The “Fourth of July Fake”

ASIDE from the regulation "censorship" cry, the thing 2\ that worked principally to the prejudice of the Committee on Public Information was the charge that I "elaborated" a "cryptic" cable sent by Admiral Gleaves, and gave to the country an utterly false account of submarine attack upon our first transports. Although disproved fully, the falsehood persisted to our hurt and discredit, and even to this day there are people honestly of the opinion that the initial troop-ships had a "safe and uneventful voyage." Of the many lies leveled against the Committee during its existence, I think I minded this lie the most, for not only was it peculiarly indecent in its groundlessness, but its contemptible course carried far beyond me and struck down a people's pride in their navy at the exact moment when that pride was a war necessity. For the first time in history American soldiers were being sent to fight on foreign soil, traveling ocean lanes thick with U-boats, and the period of suspense was our "zero hour." The news of safe arrival, of dangers met and conquered, was a clarion to the courage of the nation, yet this helpful enthusiasm was changed into a sneer for no greater reason than that a press association might have a "story" and that partizan Senators might take a fling at the Administration. Here are the facts:

The first transports, leaving in June, sailed in four separated groups to minimize the danger of submarine attack. We had no cable censorship at the time, and out of fear of enemy communication, the press was asked to make no announcement of departure or arrival until the last of the four groups reached St. Nazaire. On June 27th, however, through some blunder in France, the Associated Press received a despatch announcing the arrival of the first group, and without reference to the War Department or to the Committee it put the news upon its wires from its New York office. By way of contribution to the general confusion, various correspondents attempted to prove that I had given the Associated Press authorization for the release, and printed the falsehood that the Secretary of War had "broken" relations with the Committee in consequence.

At the very time of the premature announcement we knew that the other three groups were either in or near the danger zone. Adding to the anxiety occasioned, a cable came from Admiral Gleaves in command of the transports, telling of attacks by submarines, their repulse, and the certain sinking of one U-boat. Even without this news the tension was extreme and there was not a heart in any department in Washington that did not wait in sick impatience.

Late in the afternoon of July 3d the navy received the flash that announced the safe arrival of the last group, and the correspondents were told on the instant. As the word traveled a great happiness took possession of every one. When I entered the office of Secretary Daniels in response to a summons, tears were in his eyes, and his first words were, "What a Fourth-of-July present for the people!"

As a matter of course, the press clamored for the details of the submarine attack and I urged the verbatim release of the cable received from Admiral Gleaves. The high admirals flatly refused permission, informing me that it was the immemorial policy of the navy, in time of war, not to employ the language of a message coming in code, as it would acquaint the enemy with the cipher. Moreover, the Gleaves cable gave the names of the ships, set down latitude and longitude, and furnished other information of equal value to the enemy.

Because of these considerations, it was then determined to issue the information in the form of a statement to the people from the Secretary of the Navy. Out of his relief, his pride and joy, Mr. Daniels gave me his ideas as to the subject-matter, naval experts checking from the Gleaves cable, and the statement was written then and there. With every correspondent in Washington panting for the release, and with wires cleared for the sending, there was not time for word-picking and word-shading, even had the emotions of the moment not precluded all thought of "style" and meticulous phrasing. Every care was taken to set down the facts, but the spirit of thanksgiving that flooded every heart insensibly took charge of phraseology. This was the statement that went to the press within one hour from the time of the original announcement:

PRESS STATEMENT

[From the Committee on Public Information. For immediate release.]

July 3, 1917.

The Navy Department at five o'clock this afternoon received word of the safe arrival at a French port of the last contingent of General Pershing's expeditionary force. Announcement was made instantly, and at the same time the information was released that the transports were twice attacked by submarines on the way across.

No ship was hit, not an American life was lost, and while the navy gunners report the sinking of one submarine only, there is reason to believe that others were destroyed in the first night attack.

OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF SECRETARY DANIELS

It is with the joy of a great relief that I announce to the people of the United States the safe arrival in France of every fightingman and every fighting-ship.

Now that the last vessel has reached port it is safe to disclose the dangers that were encountered and to tell the complete story of peril and courage.

The transports bearing our troops were twice attacked by German submarines on the way across. On both occasions the U-boats were beaten off with every appearance of loss. One certainly was sunk, and there is reason to believe that the accurate fire of our gunners sent others to the bottom.

For purposes of convenience, the expedition was divided into contingents, each contingent including troop-ships and a naval escort designed to keep off such German raiders as might be met.

An ocean rendezvous had also been arranged with the American destroyers now operating in European waters, in order that the passage of the danger zone might be attended by every possible protection.

The first attack took place at 10.30 on the night of June 22d. What gives it peculiar and disturbing significance is that our ships were set upon at a point well this side of the rendezvous, and in that part of the Atlantic presumably free from submarines.

The attack was made in force, although the night made impossible any exact count of the U-boats gathered for what they deemed a slaughter.

The high-seas convoy, circling with their search-lights, answered with heavy gun-fire, and its accuracy stands proved by the fact that the torpedo discharge became increasingly scattered and inaccurate. It is not known how many torpedoes were launched, but five were counted as they sped by bow and stern.

A second attack was launched a few days later against another contingent. The point of assault was beyond the rendezvous and our destroyers were sailing as a screen between the transports and all harm. The results of the battle were in favor of American gunnery.

Not alone did the destroyers hold the U-boats at a safe distance, but their speed also resulted in the sinking of one submarine at least. Grenades were used in firing, a depth-charge explosive timed to go off at a certain distance under water. In one instance oil and wreckage covered the surface of the sea after a shot from a destroyer at a periscope, and the reports make claim of sinking.

Protected by our high-seas convoy, by our destroyers, and by French war-vessels, the contingent proceeded and joined the others in a French port.

The whole nation will rejoice that so great a peril is past for the vanguard of the men who will fight our battles in France. No more thrilling Fourth-of-July celebration could have been arranged than this glad news that lifts the shadow of dread from the heart of America.

A wave of joyful enthusiasm swept the nation. Every newspaper in the land carried the statement in full, and not even the partizan press, always so eager to criticize, had a word to say about "bombast" or "flamboyancy." For the moment, at least, the meannesses of prejudice were subordinated to the exaltations of patriotism.

Three days later Mr. Melville Stone, of the Associated Press, received a despatch from his London correspondent stating that officers at the American flotilla base in English waters had declared that the transports were not attacked by submarines at all, and that it was more than likely that the supposed U-boats were merely floating spars or blackfish. Mr. Stone telephoned the Secretary of the Navy from New York and Mr. Daniels gained the impression that a representative of the Associated Press would call upon him with the despatch before its release. When the Washington correspondent came, however, the Secretary was astounded to learn that the London cable had already been put on the wires and that the visit had no greater purpose than to find out "if he had anything to say." Mr. Daniels pointed out that the despatch was absolutely anonymous in that it did not give the name of a single American officer responsible for the slander, and declared his sense of outrage that the comment of unknown persons, far from the scene of the incident, should be matched against the report of an admiral of the navy. As a result the Associated Press sent out a "kill," but with such a start the story could not be caught.

The partizan press leaped forward instantly in eager acceptance of the truth of the anonymous cable, and even friendly papers, unwilling to lose a "good story," joined in the hue and cry. The Secretary of the Navy was besieged by correspondents demanding the original cable from Admiral Gleaves, and when he refused for the very same reasons that had prevented publication in the beginning, a great shout arose that the whole occurrence had been nothing more than a "Fourth of July hoax." Then, and only then, did every solemn editorial ass discover that the statement was "lurid" and "bombastic."

A reporter of The Tribune called at my office the following afternoon on some personal matter, and while we were discussing it several other correspondents came into the room. The submarine controversy came up, and I told them, naturally enough, that I had no comments to make whatsoever, as any statement must properly come from the Secretary of the Navy. In the course of what I conceived to be personal conversation I tried to explain the point of view of the admirals, citing the importance of the navy code, the value to the enemy of the information as to longitude and latitude, and remarked also that a navy cable would have small news value, anyway, inasmuch as its technical wording made it cryptic to civilians.

One of the men then sneered something about "elaboration," and I answered that the veriest fool could see that the release did not purport to be the Gleaves cable, but was openly and frankly a statement of the Secretary of the Navy based upon the facts contained in the cable. I should have been conscious of the possibility of distortion, but aside from the fact that I did not consider it an interview, the savage contempt that filled my heart left little room for other considerations. The men standing before me, every one husky, healthy, and within the military age, were holding down their peace-time jobs, while others sailed across the sea to offer their lives on the altar of American ideals. Surely the least that they could do was to think in terms of helpfulness, yet there they were, fairly quivering with eagerness to attack, to decry, and to defame.

The two words, "cryptic" and "elaboration," were fatal. Although only the three or four reporters saw me, virtually every paper carried a story the following day in which I was actually quoted as having admitted that the Gleaves cable was "cryptic" and that I "elaborated" it in the sense of supplying facts and details out of my own fancy. Senator Penrose, an ancient enemy, rose joyfully to take advantage of the opportunity for a display of scurvy partizanship. His resolution not only called for an investigation of the "Fourth of July fake," but for an inquiry into every act and activity of the Committee. Reed, Watson, Johnson, and other Senators with old angers to satisfy, joined in the attack and the press came in as chorus.

What gave a touch of malignancy to the whole affair was that reports fully corroborating Secretary Daniels's statement were regularly pouring in from independent sources. As early as July 7th The New York Times carried an account of the attack on the transports, written by its Paris correspondent. The New York World a few days later printed an interview with "the captain of an American ship " telling of the encounters and quoting him to the effect that "almost every vessel in the convoy was fired at by the U-boats, but American gunners proved too quick for the Germans." The correspondent of The Philadelphia Public Ledger cabled a graphic story of submarine attack, claiming the destruction of one U-boat, and in a score of metropolitan dailies appeared interviews with sailors, hospital apprentices, officers, etc., all thrilling in their description of the sea battle. On July 20th The New York Tribune, a paper most horrified by our "fake," published a letter received from a private in France in which these statements were made:

The Dutch must have known we were coming, because they took their first crack at night, before the destroyers joined up with the fleet. It was about eleven o'clock and dark, but there was some phosphorus in the water and it was easy to see the bubbles from the torpedoes. The "subs" took two shots at one transport. They didn't miss her much. The "subs" got busy and shot at five other boats. They missed them all, but it was close squeaking all right. It was sort of bad that night because the destroyers didn't meet up with the fleet until the morning. They put a smoke screen around the transports and went out after the "subs." One of our ships got one spotted close and nailed her after she dodged. That was pretty neat. She nailed her Vay down under the water. We got the "sub" all right. There was more than oil came up.

Most delightful contribution of all was this report that the Associated Press itself sent out:

HALIFAX, N. S., July 25th. — British sailors arriving here to-day, who claim to have been among crews of vessels in the vicinity of the transports which conveyed the first American troops to France, say they were credibly informed that German submarines made a concentrated attack and were beaten off, with a loss of six U-boats, only one submarine escaping.

The sailors said they were within three miles of the transports and witnessed heavy and continuous fire. The men were on three former Dutch vessels which had been taken over by the British government and were on their way to Europe.

The very papers, however, that carried sensational and even lurid accounts of the battle in their news columns at the very same time thundered editorially against the "Fourth of July hoax" and gravely condemned me for what they were pleased to term my " flamboyancies."

All the while we were awaiting the return of Admiral Gleaves in order to receive the full report that it was his duty to file with the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. In the mean time, just as the newspaper attack was abating, Senator Penrose called up his resolution and for a day the Chamber rang to a bitter debate. In his most brazen manner, Penrose declared that the American public had been "regaled on the Fourth of July with the bombastic account of a battle which never occurred, and relating to a squadron which crossed the ocean in placid seas and arrived on the other side without an important event."

Senator Swanson of Virginia openly charged dishonest purpose. Senator Penrose, he said, had been informed by the Navy Department that every one of the documents in the case was at his disposal, including the original cable from Admiral Gleaves, and his flat refusal to avail himself of the offers proved that he had no interest in facts. Senator James of Kentucky talked plainly of "copperheadism" and coined a new word when he substituted "Penrosing" for "sniping." Nothing came of the resolution because it was never meant that anything should come of it. Having hurled his insults and launched his charges, nothing was farther from the Penrose mind than that there should be any hearing at which his assertions might be answered.

At last, however, after what seemed an interminable delay, the report of Admiral Gleaves came to hand, and not only did it bear out the original statement in every degree, but went beyond it. I submit a verbatim copy of the document :

REPORT OF ADMIRAL GLEAVES

DESTROYER FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET, FLAGSHIP, , France, July 12, 1917.

From: Commander, Destroyer Force. To: Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Attacks on convoy by submarines on the nights of June 22d, June 26th, and June 28th, 1917.

1. About 10.15 P.M., June 22d, the first group of the expeditionary force of which the flagship was the leader, encountered the enemy's submarine in latitude ., longitude W.

2. At the time it was extremely dark, the sea unusually phosphorescent; a fresh breeze was blowing from the northwest which broke the sea into whitecaps. The condition was ideal for a submarine attack.

3. (Paragraph 3 gives the formation and names of the vessels, together with the speed they were making and method of proceeding; nothing else. It is therefore omitted for obvious reasons.)

4. Shortly before the attack the helm of the flagship had jammed, and the ship took a rank sheer to starboard; the whistle was blown to indicate this sheer. In a few minutes the ship was brought back to the course. At this time the officer of the deck and others on the bridge saw a white streak about 50 yards ahead of the ship, crossing from starboard to port, at right angles to our course. The ship was immediately run off 90° to starboard at full speed. I was asleep in the chart-house at the time. I heard the officer of the deck say, "Report to the admiral a torpedo has just crossed our bow." General alarm was sounded, torpedo crews being already at their guns. When I reached the bridge the A and one of the transports astern had opened fire, the former's shell fitted with tracers. Other vessels of the convoy turned to the right and left, in accordance with instructions. B crossed our bow at full speed and turned toward the left column in the direction of the firing.

5. At first it was thought on board the flagship that the wake was that of a torpedo, but from subsequent reports from other ships and in the opinion of Lieut. X, who was on the bridge, it was probably the wake of the submarine boat itself. Two torpedoes passed close to the A from port to starboard, one about

4 37 30 yards ahead of the ship and the other under her stern, as the ship was turning to the northward. Capt. Y reports the incident thus:

" Steaming in formation on zigzag courses, with base course 75° p. s. c., standard speed. At 10.25 sighted wake of a torpedo directly across our bow about 30 yards ahead of the ship. Changed course 90° to left and went to torpedo-defense stations. Fired two 1-pounder shots and one 5-inch shot from port battery in alarm in addition to six blasts from siren. Passed through two wakes, one being that from the U. S. S. C. in turning to northward, the other believed to have been from the passing submarine. A second torpedo wake was reported at about 10.35 from after lookouts. After steaming in various courses at full speed, resumed course 89° p. s. c. at 11.10 for rendezvous. At 12 set course 56° p. s. c. ."

6. The torpedo fired at the D passed from starboard to port, about 40 yards ahead of the ship, leaving a distinct wake which was visible for about four or five hundred yards. Col. Z, United States Army, was on the starboard wing of the bridge of the D at the time and states: "I first saw a white streak in the water just off the starboard bow, which moved rapidly across the bow very close aboard. When I first saw it, it looked like one very wide wake and similar to the wake of a ship, but after crossing the bow and when in line with it there appeared two distinct and separate wakes, with a streak of blue water between. In my opinion they were the wakes of two torpedoes."

7. The submarine, which was sighted by the flagship, was seen by the B and passed under that ship. The E went to quarters. When the alarm was sounded in the E, Lieut. W was roused out of his sleep, and went to his station and found unmistakable evidence of the presence of a submarine. He had been there only a few seconds when the radio operator reported, "Submarine very close to us." As the submarine passed the E and the flagship's bow and disappeared close aboard on our port bow, between the columns, it was followed by the E, which ran down between the columns, and when the latter resumed her station she reported that there were strong indications of the presence of two submarines astern, which were growing fainter. The E was then sent to guard the rear of the convoy.

8. When I was in Paris I was shown by the United States naval attache* a confidential official bulletin of information issued by the General Staff, dated July 6th, which contained the following :

"Punta Delgada, Azores, was bombarded at 9 A.M., July 4th. This is undoubtedly the submarine which attacked the E on June 25th, 400 miles north of the Azores, and sank the F and G on the 29th of June, 100 miles from Terceira (Azores). This submarine was ordered to watch in the vicinity of the Azores at such a distance as it was supposed the enemy American convoy would pass from the Azores."

9. It appears from the French report just quoted above, and from the location of the attack, that enemy submarines had been notified of our approach and were probably scouting across our route. It is possible that they may have trailed us all day on June 22d, as our speed was well within their limits of surface speed, and they could have easily trailed our smoke under the weather conditions without being seen; their failure to' score hits was probably due to the attack being precipitated by the fortuitous circumstances of the flagship's helm jamming and the sounding of her whistle, leading enemy to suppose he had been discovered.

10. The H, leading the second group, encountered two submarines, the first about 11.50 A.M., June 26, 1917, in latitude

N., longitude W., about a hundred miles off the coast of

France, and the second two hours later. The I investigated the wake of the first without further discovery. The J sighted the bow wave of the second at a distance of 1,500 yards and headed for it at a speed of 25 knots. The gun-pointers at the forward gun saw the periscope several times for several seconds, but it disappeared each time before they could get on, due to the zigzagging of the ship. The J passed about 25 yards ahead of a mass of bubbles which were coming up from the wake and let go a depth charge just ahead. Several pieces of timber, quantities of oil, bubbles, and debris came to the surface. Nothing more was seen of the submarine. The attacks on the second group occurred about 800 miles to the eastward of where the attacks had been made on the first group.

11. The voyage of the third group was uneventful.

12. In the forenoon of June 28th, when in latitude N., longitude - - W., the K opened fire on an object about 300 yards distant which he thought was a submarine. The commander of the group, however, did not concur in this opinion, but the reports subsequently received from the commanding officer of the K and Lieut. V are too circumstantial to permit the incident from being ignored. The commanding officer states :

" (b) The only unusual incident of the trip worth mentioning was on the 28th day of June, about 10.05 A.M., the lookouts reported something right ahead of the K. (I had the bridge at the time.) When I looked I saw what appeared to be a very small object on the water's surface, about a foot or two high, which left a small wake; on looking closer and with the aid of binoculars I could make out a shape under the water about 250 to 300 yards ahead and which was too large to be a blackfish, lying in a position about 15 degrees diagonally across the K's course.

" (b-1) I ordered the port-bow gun to open fire on the spot in the water and sounded warning siren for convoy. When judging that ship had arrived above the spot first seen I ordered right rudder in order to leave the submarine astern.

"(&-#) A minute or two later the port after gun's crew reported sighting a submarine on port quarter and opened fire at the same time. The lookouts from the top also reported seeing the submarine under the water's surface and about where the shots were landing.

"(b-3) The ship kept zigzagging and firing from after guns every time something was sighted.

"(b-4) Lieut. V, United States Navy, was in personal charge of the firing and reports that he saw, with all the gun crews and lookouts aft, the submarine fire two torpedoes toward the direction of the convoy, which sheered off from base course to right 90° when alarm was sounded.

" (b-5) All the officers and men aft had observed the torpedoes traveling through the water and cheered loudly when they saw a torpedo miss a transport. They are not certain, though, which one it was, as the ships were not in line then and more or less scattered.

"(6-0) The gunnery officer and all the men, who were aft at the firing, are certain that they saw the submarine and the torpedoes fired by same.

" (6-7) A separate report of Lieut. V, United States Navy, the gunnery officer, is herewith appended.

"(6-5) The K kept zigzagging until it was considered that danger was past, and in due time joined the escorts and convoy, formed column astern.

"(6-9) Report by signal was made to group commander of sighting submarines and torpedoes."

13. (Paragraph 13 deals exclusively with a recommendation as to the best methods to be employed in the future for the purpose of saving life. It is plain this ought not to be made public.)

14. Copies of reports of commanding officer's flagship, A, D, and H, are inclosed; also copy of report of Lieut. V, of the K.

ALBERT GLEAVES.

Here at last was the ultimate word, the complete story, the conclusive proof. The Secretary of the Navy had not lied, the first joy and enthusiasms of the people were not unjustified. Even though a month of lying had worked grave injury to American morale, it seemed a certainty that the publication of the report would remedy the evil in great degree. What happened? The Senate ignored the report, and the press, almost without exception, chopped it to pieces and printed it, obscurely, as the "last chapter in an unfortunate incident."

I had no intention of letting the matter rest, however, and under my insistence a request was made upon Admiral Sims to investigate the sending of the Associated Press despatch that started the whole train of calumny. In due time the following report was received:

3 August, 1917.

From: Commander J. R. P. Pringle, U. S. Navy.

To: Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Operating in European

Waters. Subject: Cablegram — OpNav. 49.

1 . Upon receipt and after consideration of the above-mentioned cable forwarded from your office in London, I decided that the matter was one which would have to be brought to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief, Queenstown, since the sending of the despatch referred to in OpNav. 49 had not been authorized by me and, as a consequence, if authorized at all, could only have been authorized by competent British authority.

2. I accordingly requested an interview with the Commanderin-Chief and also permission to bring with me Mr. Frank America, the Associated Press Correspondent at Queenstown. At 10.30 A.M. to-day I went, in company with Mr. America, to the Commander-in-Chief s office and found Lieutenant-Commander Olebar, R. N., the British Naval Censor for Queenstown also there.

3. The Commander-in-Chief read the cablegram (OpNav. 49) and then interrogated Mr. America, who stated in substance as follows: That he had received a wire from the London office of the Associated Press stating that certain information had been given out by the Secretary of the Navy, and asking if there was a Queenstown end to the story. That he had received shortly afterward a second wire from the same source telling him that a "follow up" story was desired. That he got into communication with Commander Pringle and asked permission to write a "follow up" story. That Commander Pringle refused to allow him to do so as the Censorship Regulations would not permit of its being done, and that Commander Pringle refused to enter into any further discussion of the subject. That he sent to the London office of the Associated Press a wire intended for the private information of his superiors in that office and not intended for publication, and that since the wire was "private" he did not consider it necessary to submit it to censorship by either the British authorities or myself, and accordingly did not submit it. That the information contained in this wire was substantially as given in OpNav. 49, and represented his general impression formed as the result of casual conversations held with a couple of officers and some men. That he did not know any one of the officers or men, but had met them on the pier, in the streets, or at the hotel.

4. About July 5th or 6th, Mr. America came on board the Melville to see me and showed me a wire which he had received from his London office which stated in substance that the Navy Department denied the statements contained in his (Mr. America's) wire, and, further, that the statement given out by the Secretary of the Navy was based upon official reports made by Rear- Admiral Gleaves. This was the first intimation that I had of Mr. America's having sent his wire, and, as Mr. America seemed to wish to renew his efforts to get me to discuss the subject, I sent for the Executive Officer of the Melville, Lieut.- Commander Arwine, and, in his presence, informed Mr. America that I had declined to permit him to send any communication on the subject in question; that it would be entirely improper for me to discuss statements which had been issued by the Secretary of the Navy, and that, once again, I declined to do so.

5. In accordance with your verbal instructions, I had an interview with Mr. America shortly after your departure from Queenstown and informed him that he should come to me for information; that I would always give him such items as it was possible to give without violating the Censorship Rules, and that what news he got from me would be accurate. It was, therefore, entirely proper for him to have come to me for permission to write the "follow up" story requested.

6. The above is a recital of the facts in the case so far as I am able to ascertain them.

7. As a matter of opinion, it appears to me that, so far as the publication of his despatch is concerned, Mr. America is more sinned against than sinning, if the ordinary procedure regarding the publication of despatches received by the Central Office from correspondents is as stated by him. He felt that his despatch would not be published, and it seems to me that, if he was justified in his belief, his superiors in London have put him in a very embarrassing position.

8. With regard to any criticism either express or implied of statements given to the press by the Secretary of the Navy, I doubt very much whether any of the persons from whom Mr. America got his information were aware of the fact that the Secretary had given out a statement. There is a general tendency among officers and men of the Force to attribute many cases of supposed torpedo attack to the sighting of blackfish or porpoise, while spars are sometimes mistaken for periscopes, and any statements made are much more likely to have been intended to express a belief that the reports were exaggerated at the source than to express anything else.

J. B. P. PRINGLE. Forwarded, approved. WM. S. SIMS. What a record!

The word of an admiral of the navy, the authorized statement of the Secretary of the Navy, set aside and publicly shamed on the authority of men "met on the docks, at the hotels, and in the street," and whose names were not even known to the correspondent!

The message sent as private — meaning that it was not intended for publication — thereby evading the censorship!