made by the insinuation that a favourable peace could be secured at any time, if England were willing to return the colonies which she had taken from Germany.
Steed seized the opportunity in one of his lectures to explain that the former colonies of Germany could never be disposed of at the arbitrary whim of Downing Street. The British Empire was no longer, strictly speaking, an Empire ; it had become a Commonwealth of Nations, whose component members had__spilt their blood in these former^’ German territories, and would never consent to permit Downing Street to use them as mere bargaining points. Steed believed that it was only by explaining the constitutional facts of the British Empire that the rumour could be squashed once and for all.‘
Some of the lukewarmness of Italy toward American participation in the War was due to the widely circulated assertion that America had entered the War to capture the commercial supremacy of the world. The American plan * See Steed, Through Thirty Years, II : 135. was to loan vast sums to the impoverished Governments of Europe and, once the War terminated, to demand compensation of an unspecified, but alarming kind. This subtle campaign of insinuation and suspicion was met by a vigorous Wilsonian propaganda, which dwelt upon the \ disinterested and humanitarian character of America's war aims.
The French were grieved to discover that American opinion was by no means united in support of the thesis that Alsace and Lorraine should be handed over to France at the end of hostilities. The French War Mission to the United States busied itself to convert the Americans, and the French High Commissioner, M. Tardieu, strained every nerve in this direction. A few months after his arrival in May, 1917, he takes pleasure in recording, this state of opinion was entirely changed. I venture to believe that the activities of my co-workers and myself, the 15,000 lectures in English where young officers, with all the authority of their war record and of their wounds, presented the pitiful situation of the captive provinces, had something to do with this transformation. (He organized an Association of Alsatians and Lorrainers in America.) Thousands of huge posters, reproducing Henner’s Alsacienne with the text of the Bordeaux protest . . . had carried the meaning and scope of our claim to every State in the Union. ^
The process of '' selling " one country to another is illustrated by the campaign to secure American support, which was waged by the friends of Lithuania in 1919. The Lithuanian National Committee retained a public relations counsel to conduct a campaign which was practically tantamount to encouraging an ally to accept the aims (complete independence) desired by its minor partner. The following moves were made by the public relations counsel :
^ Andr6 Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty, p. 240.
He had an exhaustive study made of every conceivable aspect of the problem of Lithuania from its remote and recent history and ethnic origins to its present-day marriage customs and its popular recreations. He divided his material into various categories, based primarily on the public to which it would probably make its appeal. For the amateur ethnologist he provided interest and accurate data of the racial origins of Lithuania. To the student of languages he appealed with authentic and well-written studies of the development of the Lithuanian language from its origins in Sanscrit. He told the ‘‘ sporting fan '' about Lithuanian sports, and he told the women about Lithuanian clothes. He told the jeweller about amber and provided the music lovers with concerts of Lithuanian music.
To the senators he gave the facts about Lithuania which would give them basis for favourable action. To the members of the House of Representatives he did likewise. He reflected to those communities whose crystallized opinions would be helpful in guiding other opinions facts which gave them basis for conclusions favourable to Lithuania.
A series of events which would carry with them the desired implications were planned and executed. Mass meetings were held in different cities ; petitions were drawn, signed and presented ; pilgrims made calls upon Senate and House of Representatives Committees. All the avenues of approach to the public were utilized to capitalize the public interest and bring public action. The mails carried statements of Lithuania's position to individuals who might be interested. The lecture platform resounded to Lithuania's appeal. Newspaper advertising was bought and paid for. The radio carried the message of speakers to the public. Motion pictures reached the patrons of moving picture houses.
Little by little, and phase by phase, the public, the Press, and the Government officials acquired a knowledge of the customs, the character, and the problem of Lithuania and the small Baltic nation that was seeking its freedom.
When the Lithuanian Information Bureau went before the Press Associations to correct inaccurate or misleading Polish news about the Lithuanian situation, it came there as representative of a group which had figured largely in American news for a number of weeks, as a result of the advice and activities of its public relations counsel. In the same way, when delegations of Americans, interested in the Lithuanian problem, appeared before the members of Congress or officials of the State Department, they came there as spokesmen for a country which was no longer ignored.^ ^
This sort of propaganda needs to be supplemented by constant assertions of respect and esteem. The Allies observed one another’s chief holidays. The American 4th of July was spread far and wide in Europe. American propagandists staged a great demonstration in honour of Italy’s entry into the World War (May 24th). The public addresses and statements issued by the Inter-Allied War Missions consisted in fulsome phraseology which rang true in moments of profound emotional agitation.
Each ally ought to re-enforce the themes of domestic propaganda at every point. They must stimulate each other to realize that their own interests are at once threatened and obstructed by the enemy. It was failure on this point that may have been partly responsible for the defection of revolutionary Russia from the ranks of the Entente. Colonel Robins was sent over to Russia to aid Colonel Thompson of the American Red Cross, and his version of what happened in Russia is a matter of public record in the hearing conducted before a Senatorial investigating committee. Colonel Robins went out to see what the soldiers were thinking, and when he came back, Colonel Thompson asked him : ^
^ E. L. Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion, pp. 2^~2y.
^ See F. W. Halsey (ed.), Balfour, Viviani and Joffre; The Imperial Japanese Mission, Washington, 1918 ; America's Message to the Russian People. Addresses by the Members of the Special Diplomatic Mission of the United States to Russia in the Year 1917, Boston, 1918 ; Rene Viviani, La Mission Frangaise en Am^rique, Paris, 1917. ^
Now, this thing is cutting deep, is it not — this thing that is going through Russia — this defeatist culture ? '' I said : ‘'Yes, Colonel ; and it tends to disorganize the whole Russian social fabric.'’ He said, “ Well, what about the Allied propaganda ? " I said : “ Colonel, that is worse than nothing." The Allied propaganda at that hour, Senator Overman, was this : Pictures and written words about how great France is, how tremendous England is, how overwhelming America is. “ We will have 20,000 airplanes on the front in a few weeks. In a few months we will have 4,000,000 soldiers. We will win the war in a walk." The peasant moujik said: “Oh, is that so? Well, if the Allies are going to win the war in a walk, we who have been fighting and working a long time will go back and see the folks at home " ; and the real effect of the AUied propaganda was to weaken the moral instead of strengthening it, if I am any judge of the facts.
It was agreed among us that there was an answer that was close to the ground, and that was genuine — an effort to interpret this to revolutionary Russia, cursed by the Tsar's espousal of the Allied cause in the first instance, and by all the cross-currents that followed ; that, although it was not possible at all, I knew, to get that massed revolutionary mind to think as we thought as Allies, it was possible to get them to fight Germany to save the Revolution ; and if they served the cause, we did not care anything about what they thought, and we said, “ This is the situation : We have got to interpret the holding of the front and the defeat of German militarist autocracy into terms of saving the Revolution ; and it happens to be true. We have got to say that, if the German militarist autocracy wins, the Russian Revolution is doomed. We have got to picture it until the average soldier and peasant sees behind the German bayonets the barons and feudal landlords coming to take back the land ; behind the German bayonets the feudal masters of industry coming back to transmute the 8 hours and 15 roubles of the Revolution back to the 2 roubles and 12 hours of the semi-slave days before the Revolution in the factories, mills, and mines. We have got to have them see that behind the German bayonets are the grand dukes coming to destroy their local self-governing soviets and revolutionary councils. If we do that, we can save the situation.
In the second or third conference on this matter the question of money came up. It was a large enterprise. “ How are you going to do it ? Well, it was perfectly apparent that you could not do it. There was no machinery to doit, no American or Allied bureau to do it. The Allies shared in the common curse of the autocracy in the mind of peasant Russia. It had to be Russian, and it had to be revolutionary.
There was in the Winter Palace at that time Madame Breshkovsky, that old and yet heroic figure, possibly the greatest revolutionary figure at that time. Madame Breshkovsky, after 40 years of service in Russia for the Revolution, was now at the Winter Palace in Petrograd, having come back from Siberia in a triumphal journey with great celebrations, having been received in Petrograd by one of the greatest gatherings in the history of that city — this old peasant woman and revolutionist received in the great railroad station in the chamber of the Tsar, honoured by the ministers of the government, and all that sort of thing. She was now in the Winter Palace, in the Grand Duke's suite that looked out over the Neva to Peter and Paul, where she had been three years a prisoner. It was a dramatic, a tremendous setting. I had known her, known her for 12 years, known her when she was in this country ; had helped her in some of her work at that time. I knew Nicholas Tchaikovsky, a thoroughly sincere and genuine revolutionist, and at that time the head of the Peasant Co-operative in Russia.
It was agreed by Col. Thompson that there should be organized a committee on civic education for free Russia. Madame Breshkovsk}^ should be chairman of the cnjmmittee ; and as members there should be Nicholas Tchaikovsky ; Lazaroff, the Russian revolutionist, who had been head of the milk station or dairy in Switzerland, which was really an underground statiorir for the Russian Revolution, for many years, and well known with credit through service to his country ; Gen. Neuslakovsky, the most trusted member of Kerensky's general staff, who was in active co-operation with this committee from the military angle ; and David Soskice, Kerensky's private secretary. They were to form the committee on “ Civic education in Free Russia." The programme was this : " We will begin by buying some newspapers, and with other publicity we will prepare simple statements in peasant patois and in the general terms of the Russian peasant's and workingman’s mind, by Russian peasants and workmen, not by intelligentsia. We will send into the ranks and into the peasant villages this new gospel of fighting German militarist autocracy ; not to serve the Allies but to save the Revolution.^
Colonel William B. Thompson spent one million dollars of his own money on this sort of propaganda in an effort to stave off the defection of Russia. ^
At the first of the War the keynote of the Allied propaganda was very properly the thesis of ultimate victory against an aggressive Germany. It required all the ingenuity of the Allied representatives in Russia to bolster the Russian moral during the months of August and September when the French and British armies were recoiling before the German avalanche. The French Ambassador, writing in his diary of those days, records :
I have seen to it that these events should be presented by the Russian Press in the most suitable (and perhaps the truest) light, i,e.y as a temporary and methodical retirement, a prelude to a volte-face in the near future for the purposes of a more formidable and vigorous offensive. All the papers support this tj^eory.^
^ 66/A Congress, ist Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 62. 3 : 775 et seq.
* One of the novelties of the propaganda to keep Russia in the War was the organization of a battalion of Russian women to shame the men into fighting^Germany.
He was confronted by this situation :
Financial circles in Petrograd are in continuous communication with Germany through Sweden, and all their views on the war are inspired by Berlin.
The thesis they have been expounding during the last few weeks bears a thoroughly German stamp. We must see things as they are, they say. The two groups of belligerents must realize that neither will ever succeed in vanquishing and really crushing the other. The war will inevitably end in arrangements and compromise. In that case, the sooner the better. If the hostilities continue, the Austro-Germans will organize an enormous fortified line around their present conquests, and make it impregnable. So in the future let us give up these futile offensives ; with the inviolable protection of their trenches, they will patiently wait until their disheartened adversaries moderate their demands. Thus peace will inevitably be negotiated on the basis of territorial pledges.
... I never fail to reply that it is our enemies’ vital interest to obtain a swift decision, because, when all is said and done, their material resources are limited, while ours are practically inexhaustible. In any case the German General Staff is condemned by its theories to preserve an offensive strategy. ^
There are circumstances in which the unity of operations is seriously prejudiced by stimulating the self-confidence of an ally. The Germans were fearful lest the Austrian and Hungarian authorities might grow too sanguine of the future and resent their subordination to the northern ally.®
The propaganda which is directed to disaffected groups inside a nation may be powerfully reinforced by inter- AUied co-operation. The Catholics of Italy were not only subjected to the appeals of certain Italian leaders who were friendly to the Allies, but from such men as Cardinal Gibbons, Cardinal Farley and Cardinal O'Connell, of the American hierarchy. The Labour groups of Italy were reached, not alone by pro-Ally leaders at home, but by a visiting selection of Radicals from abroad. The Americans brought over Alexander Howat (“ the man who never lost a strike") and John Spargo.
^ Palaeologue, An Ambassador’s Memoirs, I : T03.
® Palaeologue, as cited, II : to8.
* Nicolai, Nachrichtendienst, Presse, und V olksstimmnnj: Welktrieg, 59.
Inter- Allied propagandas of friendship require a reciprocal control of attitudes. Most of the friendly sentiments toward an ally are manufactured by one country among its own population. The stimulation of pro-ally emotions at home is more important than the stimulation of pro-ally sentiments abroad. The themes to employ are identical with the ones which have already been enumerated in connection with the problem of arousing an ally.
Sometimes the business of retouching the figure of an ally in the public mind is a delicate and precarious operation. Arthur Meyer frankly marvelled at the extent of the rapprochement between France and England, for he could remember when the children of Paris were chanting the couplet :
Jamais, jamais en France L' Anglais ne regnera
Sometimes a frank apology helps, as when the celebrated writer, Pierre Loti, of the French Academy, published in the Figaro his plea to Serbia :
Pauvre, petite Serbie, devenue tout k coup martyre et sublime, je voudrais au moins Ini ramener les quelques cours fran^ais que mon dernier livre a peut-gtre cloignes d'ellc.^
^ Le Gaulois, October 19, 1914.
The most delicate problem was how to evoke a pro- Russian response in the ranks of the British public. For many years the traditional menace to the Empire had been Russia, and not Germany, and the stories of Russian absolutism froze the blood of a nation inoculated with parliamentarism. The success in revamping the public attitude was indeed notable, and Basil Thompson, head of Scotland Yard, looks back upon it rather cynically from the vantage ground of subsequent years :
It is strange, now, to think that in March, 1915, Russia was thought in England to be breathing a new inspiration to the West. It w^is said that the Crusader spirit was alive again, that the whole Russian nation was inspired with a determination to rescue Constantinople for Christianity, and to win again the holy sepulchre ; . . . vodka was prohibited with the unanimous approval of the nation ;
. . . crime had almost disappeared among the peasants. . . If they were successful in the war they were told that there would be a struggle between their religious idealism and their high ethical instincts and the monster of western materialism from which, so far, they had kept themselves clean. All this was honestly believed by persons who thought they knew Russia ; now, after a short six years, their voices are heard no more.^
When a bond of traditional friendship unites two countries, it is simple to invoke it for emergencies. In this style does Gaston Riou welcome the Americans in his Lafayette, nous voild! (Paris, 1917.)
^ August 8, 1914.
* Queer People, p. 63. Should the exigencies of the international situation require it, this quotation can be used to cast aspersions on post-war reaction in England.
Important as the maintenance of friendly relations between the nations fighting on one side really is, the crucial problem for the outcome of the war often is the attitude of the neutrals. The essential problem in controlling neutral attitudes is to lead the neutral to identify your enemy as his enemy and your aims as his aims.
There is an imperceptible slant in the war news, which comes from one side rather than another, which leads to the propagation of a powerful bias toward the contending nations. Almost inadvertently one comes to speak of " our victory,” " the enemy retired,” or “ our lines held.” The fact that England controlled the cables to the United States was a precious advantage in her favour. The Germans were never able to perfect their wireless service to the point of competing with the cables on a plane of equality. Less from original bias than from a subtle entanglement in the bias of the news, there appeared in certain New York papers headlines of this character, even when the Germans were pounding down through Belgium and northern France : 4,
BELGIUM BEATS GERMANS; ENGLISH ARMY TO AID HER.
GERMANS LOSE THOUSANDS IN BELGIUM.
ROUT OF GERMANS IN BELGIUM TURNED INTO A SLAUGHTER.
The direct representation of the other side as an enemy of the neutrals may take a multitude of forms. As early as 1915 a book was devoted to the horrible fate of America in case Germany should win the War. In J. Bernard Walker’s America Fallen : A Sequel to the European War, the Germans sack New York (London, 1915). This timehonoured device was employed at the time of the Franco- Prussian war to incite England against Germany. In Blackwood's Magazine for April, 1871, appeared an article called '' The Fall of England, or the Battle of Dorking,’' which was reprinted as a pamphlet and sold broadcast.
The Germans found it impossible to raise the claim that Great Britain intended to attack America, since the British were obviously very much engaged in Western Europe. Instead, they insinuated that the attack upon America would come by the characteristically English method of indirection. Japan would do the will of England. What other interpretation, indeed, could there be placed upon the Anglo- Japanese Alliance ? Why is Japan feverishly engaged in ship building and has now under way 168,000 tons of shipping ?
We Americans feel safe, peaceful and conceited as we sell to Europe tools with which they murder each other, and as we say to ourselves, “ We are too big to be in danger.”
We would feel differently if we knew that Japan, representing all Asia, all the yellow race, had decided that the moment had arrived to make the attack, and to make both sides of the Pacific Japanese.^
Jefferson Jones viewed The Fall of Tsingtau (New York, 1915) with alarm, and the book was of some aid in arousing suspicion of the Japanese.
The heterogeneous composition of the American community lent itself to special propagandas. It was possible to arouse the Jews against the Russians, the Irish against the British, the Westerners against the Japanese, and (for some time) the Italians against the French. The Entente could appeal to the English, French, Scotch, Welsh, Russian, Serbian, Rumanian elements, and, after the growth of anti-Austro- Hungarian sentiment, to the South Slavs and the Czecho-slovaks and the Poles.
^ S. Ivor Stephen (Szinnyey), Neutrality ? The Crucifixion of Public Opinion. From an American Point of View, Chicago, 1916, p. 18. This is a repository of German propaganda themes.
The hereditary enemy of America, the Erbfeind, was England, and upon the anti-English chord the Germans strummed incessantly. It was England who burned Washington in 1814, and drew from Jefferson the bitter saying that
It was reserved for England to show that Napoleon in atrocity was an infant compared to her ministers and generals.
It was, moreover, the dastardly English who stirred up the Indians to massacre the Americans who lived on the frontier during the Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812. Perfidious Albion is still trying to put something over, and Mr. O'Reilly, through the hospitable columns of the Hearst press, asked :
Are we not being bribed to sacrifice our own best interests as well as our moral scruples, and to send arms to England, so that then she can exterminate the Germans and obliterate Germany, and possess herself of Germany’s commerce and colonies?^
The Central Powers were set forth as the champions of the traditional American principle of a free sea. This thesis was argued in William Bayard Hale's pamphlet, American Rights and British Pretensions on the Seas,^ The British offset this appeal by exposing the German plans to expand into South America after the War, regardless of the Monroe Doctrine, and to conquer the world for German trade, by cementing a European bloc.^ The British likewise rose to assert that they were fighting a war of democracy versus militarism and autocracy, and they published General Bernhardi’s Germany and the Next War, to convict the whole nation. A brilliant rationalization such as that of H. G. Wells in Mr. Britling Sees it Through, won a large audience in America.
1 Cited in Stephen, as cited, p. 171.
2 See also, H. L. Gordon, The Peril of the United States: Rudolf Cronau, Do we need a Third War for Independence?
Hand in hand with other plans must go the systematic vilification of the enemy. During the Franco-Prussian War the French raised a gre^t outcry in England at the proposed bombardment of Pafis, bitterly assailing the Germans for their barbarous’ indifference to the priceless treasures of ci|f^ilization. Bismarck was quite aware of the importance this appeal to neutral sentiment, and instructed one of his propaganda secretaries to draft an article for the Press on this theme :
If the French wanted to preserve their monuments and collections of books and pictures from the dangers of war, they should not have surrounded them with fortifications. Besides, the French themselves did not hesitate for a moment to bombard Rome, which contained monuments of far greater value, the destruction of which would have been an irretrievable loss.^
' When the London Standard, which was hostile to the Germans during the War of 1870, printed a story by the
^ See Andr6 Ch6radame, The Pan-German Plot Unmasked, New York, 1916. Mildred S. Wertheimer restored The Payi-German League to its proper perspective in 1924. Roland G. Usher had written a book on Pan-Germanism which was published in 1913, anil given a renewed lease on life by the Entente sympathizers after 1914. See also his The Winning of the War, New York and London, 1918.
Busch, Bismarck, I : 158. 26 September, 1870. Due de Fitzjames, in which various Prussian abominations at Bazeilles were described, Bismarck dictated an answer to be transmitted to the English Press. He argued that the horrors of the War were not horrors of the Germans, but of the foolish stories of Prussian cruelty which frightened the peasants into deserting their homes where they would have been secure. He attacked the reliability of the Due as witness.*
During the same War, the French prepared a pamphlet for circulation at home and abroad which was entitled La Guerre comme la font les Prussiens. Bismarck instructed Busch,
Please write to Berlin that they should put together something of this description from our point of view, quoting all the cruelties, barbarities and breaches of the Geneva Convention committed by the French. Not too much, however, or no one will read it, and it must be done speedily.*
During the World War the neutrals were deluged withr propaganda stuff, in which the sins of the enemy were exposed to public gaze. Besides the appeal to the general sentiment of the neutral nation, hosts of special appeals were launched. The Germans circulated an appeal to Protestants in neutral countries to rise and protest against the mistreatment of missionaries by the English. Rev. W. Stark prepared a pamphlet on The Martyrdom of the Evangelical Missionaries in Cameroon, 1914, (Berlin, 1914). Such damages as were inflicted in the occupied territories to churches were assigned to the Germans. The Catholics, as the chief sufferers, organized a special propaganda committee to work on foreign Catholic opinion. The nature of its work appears from the following list :
^ Busch, Bismarck, 1 : 148. 22 September, 1871.
* Bus^, Bismarck, I ; 406. 4 February, 1871.
Rene le Cholleux, Notre Dame de Brehieres ; V Allemagne et les Allies dev ant la conscience chretienne (pref. Mgr. Alfred Baudrillart) .
La Guerre Allemande et le Catholicisme,
Raoul Narsy, Le Supplice de Louvain.
L'^veil de I’ A me frangaise devant V app el aux armes.
L'Abbe Pasquier, Le Protestantisme Allemand.
UAbbe E. Foulon, Arras sous les Obus.
Mgr. Pierre Batiffol published his letter, A un neutre catholique in 1915, for the edification of the non-combatants. The French Protestants followed the example of their Catholic brethren, and established a committee for foreign propaganda and advertised Nos sanctuaires devastes. The Italians used the same weapon in the pamphlet, Austrian Barbarities against Italian Churches (Florence, 1917).
This atrocity propaganda was conducted with great ability in America, particularly by the Allies. A mass meeting at Carnegie Hall in New York protested against the treatment of the Belgians, December i8th, 1916. Rector Manning presided, and there were addresses by the Hon. James M. Beck, Alton B. Parker, Elihu Root, and telegrams from Theodore Roosevelt, Joseph H. Choate, and Archbishop Ireland. An appeal from Cardinal Mercier was read, and the whole affair procured the widest publicity in the Press.
The Russian Government went so far as to address a special memorandum to neutral powers, for the purpose of protesting against the alleged slanders which the Central Powers were industriously circulating about the conduct of her troops. She likewise objected to the Violations of Laws and Rules of Warfare, committed by German and Austro- Hungarian troops in Russia (1915). The Germans were outmanoeuvred by the British, who secured the services of the former Ambassador Bryce to serve on an atrocity commission. The protest which the Kaiser addressed to the President of the United States against the franc-tireur excesses of the Belgians proved ineffectual. They compiled a mags of material for the purpose of incriminating the Belgians, such as the V olkerrechtswidrige Riihrung des belgischen Volkskrieges, put out by the Foreign Office, May loth, 1915- They advertised the misdeeds of the invading Russians in East Prussia, and sharply criticized the mistreatment of German civilians and military prisoners abroad.^ The Belgians replied officially to the charges lodged against them, but one of the best indirect replies was a study made by Fernand van Langenhove, Scientific Secretary of the Solvay Institute of Sociology at Brussels, on The Growth of a Legend. A Study, based upon the German accounts of Francs-Tireurs and “ Atrocities.” The English version of the work had a Preface by the eminent American social psychologist, J. Mark Baldwin, a diligent Francophile during the entire War.^* With the air and method of a serious study in collective psychology the book treated the franc-tireur stories as legends.
For circulation in America the Germans prepared an appeal to race prejudice, called Employment contrary to International Law of Coloured Troops upon the European Arena of War by England and France (Berlin, 1915).
^ For example, see Auswartiges Amt., Greueltaten vussischer Truppen gegen deutsche Civil personen und deutsche Kriegsgefangene, 1915 ; K. Jiinger and Dr. H. Vaorting, Die Behandlung der Deutschen in England, Frankreich und Russland, Berlin, 1915.
* Translated by E. B. Sherlock, New York and London, 1916.
Indeed, everybody took a whirl at blackguarding his enemies and whitewashing himself. All the minorities in America had their special propaganda, issuing such things as Austro-Hungarian Judicial Crimes (Chicago, no date), prepared by the Jugo-Slav Committee in North America. As late as 1918 the Bulgarians tried to reach the neutral world with a defence and a counter-thrust by publishing Les Atrocites Serbes, by M. D. Sopiansky (Lausanne, 1918). The most important feature, of course, was to secure the services of an eminent neutral to testify to his own countrymen. Mary Roberts Rinehart {Kings, Queens and Pawns, 1915) and scores of publicists gave their pens to the Allied cause ; fewer helped to expound the German viewpoint.
The other side is a nefarious plotter and liar, unworthy of confidence. Frederick William Wile endeavoured to expose The German- American Plot, the record of a great failure (London, 1915), and every idea which convenienced the ^'plot^was dubbed with the damning epithet, '' Pro-German."' The Germans poured out the same dark hints and insinuations about the members of the American Press and public who dared disagree with them. The American Truth Society wrote about the Treason Press, and in this indictment they meant nearly all the American Press of metropolitan standing, except Hearst and the Chicago Tribune. It goes without saying that ex-President Roosevelt came in for vile abuse from the German sympathizers. Everybody tried to tar the other fellow with the same stick. Rumours of propa-< ganda and bribery fell thick and fast.
Direct appeals to neutral opinion continued all through the conflict. In 1914 James Bryce discussed the Neutral Nations and the War. The Germans used one of their Swiss connections to publish an exposure of Comment I’Angleterre combat les neutres (Zurich, 1917) ; to which the British replied in William Archer, /In die Neutralen! Aufruf zur Geduld (1917). Max Gaetcke discussed Der grosse Raubkrieg und die Interessen der neutralen Mdchte (Karlsruhe, 1916), while the French contributions to this literature included Henri Hauser, La Guerre et les Neutres. Etude sur le sentiment dimocratique dans ses rapports avec la guerre europienne (Paris, 1917), and Ernest Lcmonon, Les Allies et les Neutres, 1914-16 (Paris, 1917).
To the general appeals were added the special appeals. The French Federation of Schoolteachers prepared a message. To the Schoolmistresses and Schoolmasters of all countries. The famous Aufruf Gelehrter Deutschen, which came early in the War, provoked the professors abroad to feverish hyperactivity. One of the numerous replies was intended for consumption in Southern Europe and South America. A manifestation was held at the Sorbonne on the 12th of February, 1915, and the addresses which were delivered were printed under a favourite title with the French, La civilisation latine contre la barbaric allemande. For the sake of interesting the wage earners, an Appeal of the Belgian Workmen to the Workmen of all Nations appeared in London in 1916, and a year later. The Condition of the Belgian Workmen, now Refugees in England.
Besides the direct themes of the order hitherto enumerated neutral opinion may be reached by indirect ones. The neutral must be confident of the ultimate success of your side. Georges Hoog published his Lettres aux neutres sur Vunion sacree, to impress the neutrals with the solidarity of his country. Books of type of Robert Grant, Their Spirit, Some Impressions of the English and French during the Summer of 1916, reassure the friends of one side and affect the indifferent. The heroism and determination of a belligerent can be illustrated in military and civilian war letters, such as War Letters from France (edited by A. de Lapradelle and Frederick Coudert, New York and London, 1916). The pictorial medium was chosen by the Information Department of the British Foreign Office, to impress the neutrals with British strength, and the film called Britain Prepared was widely circulated. ^
The crucial importance of the foreign correspondent is alluded to by Theodore Roosevelt in his letter to Sir Edward Grey, bearing the date, January 22nd, 1915 :
There have been fluctuations in American opinion about the war. The actions of the German Zeppelins have revived the feeling in favour of the Allies. But I believe that for a couple of months preceding this action there had been a distinct lessening of the feeling for the Allies and a growth of pro-German feeling. I do not think that this was the case among the people who were best informed, but I do think it was the case among the mass of not very wellinformed people, who have little to go upon except what they read in the newspapers or see at cinematograph shows. There were several causes for this change. There has been a very striking contrast between the lavish attentions showered on American war correspondents by the German military authorities and the blank refusal to have anything whatever to do with them by the British and French Governments. Our best war correspondent on the whole, is probably Frederick Palmer. He is favourable to the Allies. But it was the Germans, and not the Allies, who did everything for him. They did not change his attitude, but they unquestionably did change the attitude of many other good men. The only real war news, written by Americans who are known to and trusted by the American public, comes from the German side ; as a result of this, the sympathizers with the cause of the Allies can hear nothing whatever about the trials and achievements of the British and French armies. These correspondents inform me that it is not the generals at the front who raise objections, but the Home Governments, and in consequence they get the chance to write for their fellow-countrymen what happens from the German side, and they are not given a chance from the side of the Allies. I do not find that the permission granted them by the Germans has interfered with the efficiency of German military operations, and it has certainly helped the Germans in American public opinion. It may be that your people do not believe that American public opinion is of sufficient value to be taken into account, but, if you think that it should be taken into account, then it is worth your while considering whether much of your censorship work and much of your refusal to allow correspondents at the front has not been a danger to your cause from the standpoint of the effect on public opinion without any corresponding military gains. I realize perfectly that it would be criminal to permit correspondents to act as they acted as late as our own Spanish War, but as a layman, I feel sure that there has been a good deal of work of this kind of which I have spoken in the way of censorship and refusing the correspondents permission to go to the front, which has not been of the neu’ slightest military service to you, and which has had a very real effect in preventing any rallying of public opinion to you."
^ Rear-Admiral Brownrigg says that some influence unfriendly to Great Britain caused the film to be exhibited in the United States under the title, HOW Britain Prepared. Recollections, p. 37. D. W. Griffith, famous director, has recently recalled the offer made to him by Bernard Shaw in 1917 to write scenarios for him. This occurred “ In 19^7, just after I had completed arrangements with the British Government to do some propaganda pictures.’' (New York Times, October nth 1926.) Another of Mr. Shaw’s propaganda efforts went astray when the New York Times divided one of his despatches and left the impression inadvertently that Shaw was dressing down the Allies. Mr. Shaw has himself related the last incident, but professes to have no recollection of the Griffith rejection.
One of the most subtle and effective forms of indirect propaganda is the encouragement of everything which draws the neutral into some form of de facto co-operation with the belligerent. This may be done in part by playing up the instances in which a neutral citizen takes arms on behalf of one or the other belligerent. This phase of propaganda was discussed in the following letter to the London Times, dated December 26th, 1916, by an American partisan of the Entente. It was called British Publicity in the United States/' and read thus :
France has known how to reach the sympathy of Americans, and her publicity has been extraordinarily effective. It has been personal and it has evoked enthusiasm. It has been written to a great extent by American soldiers in the French army, each of whom is an endorsement of France. The presence of every American participant is widely advertised by the French. He is decorated wherever there is the least occasion for doing so. He is encouraged to write of his experiences. Articles and books by American soldiers of France are published by the score. Alan Seegar's Poetry of the Foreign Legion is widely known in America, and his death was as much regretted in the United States as that of Rupert Brooke in England. Robert Herrick, one of our best novelists, joined the American Ambulance with the avowed purpose of writing a series of books from the viewpoint of a participant. I was permitted to write and publish the Note-hook of an AttacM without ever submitting it to the French censor. There are only about 500 Americans in the French army. Yet in the United States we hear something about them every day. The newspapers are full of their doings ; every item of news from them is justly considered as an endorsement of France. In consequence of France’s shrewdly-managed publicity America is whole-heartedly pro-French.C Because Ian Hay was a participant in the War, albeit not an American one, the publication of his book in the United States, and his extended speaking tour, shared with the books and speeches of Frederick Palmer the distinction of being the only redeeming bits of British propaganda. . . . Bruce Bairnsfather’s drawings and Raemaeker’s cartoons, still too little known in the United States, would prove an invaluable influence to mould public opinion.^
^ Grey, Twenty- Five Years, II : 150.
Further than this, if the neutral power can be drawn into some form of non-military participation with a belligerent, his sympathies are likely to crystallize about the object of his assistance. This is the inner significance of the tremendous campaign to secure aid for Belgian widows and orphans in America, of which one memento is the pamphlet known as The Need of the Belgians, prepared by an illustrious galaxy of literary stars, among whom were Thomas Hardy, May Sinclair, Arnold Bennett, Will Irwin, John Galsworthy, Anthony Hope, A. W. Mason, and George Bernard Shaw. The Committee for Belgian Relief was the sponsor for this and other details of the campaign.
The Allies succeeded in forging bonds of economic interest between themselves and America, and against this the Germans waged a propaganda offensive from the start, realizing what its implications were to be for American attitudes. William Bayard Hale wrote The Exportation of Arms and Munitions of War in 1915, arguing that the Allies were getting most of the benefit -because of the British control of the sea, and that it was tantamount to becoming a silent partner in the Entente. His booklet was published under the auspices of the Organization of American Women for Strict Neutrality, organized for propaganda purposes.
^ Eric Fisher Wood, The Note-hook of an Intelligence Officer, 1917, reprints his letter on page 15. See also James Mark Baldwin, Between Two Wars, 2 vols., Boston ,1926. •
The German propagandists took particular care to reach out for the women on this particular issue. A memorandum of one of the conferences of the New York bureau contains these items :
May 24th, 1915.
All preparations are made for carrying through the project of poster advertising. The pamphlet entitled ‘‘ Thou Shalt Not Kill/' written by Mr. Hale, has been printed and will be sent out. Signatures to a petition to Congress collected by the ladies now number 200,000, and will in time perhaps reach 600,000. The ladies have applied for assistance in their campaign to a number of persons named by Mr. Hale. It is suggested that it be put up to the ladies to address the petition to the President and Congress, and not wait until the collection of signatures is complete before sending it to Washington, but send them, at once, in batches of about 10,000.
Mr. Hale reports that Mrs. Hale is busy upon propaganda against the exportation of horses. Mr. Claussen undertakes to have a correspondingly touching scenario (story of former fire-brigade mare slaughtered in Flanders) written.^
Some editorials of William Randolph Hearst were collected under the title. Let us promote the imrld's peace, not promote the world's warfare in 1915. Martin Ilsen argued the illegality of the Ammunition Trade in 1915, and the American Independence League broadcasted a statement by Charles Nagel on the Traffic in Arms and Ammunition, The National German- American Alliance published an open letter by Dr. Charles J. Hexamer to the Committee on Foreign ^ Sen. Doc. 62, 1395 (Brewing and Liquor Interests, etc.). Relations in which these points were reiterated, The American Truth Society (catering to the Irish) sought to expose the Peril of American Finance. The British Raid upon our Resources in 1915.
As Ambassador Bernstorh has remarked, the economic question was necessarily the centre of gravity of active propaganda in America. He shrewdly comments upon the skill of the English in applying trade restriction to America. They encroached upon the freedom to trade inch and inch, and only as they stepped in to supply the market which they curtailed. Bemstorff remarks :
It is characteristic that the declaration of cotton as unconditional contraband was made public on the very day on which the American Press was in a state of great excitement over the Arabic case, so that this comparatively unimportant incident filled the front pages and leading articles of the newspapers, while the extremely important economic measure was published in a place where it would hardly be noticed.^
The Germans formed an association of Americans to protest against the cotton contraband, but it did little good. The cleverest move of the economic propaganda of the Germans was the provoking of “ Issues,'' which Bemstorff has defined as the attempt by carefully construing individual incidents to make clear to public opinion the fundamental injustice of the English encroachments and their far-reaching consequences in practice. The most important case in this direction is that of the Wilhelmina. According to the prevailing principles of international law, foodstuffs were only conditional contrg.band. They might be imported into Germany if they were intended for the exclusive use of the civil population. As, however, England succeeded in restraining the exporters from any attempt to consign foodstuffs to Germany, especially as, in view of the enormous supplies that were being forwarded to our enemies, they , had little interest in such shipment, the question never reached a clear issue. Herr Albert, therefore, induced an American firm to ship foodstuffs for the civil population of Germany on the American steamer Wilhelmina, bound for Hamburg, by himself undertaking the whole risk from behind the scenes (Albert was the German purchasing agent in America).
^ My Three Years in America, p. 89.
/Xhis scheme went on ^e rocks because the English, after capturing the ship, declared a blockade, and the decision ceased to matter. It was one of the '' Issue '' boats that put up a problem to the British which Ambassador Walter Hines Page was able to solve. The Dacia, a ship of former German ownership, which had transferred to American registry on the outbreak of war, was outfitted with crew, flag and cotton by Mr. E. N. Breitung, of Marquette, Michigan, and, after great advertisement, sailed for Germany. A terrific row would have broken out if the British captured the ship, and Page's inspiration was to allow a French warship to capture it. This went through on schedule and not a chirp was raised in America.^
Neutrals may eventually be drawn into the war by direct instigation. The outside propagandist may circulate such pronouncements as those of Roosevelt, who favoured the Allies, and they may encourage the activity of the war party. In Italy, the pro-Ally sentiment was whipped to the exploding point by d'Annunzio. The story is told thus by Thomas Nelson Page, American Ambassador to Italy, 1913 to 1919.
^ The story is told in Pagers Life and Letters, 1 : 394.
It had for some time been contemplated to unveil a statue to Garibaldi and the Thousand '' at Quarto, the little port near Genoa from which they had sailed on the 5th of May, fifty-five years before, for the wresting of the Sicilians from a foreign yoke and the uniting them to the kingdom of Italy. Great preparations were made for the celebration of the anniversary of what was one of the most inspiring events in the history of Italy.
The Cabinet was to attend the ceremony, and it presently became known that the King and Queen would also attend. The conviction spread throughout Italy that the occasion would be availed of to announce Italy's decision to take her place with the Forces of Liberty battling in France and declare war. All Italy was on the qui vive. Then, suddenly, two days before the event was to take place, the announcement came that, after all, owing to the gravity of the moment, neither the King nor the Cabinet would attend the unveiling. . .
The absence of the King and the Cabinet from the celebration at Quarto may have given it a somewhat different trend, but certainly not one less violent. The orator of the occasion, Gabriel d'Annunzio, the poet and novelist, who had come from France for the purpose, delivered jvith telling effect an address which was rather a lyrical rhapsody on Italian liberty and aspiration than an historical address. It fell on ears attuned to receive it, and was, in fact, a firebrand stuck into a magazine charged and ready for the explosion. That night the streets of Genoa wer^ choked with the crowds that apotheosized Garibaldi and the orator, d'Annunzio, and clamoured for war. After this it was a continued progression — nothing could stop it. . . .
The orator of Quarto came to Rome in a sort of triumphal procession, and for days spoke in a species of lyric frenzy, from hotel balconies or in theatres to excited crowds who followed him into a state of exaltation. On the 14th he spoke in the Constanza Opera House, which was heavily guarded, all approaches being picketed, by a strong force of police and soldiers, including an extra force of cavalry to preserve order and prevent demonstrations before the Government offices and the Embassies of the Central Empires. The overflow demonstrants, left outside of the auditorium, resisted all efforts to disperse them, building barricades and tearing down a rear wall around an open lot adjoining the Opera House to use as missiles against the soldiers should the latter be too firm in attempting to clear the streets.^
When the state of neutral sentiment seems to be ebbing ' steadily away from the belligerent toward whom it is hoped to direct it, the propagandist may retire to certain last lines of defence. The Germans in the United States did what they could to encourage pacifist sentiment. The American League to Limit Armaments had been organized in 1914, by sincere pacifists who hoped to keep America out of the European maelstrom. This later developed into the American Union against Militarism, one of whose offshoots subsequently became the National Civil Liberties Bureau. The American Union Against Militarism organized the Collegiate Anti-Militarism League, and co-operated with numerous Peace Unions and Christian Socialist Fellowship organizations. The American Neutral Conference Committee was an emergency group which had the objective indicated by its name. The Emergency Peace Federation came to an early end, as did the Conference Committee. The Germans, of course, got such aid and comfort as they could from the existence of such societies and played the peace theme heavily as 1917 approached.
A dangerous idea — from the standpoint of the Allies — which the Germans propagated in America was that the Allies were the stumbling block to peace. The British were genuinely exercised by the progress of the peace drive of the Germans and Sir Edward Grey confesses that the German effort to cast the onus of continuing the War upon the Entente, was one of the most effective moves which they made.*
^ Italy and the World War, 209 0^1 seq.
It may be possible to stir up trouble between two neutrals and thus tie the hands of the neutral. Such a purpose appears in the rather amusing story of a German feature film named “ Patria.” This was a serial photoplay which was released weekly in two-reel episodes for a span of ten weeks. It was made under the direction of Whartons, in upper New York, for the International Film Service Corporation, a Hearst-owned film distributing company, later re-incorporated as the International Film Service Company (Incorporated). It was made in 1916, and cost about $90,000. Mrs. Vernon Castle was the star. When it began to appear, it purported to emphasize the necessity for preparedness. By the time the first episodes were ready, the country was already launched upon a preparedness programme, leaving its anti-Japanese and anti-Mexican features as the only live ones. The picture shows the great effort of Japan to conquer America with the aid of the Mexicans. A Japanese noble, at the head of the secret service of the Emperor of Japan, was the chief villain. Japanese troops invaded California, committing horrible atrocities. The picture was first shown in New York on the 9th January, 1917. The New York American and other Hearst papers ran the story serially from week to week. When the anti-Japanese element had to be suppressed, the Japanese names and characters were supplanted by Mexican names and inscriptions. But in the film, they were still wearing Japanese uniforms.^ At the last moment, it was thus converted into an effort to inflame two neutrals.
* Grey, II : 118.
The Chicago Tribune once cited an admission in the Neueste Nachrichten of Leipzig, that Germany could look with complacency upon strained relations between the United States and Mexico, because, while digesting this hard nut, Jonathan must cease to be John Bull's willing servant.
The Tribune properly observed that
If the United States had to devote all its energies to an enterprise such as the subjugation of Mexico, there would be less American ammunition going abroad. ^
The famous Henry Ford pamphlets on The War Record of the Chicago Tribune reproduce this editorial side by side with an editorial on the twenty-first of the same month, in which the Tribune said that it preferred a campaign in Mexico to a campaign in Europe.
If we win in a war against Mexico, we know what we get out of it — a secure continent. And it is practically impossible for us to lose.
If we finally win in a war against Germany, what do we win ? Blessed if we know. “ The overthrow of German militarism " will be the glib answer. Yes, and the substitution of some other — Russia’s, perhaps, or Japan’s.
However, though Fate offers us a golden apple in Mexico and bitter fruit in Flanders, Mr. Wilson, being for “ Humanity ” rather than for America, wishes us to taste the bitter one. He probably will have his wish.
The outcome of such policy as that proposed by the Tribune would have been so favourable to the Central Powers, that statements of this kind were very properly circulated by the agents and friends of Germany in America. ^This does not, of course, imply that those who made such assertions were themselves pro-German.
^ See the Sen. Doc. 62, (Brewing and Liquor Interests, etc.) 1675.
* April 4, 1916.
When a belligerent country has a larger contingency of its former nationals in a neutral land, it may, in an emergency, seek to draw or drive these elements into active work in its behalf. Von der Goltz, a captured German agent, wrote a book on My Adventures as a German Secret Agent in 1917, which credits the German propagandists with an exceedingly ingenious scheme.
It was planned so to discredit the German- Americans that the hostility of their fellow-citizens would force them hack into the arms of the German Government,
I happen to know that during the first two years of the war many of the stories about German attempts upon Canada, about German-American complicity in various plots, emanated from the offices of Captain von Papen and his military associates . . . Germany wanted to give the world convincing proof that all peoples of German descent were solidly supporting her. It was for this reason that reports of impossible German activities were set afloat — rumours of Germans massing in the Maine woods, of aeroplane flights over Canada. And since many anti- German papers had been indiscreet enough to attack the German-Americans as disloyal, the German agents used and fomented these attacks for their own purposes.
But Germany overreached herself. Emboldened by the apparent success of their schemes, her principal agents, von Papen, Boy-Ed, and von Rintelen (who had begun his work in January, 1915), became careless, so far as secrecy was concerned, and so audacious in their plans that they betrayed themselves, perhaps intentionally, as a final demonstration of their power. The results you know. In so far as the disclosure of their activities tended further } to implicate the German-Americans, they did harm. But by these very disclosures the eyes of many German- Americans were opened to the true nature of the influences to which they had been subjected, and through that fact the worst element of the German propaganda in America received its death blow.‘^
The statement which von der Goltz made is not corroborated by any other evidence, and the testimony of a professional spy is always subject to the most justifiable suspicion. There is some reason to believe that this may have been fabricated for the purpose of instigating the German- Americans against a German Government which had so cynically attempted to betray them (to this purpose the last paragraph quoted seems to be directed). But there is no denying the fact that there are circumstances in which just such strategy as that imputed by von der Goltz to his superiors could be successful.
The control of inter-Ally sentiment is partly a problem of maintaining a reciprocal cordiality, and the problem of stimulating friendly relations between a belligerent and a neutral has its bivalent aspects. What is said about the neutrals and about the war in a belligerent country tends to be translated or read in a neutral country. Thus Italian susceptibilities were wounded during the critical days of 1915 the statement of a French public man that Italy was waiting ''to fly to the succour of the victor.*' Belligerent opinion must be supervised and managed in the interest of neutral friendship.
Ambassador W. H. Page notes that
The Cabinet has directed the Censor to suppress, as far as he can with prudence, comment which is unfavourable to the United States. He has taken this action because the public feeling against the administration is constantly increasing.*
^ Condensed from pages 223-233.
/ Bismarck flew into a rage when a communique was put out by the German military authorities in 1871 saying that some shells had struck the famous Luxembourg Gardens in Paris. He demanded to have all the subsequent communiques submitted to him, so that the material which might be turned against Germany abroad could be deleted.* Bismarck put the damper on editorial criticism in Germany of the purveying of coal to the French fleet by the British, on the theory that such railing would merely handicap diplomatic arrangements.’ His chief was a level-headed old gentleman who felt the importance of neutral opinion, and Bismarck often had his way, even against the military people.’
Our discussion so far has had to do principally with the “themes which bear upon the preservation of friendship. Let us now review in summary from some of the methods which were employed by the chief competitors for the favour of America. The German methods have become public knowledge through the Senatorial inquiry conducted in 1918-1919, and writings of Ambassador Bernstorff and others. The title of the hearings is itself a triumph of insinuation. It was “ Brewing and Liquor Interests and German Bolshevik Propaganda,” and was reported in three husky volumes. The hearings did not begin until September 27th, 1918, and did not figure heavily in the War propaganda. A hearing which was conducted in February and April of 1918, dealt with the National German-American Alliance.' Three birds were killed at one stone by these hearings : the brewers, the Germans, and the Bolsheviks. The Anti-Saloon League, the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence and the Naval Intelligence were active in pressing the investigations.'^
^ Life and Letters, II : 51 (February 15, 1915).
* Busch, Bismarck, I ; 341.
* Busch, Bismarck, I : 42.
^ Kaiser Wilhelm I. made an interesting note on the margin of a document dated May i6th, 1875 ; “ Um gliickliche Kriege zu fiihren, muss dem Angreifenden die Sympathie aller edelgesinnten Menschen u. Lander zur Seite stehen, und dem, der ungerecht den Krieg zutr^gt, die offentliche Stimme den Stein werfen. Dies war das Geheimnis des Enthusiasmus in Deutschland 1870 ! Wer ungerechtfertigt zu den Wafifen greift, wird die 6ffenliche Stimme gegen sich haben, er wird keinen Alliierten finden, keine neutres hienveillants, ja iiberhaupt wohl keine Neutralen, wohl aber Qegner finden/'
Dr. Dernburg, former Secretary of State for the Colonies, was sent to this country at the outbreak of the War to float a German loan.. The American Government warned against lending money to either side, and it was impossible to produce satisfactory results. Dr. Dernburg was also an agent for the German Red Cross and began to collect funds for this work. He also undertook to explain the German version of the War to the American public, and set up a Press Bureau in New York. Opinions differ as to whether he came over here to do this, or whether he found that it was difficult to return to Germany and evolved this to keep him occupied. He had the assistance at the New York Bureau of M. B. Claussen of the Hamburg-Amerika line, and after the entry of Japan into the War the interpreter of the Consulate-General in Yokohama joined the staff. Daily bulletins of the German Information Service were issued, and
* The hearings were before the sub-committee of the Committee on the Judiciary. The most important report is the three- volume work known as Senate Document 62, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, 1919. " And
Bolshevik ” propaganda does not appear in the title to volume i. then the activity of the bureau was extended to the preparation of pamphlets. For these efforts the services of William Bayard Hale were secured. War-pictures and film-propaganda were later added. Dr. Mechlenburg and Herr Plage were held up in America on their way from Japan and placed their services at the disposal of Dr. Dernburg. Dr. Demburg had the assistance of a committee which he selected, consisting of Albert, Gerhardt, Fuehr and a few American journalists and business men. They conferred once or twice a month on propaganda policy. Dr. Dernburg stayed in this country until after the Lusitania incident, when he made a public speech at Cleveland, justifying the sinking of the boat on the theory that it carried arms. Public indignation ran so high that a sacrifice was demanded, and Demburg was the sacrificial ram. He went home. Ambassador Bernstorff tried thereafter to keep the Germans from agitating too openly in the country, preferring to work through American citizens.
The Germans had the warm co-operation of the German- American Alliance, which was well organized in the German strongholds over the nation — St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati, Milwaukee. There were numberless German social clubs and societies. The Kriegsbund was composed of those who had served in the German army. There were several veterans’ posts of the War of 1870. The Geneva Society was a peculiar organization of German waiters. The Turner Societies and all sorts of benevolent organizations were thriving in every German district.
The Lutheran Church was a strong asset of the Germans, for there were 6,000 congregations in the United States, whose communicants numbered some three million. Often their services were kept up in German, and many of their preachers had received training in Germany.
The Germans appealed to all nationalities with a grievance against the Allies. The American Truth Society was a vehicle for stirring up the Irish. The Jews had an ineradicable antipathy toward the Tsaristic system, and many of them sided with the Germans. Their Press frequently had such items as the following :
It is impossible to be a comrade of Nicholas and not be a hooligan. In the days of Beaconsfield, when England was far from Russia, no massacres of Jews were made, not on the poor, and not on the rich. To-day, when England is an ally of Nicholas, she must do as Nicholas does, she must make massacres, she must preach against the Jews.
When the war broke out, I immediately enlisted (in the French army), but I was astonished on my arrival at the camp at Lyons to see that I, together with many other Jews, was placed in a legion which was composed of criminals only. From all sides we were insulted. We were given cold black coffee and dry bread, and when we protested we were told that we were dirty Jews, and we came only to eat and nothing else. I refused to eat and got sick. WHien I applied to the sergeant to send me to the hospital, he began to beat me, etc.^
Concerning the efforts of the Germans to win the negroes, and to foment discord inside the country over the race question, Captain Lester testified to the committee :
A separate department was maintained in the Albert bureau for the handling of American race problems, the principal among which was the negro question.
^ cuppings from Wahfheit (New York). Sen. Doc. 62, 1825, ei $eq. The bureau obtained through newspaper agencies and exchanges and from these so-called clipping bureaux records of every lynching in the United States, and every attack by coloured men upon a white person, or every news item which showed the alleged oppression of the coloured race.
These were formed into propaganda articles, and were forwarded to the editors of established newspapers, that is, white newspapers, and also to the editors of coloured newspapers.
The field work was conducted by a man by the name of Von Reiswitz, formerly a consul, I understand, at one time at Chicago.
His headquarters, if you may say that he had any headquarters, was in and about New Orleans, and all of the negro propaganda work was conducted from Mexico by Von Eckhardt. I say all of it in the sense that the directing head was in Mexico. The men used for the negro propaganda work were Mexicans and half-breeds, and men that were brought to Mexico City and instructed and sent across the border ; and the wave of negro propaganda work went from the Mexican border east, and embraced the States, principally, of Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia ; and States such as North and South Carolina and Tennessee were really on the outskirts of the movement.
The propaganda was directed to stir up trouble continuously between the whites and the blacks of any nature and description. That was the first item.
The attempt was also made to win the coloured race to the cause of Germany by innumerable arguments. We have information that the propaganda took this form : That the negro leaders, who were subsidized or attempted to be subsidized, in various local communities and by letters — I do not mean the big leaders of the negro race, but small men scattered here and there — told the negroes that in Germany the blacks were equal to the whites ; that in Europe they had no colour line. They exhibited statements, presumed to be authentic, to this effect, and argued with them that, if Germany won the war, the rights of the coloured people in the South would be equal to those of the whites. That was the principal argument. They played continuously upon lynchings.^
The Germans sought to touch every foreign language group which might be suborned by controlling the American Association of Foreign Language Newspapers.
The German University League was started in 1915, to unite all who had attended a German university. The purpose was to co-operate with every effort, to strengthen the regard for the Germans and for their aims and ideals and to secure for them fair play and proper appreciation."' Among those who were officers or trustees are to be found the names of von Klenze, William R. Shepherd (Columbia), Carl L. Schurz, von Mach, and many other distinguished academic and public men. Meetings were held and papers read and distributed. The co-operation of visiting professors, such as Moritz J. Bonn, was secured. This was a direct channel of communication between the intellectuals of Germany and America, ^
The Germans were active in trying to reach the professionally trained people in the country. Nagel's pamphlet on American neutrality was circulated to 50,000 lawyers through the American Truth Society.®
The women were appealed to through the League of American Women for Strict Neutrality, which was founded in Baltimore. The wage-earners received special attention through the Labour's National Peace Council (1915). They were often very close to the brewing interests, for the latter were very much alarmed at the impending movement for Prohibition, and German propaganda agents sometimes took advantage of the anxiety of the brewers to make propaganda by offering to organize such a movement and turning it into a pro-German drive.
^ Sen. Doc. 62, (Brewing and Liquor Interests, etc.) 1785.
* For documents, see Sen. Doc, 62, 1372 etseq.
® Sen. Doc. 62, 1424.
All manner of appeals to the public at large were made through all available channels. Books upon every phase of the War were put out under the auspices of the Dernburg- Albert Bureau, and the circulation of every book, beneficial to the German cause, was facilitated. A short selection of these books follows :
England or Germany, Frank Harris.
Hindenburg’s March into London, L. G. Redraond-Howard, author of the Life of John Redmond.
Peace and America, Hugo Munsterberg, Harvard University.
America’s Relations to the Great War, John W. Burgess, Columbia University.
The Making of Modern Germany, Ferdinand Schevill, The University of Chicago.
England, Eduard Meyer, The University of Berlin.
Belgium and Germany, A Dutch View, Dr. J. H. Labberton.
Justice in War Time, Bertrand Russell.
Behind the Scenes of Warring Germany, Edward Lyell Fox.*
The New York Mail was purchased for the sake of reaching a metropolitan audience, and supplying a newspaper which could be quoted. Cartoons, pamphlets and photographs without number were employed, and distributed through steamship company offices.*
Moving pictures were s^t to America in which German soldiers were shown busily feeding Belgian and French children. There were such captions as Barbs feeding the hungry/’ Do Barbarians look like this ? ”
1 A fuller list is given in Sen, i>oc, 62, 1410 et seq.
* Additional information about t^e German system appears in Levda Melville, “ German Propaganda Societies/* Quarterly Review, 230 (1918) : 70-88. \
The head of the British propaganda in America has conveniently summarized his methods. ^
Practically since the day war broke out between England and the Central Powers I became responsible for American publicity. I need hardly say that the scope of my department was very extensive, and its activities widely ranged. Among the activities was a weekly report to the British Cabinet on the state of American opinion, and constant touch with the permanent correspondents of American newspapers in England. I also frequently arranged for important public men in England to act for us by interviews in American newspapers ; and among these distinguished people were Mr. Lloyd George (the present Prime Minister), Viscount Grey, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Sir Edward Carson, Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. Walter Runciman (the Lord Chancellor), Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Lord Cromer, Will Crooks, Lord Curzon, Lord Gladstone, Lord Haldane, Mr. Henry James, Mr. John Redmond, Mr. Selfridge, Mr. Zangwill, Mrs. Humphrey Ward, and fully a hundred others.
Among other things we supplied three hundred and sixty newspapers in the smaller states of the United States with an English newspaper, which gives weekly reviews and comment on the affairs of the war. We established connection with the man in the street through cinema pictures of the Army and Navy, as well as through interviews, articles, pamphlets, etc. ; and by letters in reply to individual American critics, which were printed in the chief newspaper of the State in which they lived, and were copied in newspapers of other and neighbouring States. We advertised and stimulated many people to write articles. We utilised the friendly services and assistance of confidential friends ; we had reports from important Americans constantly, and established association by personal correspondence with influential and eminent people of every profession in the United States, beginning with the university and college presidents, professors, and scientific men, and running through all the ranges of population. We asked our friends and correspondents to arrange for speeches, debates and lectures by American citizens, but we did not encourage Britishers to go to America and preach the doctrine of entrance into the war. Besides an immense private correspondence with individuals, we had our documents and literature sent to great numbers of public libraries, Y.M.C.A. societies, universities, colleges, historical societies, clubs and newspapers.
^ Sir Gilbert Parker, “The United States and the War," Harper's Magazine, 136 (1918) ; 521-331. Extract.
It is hardly necessary to say that the work was one of extreme difficulty and delicacy, but I was fortunate in having a wide acquaintance in the United States, and in knowing that a great many people had read my books and were not prejudiced against me. . . .
... it should be remembered that the Society of Pilgrims, whose work of international unity cannot be overestimated, has played a part in promoting understanding between the two peoples, and the establishment of the American Officers’ Club in Lord Leconfteld’s house in London, with H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught as President, has done, and is doing, immense good. It should also be remembered that it was the Pilgrims’ Society, under the fine chairmanship of Mr. Harry Brittain, which took charge of the Hon. James M. Beck when he visited England in 1916, and gave him so good a chance to do great work for the cause of unity between the two nations. I am glad and proud to think that I had something to do with these arrangements, which resulted in the Pilgrims taking Mr. Beck into their charge.^
The chief emphasis in Sir Gilbert Parker's succinct account of his own methods is upon the use of persons as channels of influence. Influence spread from business man to business man, from journalist to journalist, from professor to professor, from worker to worker. Behind the scenes, and behind the news and pictures and speeches, there flows a mighty stream of personal influencing. The War was more debated in private than in public. The doubters were won by friendship or flattery, logic or shame, to fuse their enthusiasm in the rising wave of Allied sentiment. A side-light on the method is contained in a letter from Sir Edward Grey to Theodore Roosevelt, dated September loth, 1914 :
^ The British have not publicly estimated the amount of money which they spent on American as distinguished from other types of propaganda. They spent one hundred and fifty thousand dollars {;f3 1,360 4s.) in the last four months of the War to break the German moral and to accomplish other propaganda objects.
My dear Roosevelt, — J. M. Barrie and A. E. W. Mason, some of whose books you have no doubt read, are going to the U.S. Their object is, as I understand, not to make speeches or give lectures, but to meet people, particularly those connected with Universities, and explain the British case as regards this war and our view of the issues involved.*
When a lance was broken in public for the British cause, it was done by an American and not by a foreigner. There were no obnoxiously evident Britishers as there were Dernburgs in America. It was the social lobby, the personal conversation, and the casual brush which forged the strongest chain between America and Britain. All countries found that an effective carrier of propaganda for their cause in America was the titled foreigner who said nothing whatever for the public prints, but who talked privately and casually of the War. The sheer radiation of aristocratic distinction was enough to warm the cockles of many a staunch Republican heart, and to evoke enthusiasm for the country which could produce such dignity, elegance and affability. The wife of an important newspaper proprietor was hostess to a Count ; the wife of a Senator evened the social score by countering with a Duke. A Marquis, Earl or Baron was dealt hither and thither in this diverting social game. All this was a standing joke among sophisticated Europeans, I who subtly played upon the ambitions of numerous hostesses in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Washington and Chicago.
^ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, II : 143.
The most important personality in propaganda among neutrals or allies usually is the official representative at the capital. What type of man should he be and what technique should he exploit ? No more brilliant success has ever been scored than that of Benjamin Franklin at Paris during the War of Independence. A Frenchman, M. Francis P. Renaut, describes him in these words :
(Franklin) arrived preceded by a certain reputation ; he was able not only to save his admirers from disillusion, but to kindle their enthusiasm. For some he was scientist who had captured the lightning, for others the genial philosopher, for others the enemy of tyranny and the ardent defender of public liberty ; for aU, he was the simple man of nature, the patriarch, the father of a family who unostentatiously exemplified the common virtues. And in a time when the words of Rousseau wer^lodged in every cultivated mind, who could fail to be moved by the spectacle of a venerable old gentleman coming to defend his country, supported on the arm of one of his grandchildren (William Temple Franklin). The politician scarcely appeared in this life, of which the smallest details captivated the Parisians ; the residence at Passy with its easy access, the visits to Court without ceremony, the philosophical conversations, the relations with Voltaire and the physiocrats.^ The key to Franklin was expressed by implication in the last sentence : he was a non-political personality, and the lustre of his person spread to all his affiliations.
^ La politique de propaganda des Amiricains durant la Guerre d*Ind&pendance , 1 : 52.
An example of a dubious selection is that of the Hon. Elihu Root as head of the American Mission to Russia. There was no question about his technical eminence as a student and administrator of international affairs, but the situation was such that he was open to attack in revolutionary Russia. As Colonel Robins testified :
You may know that he had attacked at one time in this country a very important public person, and you may know that, as a result of that attack, editorials, the most brilliant possible of their kind, had been published for successive weeks, accompanied by cartoons, speaking of Mr. Root as the jackal of privilege, as the watchdog of Wall Street, and all that sort of thing. They had been run in the public Press. Probably the German agents in America, immediately upon his appointment, gathered these up and sent them over, and they appeared in pamphlets in Russia, translated into Russian, with the cartoons and the words changed to Russian synonyms, so that even friendly papers said, “ How is it possible that the great democratic President should send over to Russia to help make the world safe for democracy — to revolutionary Russia — the man who has spent most of his time, according to what we hear, in trying to make America safe for plutocracy ?
If this general analysis of the technique of preserving friendship is correct, it goes to show that the chief theme of inter-allied propaganda is strenuous exertion in the common cause, and that every supporting thesis of propaganda should be sustained and reinforced. The handling of the neutral boils down to the problem of leading the neutral to identify his own interests with your own in, defeating the enemy. Aside from general representations of the enemy as threatening, obstructive, and despicable, and of one’s own nation as protective, helpful and upright, there must be some confidence in ultimate success. The most astute means of drawing in neutral sympathy is to draw the neutral into overt co-operation in some form. When all else fails, an appeal to pacifism and an effort to instigate trouble with another neutral may avoid active hostility. Among all the means to be exploited, the use of personal influencing is peculiarly important, as is the practice that in general neutrals should be addressed by neutrals.
' Sen, Doc, 62, {Brewing and Liquor Interests, etc) 3 : 819.
Propaganda Technique in the World War, Harold D. Lasswell. Published in London and New York in 1927, more than 95 years ago, so in the public domain in the United States (works published in 1930 or earlier). Lasswell died in 1978, so the text may still be protected in countries that count the author's life plus 70 years; readers outside the United States should check their own law. Provenance and rights.