The Work in the Orient

CHINESE dislike of England and Chinese hatred of Japan pointed clearly to the fact that the Allied fight for public opinion in China would have to be made by America and Americans. The Germans had carried on a very extensive and expensive propaganda, and, while unmarked by any particular cleverness, the work swept forward to success on the wave of anti-Japanese, anti- British feeling. A principal feature of the Hun activity was a news agency that supplied a daily cable service from Berlin to the Chinese press. Pay was taken in the form of advertising space, which in turn was allotted to the German houses doing business in China. As a consequence, both news and advertising columns were regularly poisoned, and China stood in danger of seeing the World War through Hun spectacles only.

Reuters, the official news agency, was in control of the field as far as Allied information was concerned. All American news, for instance, went into China by way of London, and the part sent on by Reuters dealt mainly with our crimes, corruptions, and commercial hypocrisies. Our policies were never referred to except when British interests were affected. In addition to Reuters there was a separate propaganda organization that seemed to have no other object than to preach Great Britain's preponderating part in the war. This work was directed from three headquarters: (a) the British colony of Hongkong; (6) the British Legation in Peking; (c) the British consulate in Shanghai. Through the four years of the war these three agencies worked at cross-purposes, often in opposition to one another, and at the end of the war were still quarreling over which one of the three should run the show.

Under these circumstances, the plan of campaign was different in each place. In Shanghai the work was turned over to a clerk in the consulate, who worked under the direction of Reuters' agent and the British consul. In the early part of the war they established a daily Chinese newspaper in Shanghai, at a cost said to be about $125,000. A great deal of British advertising was diverted- to this paper, but it was not a financial success and reverted to Chinese ownership after the armistice. They also published a fortnightly war magazine, distributed through British firms. In the establishment of these publications the British ignored existing mediums and created more or less resentment among Chinese publishers. A daily resume of war events was made and telegraphed to some fifty or sixty points in the Yangtze Valley to Britishers, who undertook the work of translating these messages and securing their publication in the Chinese press. This resume was also published in handbill form and seven thousand distributed in Shanghai each afternoon. In Peking a similar resume was sent to the newspapers and once a week a poster was issued giving the resume of the week's news. This poster was put up by the police in Peking and was posted in the waiting-rooms of the Britishcontrolled railways. The Hongkong committee published daily an official bulletin in English giving all Reuters' telegrams. This was sent to Chinese officials.

Through a connection between Reuters and the Kokusai (the official Japanese news agency) the Japanese were able to present their views in China, as news sent from Tokio is distributed by Reuters. This means that when there was a controversial issue between Japan and America, Japanese views were given the widest publicity in China, while American opinions were learned only after they had been edited in London. This arrangement between the Kokusai and Reuters was similar to that between the Associated Press and Reuters, with this important difference— that Japanese news was sent direct to China, while American news sent by the Associated Press had to come through London.

In addition to this arrangement with Reuters, the Japanese originated a semi-official news agency which supplied Far Eastern news to Chinese publications. Japanese consuls acted as correspondents for this agency, the despatches being sent in code. In the treaty ports the Japanese adopted the policy of registering Chinese newspapers at the Japanese consulate, thereby giving them protection against Chinese officials, and gaining more or less control over the papers. In addition the Japanese owned a number of Chinese papers and secretly controlled several English-language papers by means of loans and subsidies. None of the Japanese propaganda was directed toward creating a sentiment favorable to the Allies, but to the furtherance of Japan's aims in China.

French propaganda was directed from Shanghai and consisted principally in the publication of a fortnightly magazine of about sixteen pages, containing pictures and articles about the war. Several posters were issued. About two months before the signing of the armistice the French wireless station in Shanghai got in touch with the Lyons wireless station and received French communiques daily. These were handed to Reuters for distribution to the English - language press and were translated into Chinese by the French consulate and sent out to a list of about thirty Chinese papers.

For reasons that must be obvious, Allied propaganda had failed when we entered the field. Our first approach was through Dr. Paul Reinsch, our Minister in Peking, one of the five or six members of the diplomatic service that gave the Committee unfailing assistance instead of enmity and sabotage. Through his arrangement, our wireless service was taken out of the air by the legation station in Peking, and was also intercepted at Shanghai by the French municipal wireless station. In both places the service was handed to Reuters for distribution, but we soon discovered that this distribution was anything but adequate. Mr. Carl Crow, a brilliant correspondent and a man who knew China and the Chinese intimately and sympathetically, was soon appointed to be the Committee's commissioner, and these excerpts from his report tell the story of his conquest of the problem.

After a survey of the situation and consultation with a number of Americans we came to the conclusion (1) that Reuters, because of its attitude toward American news and its indifference to the Chinese press, could not be depended on to give the American wireless news any wide distribution; (2) that while the publication of the American news in the English-language press of the Far East is of comparatively little importance, it is of the very greatest importance that it be published in Chinese newspapers; (3) that there was no existing agency for the distribution of the news to the Chinese press and that one must be created.

In carrying out the above program a company of American business and professional men organized the Chinese-American News Agency (Oriental News Agency) for work with the Chinese press. In the mean time I engaged a staff of translators and trained them to the very difficult work of preparing translations of American war news which would be intelligible to the average newspaper reader. In due time the news agency began sending out its daily report, which included the American wireless news, special articles, Chinese news, etc. The report went to more than three hundred Chinese papers and was published in part in practically all of them. There was no other news agency of a national character in China and this agency developed into an organization occupying the Chinese field as fully as the Associated Press occupies the field at home. The only aid given the agency by the Committee on Public Information was to supply it with the translations for distribution to the newspapers and to pay it for the performance of specific functions (distribution of pictures, presidential addresses, etc.) which the agency could perform economically. In working out the above plans I was in close co-operation with Doctor Reinsch and Mr. J. B. Powell, with whom I consulted regarding every phase of my work.

In order to distribute literature and collect information about Chinese in the interior it was necessary to secure the co-operation of a number of volunteer agents. These were secured, about four hundred in number, from the ranks of the American missionaries, teachers, and Standard Oil employees. These men undertook their work with great enthusiasm and constituted an active body of agents of tremendous value. It would have been impossible for any other country to organize a body of this sort because no other country was so ably represented in the interior of China.

Through the courtesy of the Standard Oil Company, the British-American Tobacco Company, the Singer Sewing Machine Company, and other American concerns in China, we had at our disposal several thousand stations where pictures and posters could be displayed. These stations were the sales agencies of the above concerns in almost every town and village in the country, exceptionally well located on busy streets where pictures received the greatest possible attention.

I collected the principal addresses of President Wilson and gave them to the Commercial Press, a large Chinese publishing-house, with the suggestion that they bring out a Chinese edition. This was published, and the first edition was all sold out in two weeks, compelling a second edition. This volume became the best seller in China, and the Commercial Press is pushing the sale of the book to Chinese schools.

As a means of promptly reaching the ruling class in China, it was decided to compile a mailing-list, which would comprise the names of the real Chinese leaders of thought in each community. The help of the volunteer agents mentioned above was enlisted and the work of compiling the list went forward rapidly. I included the names and addresses of all members of the Provincial Assembly, all members of the Chamber of Commerce, all officials of or above the rank of magistrate, and all Chinese scholars. In the end we had the most valuable mailing-list in China, consisting of about twenty-five thousand names. As far as funds at our disposal permitted, I sent to each name on this list a copy of President Wilson's addresses.

It will be noted that the program of work outlined above contemplated propaganda among the ruling classes. It did not take into consideration the student classes, because funds were not sufficient for work in both. The students are more easily reached and influenced, and if it were possible to plan and carry out a program to extend over a period of years, great good would result from it in the future. The most obvious and direct way of reaching the students would be by distribution of literature in both English and Chinese to mission and government schools. There are great possibilities in a sustained program among the students. The text-book publishing industry is at present undeveloped and it would be possible to secure the use in Chinese schools of text-books planned and edited by Americans. This would not involve any expenditures for publication, as the books would be published and their use developed by Chinese publishing-houses. Some American university should send a man to China for several years to make a study of this situation. He should be supplied with funds enough to enable him to organize a translation bureau. The result of his studies would doubtless disclose many ways in which America can be of benefit to China in developing her educational system. Several American text-book companies have interested themselves in this field, but chiefly as a market for English text-books.

Japan, strangely enough, presented few problems. In the first place, Ambassador Morris put his personal and official influence behind the Committee at the very outset and drove through an arrangement that worked splendidly. The daily Compub service was turned over to the Kokusai, the official Japanese news agency, for translation and distribution to the Japanese press. A clipping bureau maintained a constant check on the operation and never at any time did we have cause to complain, either as to the distribution itself or with respect to the manner in which the Japanese newspapers printed it.

In the matter of films, we found that the Universal Company had built up a good Oriental business, and the Ambassador entered into a working agreement with its representative, Mr. Cochran, that gave us the services of an established organization. Mr. Cochran gave generously of his titne and effort and the Committee's pictures became feature attractions in the provinces as well as in the cities.