Chieu Hoi and Radio Hanoi:both sides' propaganda aimed at the other side's soldiers in Vietnam

President Johnson's Gulf of Tonkin 'Midnight Address', White House Photo Office, 1964. Public domain.

Card-stacking in the same war, on the other side of the microphone. On 4 August 1964, President Johnson told Americans that a second attack in the Gulf of Tonkin had taken place, backed by intercepts that the National Security Agency's own historian later found had been selected and presented as confirmation. Radio Hanoi's casualty lists aimed the same method at American soldiers instead of American voters. There are differences. Johnson's address announced air strikes and led to a congressional resolution. The English-language programme, covered on Hanoi Hannah (Trịnh Thị Ngọ) and Radio Hanoi's English broadcasts, was radio, and this page does not measure its effect. The second Tonkin attack did not happen, while the names Radio Hanoi read belonged to real dead. For testimonial, see also Pershing Says: The S.O.S. Shares the Success With Us, where a commander's name, not a rallier's face, is the proof.

• U.S. and Saigon officials. RAND's 1973 report calls Chieu Hoi "one of the most cost-effective programs in the pacification effort". JUSPAO rated the multilingual safe-conduct pass the most effective single item, according to the figures and assessments Friedman quotes.
• An inside critic. Zorthian, JUSPAO's director, said in 1988 that there was "probably too much dependence" on "counting effectiveness in the millions of leaflets we dropped rather than the substance". He named "the return of Chieu Hois" as one measurement, and said of counts of leaflets dropped and film showings: "those obviously are just statistics and don't tell you what people are thinking."
• The data-quality debate. The 194,000 figure counts people processed as ralliers, not proven enemy fighters. A U.S. Army Command and General Staff College thesis (DeMure) cites analysts' estimates that in the peak years only about a fifth of recorded defectors were genuine. On this view, the rest were people seeking respite, rewards or cover, and some were infiltrators. Other assessments, including RAND's, count the programme a success. Both positions are on the record; the true share is not established.
• Hanoi's side. The English-language service, the announcer U.S. troops called Hanoi Hannah, and what the obituaries say about her scripts are on Hanoi Hannah (Trịnh Thị Ngọ) and Radio Hanoi's English broadcasts. Voice of Vietnam announced her death. This page does not restate that record.
• What is not shown. Any measured effect of Radio Hanoi on U.S. morale; how many of the loudspeaker broadcasts led to defections, which Operation Wandering Soul and Ghost Tape Number Ten also does not total; and whether the individual claims on the Chieu Hoi posters were true. This page makes no finding on the war itself.

The same definitions were applied to both sides. A named rallier's quote on a Saigon poster and a captured pilot's statement on Hanoi radio are both testimonial. "Nowhere to hide" from the U.S. Army and "die or be maimed" from Radio Hanoi are both fear appeals. A running count of ralliers is bandwagon whoever prints it. If Armed Forces Radio had read out only North Vietnamese dead and Hanoi's internal dissent, it would be card-stacking too.

What differs is scale and conditions. The U.S. and Saigon side printed leaflets by the billion. Hanoi's English service was a few half-hour programmes a day. Ralliers came in at least nominally by choice and were paid allowances, which one poster lists: 24 piastres a day for food, 200 a month, 500 to go home. The POW statements were taken from men in captivity, and one was used to report torture.