


- Actor
- Russia-aligned influence operation known as Matryoshka, Operation Overload, or Storm-1679 (open-source: CeMAS, ISD, NewsGuard, DW Faktencheck; German domestic intelligence warnings). Technical lineage to Storm-1516 / GRU-linked clusters is reported by OSINT groups and is medium pending primary indicators.
- Target
- Voters and candidates in September 2026 German state and municipal elections (Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Berlin; Lower Saxony municipal), plus the federal government
- Source
- Impersonated black (fabricated crimes, celebrity deepfakes, forged newspaper fronts)
- Techniques
- Synthetic mediaName-callingFirehosingFlooding the zoneCard stackingFear appeal
- First seen (this wave)
- 24 Jun 2026 onward; elections 6 Sep (Saxony-Anhalt) and 20 Sep 2026 (Berlin, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern)
- Status
- active as of September 10, 2026
- Related briefs
- (none in the hourly cabinet before September 10, 2026; this dossier is the first durable map)
Mechanism
The operation does not argue policy. It accuses named politicians of crimes they did not commit, at a cadence a regional newsroom cannot match.

The Landtag of Saxony-Anhalt, Domplatz, Magdeburg, photographed 9 June 2017. Saxony-Anhalt voted on 6 September 2026, the first of the state elections named in this dossier. Photo: W. Bulach, CC BY-SA 4.0.
CeMAS (Julia Smirnova, Anna Meyer, 4 Sep 2026) logged 141 distinct election-related videos between 30 June and 28 August, with false claims against 53 politicians from CDU, SPD, Greens, Die Linke, and FDP. ISD counted 269 posts across 21 days (24 Jun–1 Sep) on X, plus activity on Bluesky and TikTok. DW Faktencheck reported 180+ fake posts since 24 June, weekdays only. Hashtags such as #StopMerzToday and celebrity deepfakes sit on top of the crime-accusation pile. NewsGuard documented a parallel #TimeToDivideGermany line using falsified newspaper fronts that put redivision into East and West in the mouths of celebrities and editors.

Election posters of the AfD, Die Linke and Die PARTEI on lamp posts at the Marienplatz in Schwerin, photographed on 30 August 2026, three weeks before the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern state election of 20 September 2026. The image shows the physical campaign setting during the period in which the operation's posts circulated; it does not depict the operation itself. Photo: Frijfuhs, CC0 (Wikimedia Commons).
Firehosing and flooding-the-zone are the architecture: volume, contradiction-tolerant, local-candidate granularity that is new relative to earlier Matryoshka waves (Bundestag, Moldova, Armenia, Paris Olympics). Card-stacking is in the target list — CDU, SPD, Greens, Die Linke, and FDP are hit; AfD and BSW are largely spared, a pattern in target selection rather than evidence of party involvement. Synthetic media supplies the deepfakes and forged fronts. Name-calling and fear-appeal do the rest.

Schwerin Castle, seat of the Landtag of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, photographed 5 September 2009. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern voted on 20 September 2026 alongside Berlin. Photo: Kolossos, CC BY-SA 3.0.

The Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin, the city-state's parliament, Niederkirchnerstrasse, Berlin-Mitte, photographed 27 October 2014. Berlin voted on 20 September 2026. Photo: Abghs, CC BY-SA 4.0.

Polling station 0105 at the Altes Rathaus, Magdeburg, on election day for the Saxony-Anhalt state parliament, 6 September 2026 (photographed at about 17:40). Photo: Roy Zuo (RoyZuoMedia), CC BY-SA 4.0 (Wikimedia Commons).
ISD’s own caveat is load-bearing: 269 posts with recycled formats and production errors are detectable. Volume is not the same as persuasion. File the method; do not inflate effect.
Evidence
- CeMAS, 4 Sep 2026, “Desinformation vor Landtagswahlen” — https://cemas.io/blog/desinformation-vor-landtagswahlen
- Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 4 Sep 2026, “An old dog with no new tricks: Matryoshka targets regional elections in Germany” — https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/investigation-an-old-dog-with-no-new-tricks-matryoshka-targets-regional-elections-in-germany/
- NewsGuard, Aug 2026, “New Russian Influence Campaign Aims to Re-Divide Germany Into East and West” — https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/new-russian-influence-campaign-aims-to-re-divide-germany-into-east-and-west
- tagesschau / DW Faktencheck on Matrjoschka and German elections — https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/faktencheck-russland-deutsche-wahlen-100.html
- POLITICO, 6 Aug 2026, Leipzig drone incident and official monitoring of Matryoshka — https://www.politico.eu/article/leipzig-drone-incident-fuels-fears-russia-election-meddling/
What would falsify this read
A showing that the video cluster is domestic, uncoordinated smear rather than the Overload fingerprint (weekday-only posting, recycled templates, cross-platform identical assets); or platform/BfV indicators that attribute the wave to a different actor. AfD being “spared” is a pattern observation, not proof of collusion with AfD.
Literacy counter
A viral clip that accuses a Landtag candidate of murder, corruption, or treason, posted by an account with no local history, on a weekday, in a format you have seen before, is provisional. Reverse-search the video. Check CeMAS / ISD trackers. Prefer the candidate’s primary record and local newspapers over a dubbed celebrity. Do not treat “Russia did it” as a reason to ignore a real local scandal if one exists — that would be the mirror error.